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Abstract
Carnap and the Ontology of Mathematics
Benjamin Marschall
In this thesis I investigate Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. Most
philosophers assume that the nature of mathematics raises deep philosophical
questions, which call for theories about how we manage to know about and
interact with abstract objects. Carnap’s position, in contrast, is deflationary:
he aims to show that we can take mathematics at face value without having
to answer questions about the metaphysical status of mathematical objects. If
Carnap is right, there is thus no need for a philosophy of mathematics as it is
usually understood at all. The main argument of my thesis is that Carnap’s
position is unstable, since his own commitments force him to make at least some
ontological assumptions about syntax, i.e. entities such as letters, strings, and
proofs.
My claim that Carnap needs to accept some ontological questions as being
in good shape goes against the received view in the secondary literature. Since
the late 1980s interest in Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics has been growing,
mostly in the wake of important papers by Michael Friedman, Warren Goldfarb,
and Thomas Ricketts. These and other scholars have forcefully defended Car-
nap against objections by, among others, Kurt Gödel, W. V. Quine, and Hilary
Putnam. The most powerful challenge to Carnap’s view, however, can actually
be found in a less well-known paper by the logician E. W. Beth. The core of
my thesis is thus a new interpretation of what I call Beth’s argument from non-
standard models, which relies on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and targets
Carnap’s claim that mathematics is analytic. I show that my reconstruction of
Beth’s argument is more charitable to the text than competing interpretations
in the secondary literature, and argue that it is also more powerful since extant
defences of Carnap cannot be applied.
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Gödel: With indefinite concepts theology begins! ?!
He later says: he means thereby that in mutual communication one always
needs to start from the definite. But of course he wants to use indefinite
concepts too. (Carnap, note from July 1933, quoted from Köhler 2002: 123)
In this thesis I investigate Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. Carnap
claims that his account can vindicate classical mathematics, and hence makes
revisionary projects like intuitionism or nominalism unnecessary, without com-
mitting him to any contentious metaphysical assumptions. My focus will be
on the question whether Carnap’s response to Gödel’s incompleteness results
is satisfactory, and I will argue for a negative answer. Carnap either needs to
accept some ontological questions as meaningful and factual, or has to endorse a
revisionary conception of mathematics after all.
One might wonder why an investigation as detailed as this one is needed
in the first place. Of course to this day there is little consensus on which ap-
proach to the philosophy of mathematics is the most fruitful. One thing that
does seem to be commonly accepted, however, is that the account Carnap de-
velops in his Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap 1937a) is not a contender that
needs to be taken very seriously. It would for instance be odd for someone
to teach an introductory course into the philosophy of mathematics without
mentioning Hilbert’s formalism or Frege’s logicism, but in my experience few
people would expect extended discussions of Carnap’s approach. The implicit
assumption seems to be that Quine’s arguments against logical conventionalism
and analyticity (Quine 1949, Quine 1951) – and maybe also Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorems – conclusively establish that Carnap’s approach is fundamentally
flawed.1
1 Øystein Linnebo’s introductory textbook in the philosophy of mathematics from 2017 does
not mention Carnap once (Linnebo 2020a), for instance, and neither does Mark Colyvan’s
textbook from 2012 (Colyvan 2012). Things have not always been this way, however: the 1983
second edition of Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam’s influential selection of articles on
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A very different picture emerges, however, if one spends some time studying
the scholarly work that has been done on Carnap since the late 1980s, pioneered
by Michael Friedman, Richard Creath, Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts,
and continued by, among others, Gary Ebbs, Steve Awodey, André Carus, and
Gregory Lavers.2 By now there is a large number of articles which defend the
coherence of Carnap’s account of mathematics against numerous objections, in-
cluding the most influential ones by Quine and Gödel. A keen reader of this
literature will thus be tempted to ask why, given the apparent attractiveness
of Carnap’s view, not everyone is a Carnapian. In other words, the continued
existence of foundational disputes about the nature of mathematics will seem
puzzling if these scholars are on the right track.
My main argument goes against this latter-day trend, as I want to show
that there are some serious problems with Carnap’s position. This is not to
say that the scholarly work I alluded to is misguided, however. As we will
see throughout the thesis, Carnap can actually give convincing responses to
a number of arguments commonly thought to be damaging, and hence those
who argue that Carnap’s position is defensible are largely on the right track. I
will show, however, that there is a less well-known objection whose force has
been underestimated by friends and enemies of Carnap so far: namely E. W.
Beth’s argument from non-standard models (Beth 1963). The core of the thesis
is consequently a novel reconstruction of Beth’s argument, to which, so I will
argue, extant defences of Carnap do not apply.3
Methodologically speaking, the biggest challenge for my project is to present
an argument that actually poses a problem for Carnap, and not merely a straw
man who superficially resembles him. This worry is salient since the Carnap-
scholars I mentioned have convincingly shown that many anti-Carnapian ar-
guments miss their intended target, by ascribing views to Carnap he did not
the philosophy of mathematics still contains two paper’s by Carnap (including ”Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology”), as well as Quine’s paper ”Carnap and Logical Truth” (Benacer-
raf and Putnam 1983). Stewart Shapiro also has a section on Carnap in his Thinking about
Mathematics from 2000 (Shapiro 2000: section 5.3).
2 Some of the key works are Friedman 1999a, Creath 1990, Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992, Ricketts
1994, Friedman 1999b, Ebbs 1997, Awodey and Carus 2004, Lavers 2008, and I will discuss
many other papers in what follows. Another important figure is Alan Richardson (Richard-
son 1994), whose work, however, tends to concentrate on Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der
Welt rather than his philosophy of logic and mathematics (Richardson 1997).
3 I am aware of two other PhD theses written on Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics in the
last ten years: Doyle 2013 and Friedman-Biglin 2015, which, broadly speaking, defend rather
than attack Carnap’s position. Friedman-Biglin develops a new version of the established
responses to Gödel’s arguments against Carnap, but does not discuss Beth. And while Doyle
attacks the deflationary reading of Carnap associated with Goldfarb and Ricketts, he does
not think that Beth’s argument is a deep challenge.
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himself hold. The consensus that has been emerging in the literature is that Car-
nap’s overall position is a deflationary one, meaning that Carnap is not interested
in even addressing many of the questions that other philosophers have meant to
answer.
I will argue that there are good reasons to think that Beth’s argument, as I
interpret it, succeeds as an objection to Carnap’s actual position. The exegetical
situation is not straightforward, however. There certainly are passages which
suggest that Carnap’s deflationism is so radical that he does not have to worry
about Beth’s argument either. I will present some new and previously unpub-
lished textual evidence that speaks against such an interpretation, however, and
furthermore argue that a radically deflationary reading of Carnap is also hard to
swallow on systematic grounds. This will probably not convince everyone, but
I hope that even those who still want to side with Carnap will agree that, as is
demonstrated by Beth, Carnap’s approach of dealing with Gödel’s incomplete-
ness results requires far more attention than has been recognised so far.
I will briefly summarise the structure of the thesis, which is divided into
three parts. The chapters in part I introduce Carnap’s position in the philosophy
of mathematics, which I call internal Platonism.4 Chapter one outlines the crucial
notion of a linguistic framework, and explains the role analyticity plays in the
overall account. I also discuss to what extent Carnap’s position is a form of lin-
guistic conventionalism. In chapter two I describe Carnap’s reaction to Gödel’s
incompleteness results, which involves using non-recursive rules to define ’ana-
lytic’ for mathematical discourse. I then discuss an argument against Carnap’s
position put forward by Gödel himself, and show that it is uncertain how dam-
aging Gödel’s objection really is. The short chapter three concludes this part by
briefly discussing Quine’s famous rejection of the analytic/synthetic-distinction,
as this will be helpful to appreciate how Beth’s argument differs from more
familiar concerns about analyticity.
In part II I then present my reading of Beth’s argument from non-standard mod-
els, and argue that it is both more damaging to Carnap and more charitable to
Beth than alternative interpretations found in the secondary literature. In chap-
ter four I explain why, on my reading, Beth’s argument can be used to criticise
two of the main tenets of Carnap’s account: the principle of tolerance, according to
which choosing between different systems of logic is a purely pragmatic ques-
tion, and the internalist thesis that one can quantify over abstract objects without
any metaphysical commitments. The overall result is that these two theses need
4 This position is distinct from the internal platonism about set theory of Potter 2004: 40.
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to be restricted, and thus Carnap is pushed into accepting at least some ontolog-
ical questions as being meaningful and factual. Unfortunately Beth’s paper is at
times unclear and misleading, and it is therefore no wonder that commentators
have interpreted his argument in various ways. In chapter five I survey the ex-
tant secondary literature and argue that my interpretation is preferable overall.
In chapter six I respond to the worry that Beth merely attacks a straw man rather
than Carnap’s actual position. I argue that this is implausible, since deflationary
readings of Carnap that immunise him against Beth’s objection would make his
position collapse into a form of Wittgenstein’s radical conventionalism.
Part III looks beyond the position of Logical Syntax in different ways. In chap-
ter seven I briefly discuss a number of contemporary and historically influential
views in the philosophy of mathematics, including Frege’s logicism, in order to
see whether they face the problem Beth diagnosed as well. We will see that,
in one way or other, these authors all need to rely on something like external
mathematical facts or assumptions about what the one true logic is, and that
hence Carnap cannot easily follow their example. Chapter eight revisits Quine,
and contains a more detailed discussion of his positive views on truth in math-
ematics. Since Quine shares many of Carnap’s convictions, such as empiricism
and a broadly behaviouristic view of language, it is natural to expect that he
will run into analogous problems. Against this I argue that Quine’s attempt to
make a mathematical ontology compatible with empiricism without relying on
analyticity, while controversial in many ways, is not threatened by Beth’s ob-
jection. Chapter nine finally leaves pure mathematics behind and investigates
whether Beth’s point teaches us anything about Carnap’s account of ontology
more broadly, including the ontology of the empirical world. I show that this is
indeed so, since the core of the problem is Carnap’s lack of interest in the role of
natural language.
I conclude the thesis by briefly discussing how those sympathetic to Carnap’s
overall philosophical outlook should proceed. I distinguish between four broad






It is convenient to have a label for Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, and I
will therefore call his view internalism. In this chapter I introduce Carnap’s in-
ternalism as it is presented in his Logical Syntax of Language and ”Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology”. In the first half we will see that, from a contempo-
rary perspective, it is tempting to classify Carnap as a mathematical Platonist,
and then consider how the notion of a linguistic framework makes internalism
distinctive. This theme is then continued in the second half, where I begin to
explain what role the notion of analyticity plays in Carnap’s philosophy. The
chapter ends with a discussion of whether internalism is a form of linguistic
conventionalism, a question we will also come back to in later chapters.
1.1 Platonism and Frameworks
1.1.1 Who’s a Platonist?
In his paper ”On What There Is” from 1948, Quine enumerates a number of
”latter-day Platonists”, and includes Carnap on this list (Quine 1948: 33).1 This is
somewhat surprising, for Platonism in mathematics is usually regarded as a po-
sition that comes with metaphysical commitments – whereas Carnap is known
to as the arch-enemy of metaphysics. But things are not quite as simple. Car-
nap’s most polemical anti-metaphysical writings are from the late 1920s and
early 1930s (Carnap 1928, Carnap 1931), but if one looks into some of his works
from the 1950s one can easily feel as if one is reading a paper by a contemporary
metaphysician:
1 In the reprint from 1953 Quine has removed this label from the paper, and Carnap is merely
classified as a logicist (Quine 1953: 14).
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The term ”concept” will be used here as a common designation for
properties, relations, and similar entities For this term it is especially
important to stress the fact that it is not to be understood in a mental
sense, [...] but rather [as referring] to something objective that is
found in nature and that is expressed in language by a designator of
nonsentential form. (Carnap 1956b: 21)
The fact that no references to mental conditions occur in existential
statements [...] shows that propositions are not mental entities. Fur-
ther, a statement of the existence of linguistic entities [...] must con-
tain a reference to a language. The fact that no such reference occurs
in the existential statements here, shows that propositions are not
linguistic entities. The fact that in these statements no reference to
a subject [...] shows that the propositions (and their properties, like
necessity, etc.) are not subjective. (Carnap 1956a: 210f)
Did Carnap undergo a radical change of view in the intervening years? Some,
including his close companion Otto Neurath, in fact thought so. Until the mid-
1930s Carnap assumed that the rejection of metaphysical speculation also re-
quired one to reject semantic notions such as ’truth’ and ’reference’ altogether.
In Logical Syntax, Carnap was still adamant that statements involving word-
world relations – such as designation – are only admissible if understood in a
loose sense, and should strictly speaking be replaced by meta-linguistic state-
ments. The claim that the word ’daystar’ designates the sun, for instance, is to
be construed as follows:
The word ’daystar’ is synonymous with the word ’sun’. (Carnap
1937a: 289).2
Carnap changed his mind about the so-called doctrine of pseudo-object sentences
after becoming acquainted with Tarski’s theory of truth (Carnap 1963a: 60).3 In
”The Foundations of Logic and Mathematics” from 1939, he is happy to describe
formal systems with straightforwardly semantic rules, such as
2 The use of synonymy – an intensional notion – may seem inappropriate in an account of the
extensional notion of designation. In the context of this passage Carnap assumes that, at least
for names, meaning and designation amount to the same thing.
3 In Logical Syntax Carnap objects to the notions of truth and falsehood on the grounds that
they are ”not proper syntactical properties” (Carnap 1937a: 216). It is actually quite difficult
to understand why exactly Tarski’s theory of truth convinced Carnap to change his position,
for discussion see Ricketts 1996.
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’mond’ designates the moon (Carnap 1939: 9)
And since Carnap’s languages also contain words for numbers, it was only nat-
ural that he also came to accept statements such as
’Five’ designates a number. (Carnap 1956a: 217)
Neurath died in 1945, but he reacted strongly and negatively even to Carnap’s
initial acceptance of semantics. After reading Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics
from 1942, he wrote a letter with the following remark:
Your Semantics copy did not arrive, I therefore tried to get one for a
few days. I am just looking through the main chapters, particularly
the chapters, you mentioned in your letter. I am really depressed to
see here all the Aristotelian metaphysics in full glint and glamour,
bewitching my dear fried Carnap through and through. (Neurath,
Letter to Carnap from January 15, 1943 (Cat and Tuboly 2019: 570))
Neurath thus believed that by accepting semantics, Carnap had once again made
the door for doing metaphysics wide open. The rest of Neurath’s letter suggests
that he thought that, once we allow word-world relations such as reference to
count as meaningful, we end up being committed to a version of the corre-
spondence theory of truth, according to which language is in the business of
matching a structure reality has in itself. No doubt he would also have been
worried by Carnap’s assertion that ’five’ designates a number, for that seems to
commit us to a realm of abstract mathematical entities.
As we will see later, Neurath’s interpretation of Carnap is largely mistaken.
But his concerns are certainly understandable, for it is very tempting to describe
Carnap’s mature positions in terms that suggest certain metaphysical commit-
ments. Herbert G. Bohnert, who was a student of Carnap, for instance charac-
terises Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics as follows:
Gödel’s platonism has often been said to be informally epitomized
by his reference to ”some well-determined reality, in which Cantor’s
(continuum) conjecture must be either true or false”. But Carnap’s
platonism, was in a sense more extreme than Gödel. Abstract entities
of every consistently imaginable (or unimaginable) sort existed, and
every consistent set of axioms had many interpretations in the realm
of abstract entities. (Bohnert 1975: 204f)
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Carnap’s attitude towards the abstract seems to have confused even some of his
colleagues and students. In 1959, for instance, Carnap gave a talk about his
treatment of theoretical terms in science at the Pacific APA.4 In the discussion
afterwards, Richard Montague and David Kaplan both asked questions about
the background assumptions Carnap requires, in particular the need for higher-
order logic and set theory with the axiom of infinity. They sound worried about
these potentially controversial ontological commitments, but Carnap merely re-
sponds that ‘’you need a lot of assumptions, of course”.5
In a way Platonism is actually quite a good description of Carnap’s position.
For at least since Quine’s work on ontology, it is common to identify Platonism
with a willingness to quantify over numbers and sets, and Carnap was certainly
happy to do that. Unlike Quine and Goodman he did not have much of an inter-
est in trying to construct nominalist languages.6 And he also always preferred to
use classical logic and mathematics, having little sympathy for the philosophical
motivations underlying constructivist approaches to mathematics. So it is quite
appropriate to say that Carnap talks like a Platonist.
The crucial question then becomes whether talking like a Platonist is possible
without any of the metaphysical commitments that have made nominalist or
constructivist alternatives attractive to philosophers. As we will see in the next
sections, the goal of Carnap’s internalist program is to answer this question
in the affirmative. Understanding how this is supposed to work exactly, and
assessing whether his strategy does in fact work, will then occupy us for the rest
of the thesis. Before we start it will be instructive to look at some senses in which
Carnap rejects Platonism, however.
In his ”Empiricism and Abstract Entities”, which was a contribution to the
volume on Carnap’s philosophy edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, Wilfrid Sellars
raises an objection that is similar to Neurath’s worries: Sellars thinks that once
we allow reference-relations to obtain between numerals and numbers, we are
committed to some sort of Platonic heaven (Sellars 1963). Carnap finds this
objection unconvincing, for reasons that will become clearer later. What is espe-
cially helpful about his reply is that it reveals how Carnap himself conceived of
4 The talk can be found online (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7ebOwmCAqE) and has
been transcribed by Stathis Psillos (Psillos 2000b). This transcription does not include the
brief discussion after the talk, however.
5 There is a transcript of the discussion in the Carnap Papers at the University of Pitts-
burgh (https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061846840/
viewer#page/50/mode/2up).
6 Alspector-Kelly 2001 in fact argues that ”Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” was a reac-
tion to Goodman and Quine’s ”Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism” (Goodman and
Quine 1947).
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Platonism:
Relations of the causal type can indeed hold only among physical
objects (or states or processes), not between a physical object and
an abstract entity. It seems typical of Platonism, which both Sell-
ars and I reject, that it speaks of relations of this causal type (called
”commerce” or ”intercourse” or the like) as holding between physi-
cal objects (or persons or minds) and abstract entities. (Carnap 1963b:
924f)
Carnap’s assumption that Platonists typically believe in causal relations between
persons and abstract objects seems rather questionable – indeed it is not so obvi-
ous whether any 20th century Platonist really endorsed such a bold hypothesis.7
But it is useful to know that Carnap made this assumption, for it makes clear in
what sense he took himself to reject Platonism: while he was happy to say that
numerals refer to numbers, he denies that causal relations obtain between these
entities.
The rejection of causal links to numbers is not the only metaphysical thesis
about mathematics Carnap denies. As I already mentioned Carnap is happy
to quantify over numbers, and thus counts as a Platonist by the standards of
Quinean ontology. In principle Carnap has nothing against this classification
either, but he is unhappy with the connotations the term ’ontology’ brings:
I should prefer not to use the word ’ontology’ for the recognition of
entities by the admission of variables. This use seems to me to be at
least misleading; it might be understood as implying that the deci-
sion to use certain kinds of variables must be based on ontological,
metaphysical convictions. (Carnap 1956b: 43)
What is important to Carnap here is that there is no need to justify one’s decision
to quantify over abstract entities in any way. We will see why Carnap’s holds
this later on, but can already note that this attitude distinguishes him from other
Platonists. For it is very natural to think that we should accept a theory that
quantifies over numbers because there are numbers, and if we fail to do so we miss
out on an aspect of reality. William Tait vividly describes a version of Platonism
which fits the latter idea:
7 Gödel’s position is usually taken to be the ’most gung-ho version of platonism imaginable’
(Potter 2001: 331), but as Potter shows it is doubtful whether Gödel actually wanted to explain
mathematical knowledge by invoking a mysterious quasi-perceptual faculty of mathematical
intuition.
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[...] mathematical practice takes place in an object language. But
this practice needs to be explained. In other words, the object lan-
guage has to be interpreted. The Platonist’s way to interpret it is by
Tarski’s truth definition which interprets it as being about a model
– a Model-in-the-Sky – which somehow exists independently of our
mathematical practice and serves to adjudicate its correctness. (Tait
1986: 348)
On such a picture, the Model-in-the-Sky serves as a theory- and language-
independent arbiter of mathematical truth, and could for instance be invoked
in order to justify the acceptance of certain axioms over others as objectively
correct. This is a way to think about mathematical objects that is diametrically
opposed to Carnap’s position, as we will soon be able to appreciate. For dialec-
tical purposes it is useful to keep this alternative view in mind, however, and in
the course of this thesis I will refer back to it from time to time. It is therefore
convenient to label this position Model-in-the-Sky or external Platonism. With
this background in mind let us now look at Carnap’s internalist alternative.
1.1.2 Linguistic Frameworks
”Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (ESO) starts with the following obser-
vation:
Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind
of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propo-
sitions, etc. They usually feel much more in sympathy with nomi-
nalists than with realists. [... On the other hand, the empiricist will
probably] just speak about all these things like anybody else but with
an uneasy conscience, like a man who in his everyday life does with
qualms many things which are not in accord with the high moral
principles he professes on Sundays. (Carnap 1956a: 205f)
The aim of ESO is thus to relieve empiricists of their guilty conscience and allow
them to overcome their nominalistic scruples, by showing that using a Platonistic
language ”does not imply embracing a Platonic ontology but is perfectly com-
patible with empiricism and strictly scientific thinking” (Carnap 1956a: 206). If
successful the account of ESO should thus be able to elucidate the question that
arose in the previous section: namely why Carnap thinks that he can talk like a
11
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Platonist without embracing metaphysics. And from a purely systematic stand-
point this project is of great interest as well, since in contemporary philosophy
quantifying over abstract objects is usually regarded as much more controversial
than Carnap makes it out to be.
Carnap proceeds by relying on the notion of a linguistic framework, which he
introduces as follows:
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of en-
tities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject
to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a lin-
guistic framework for the new entities in question. And now we must
distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of
the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework;
we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the
existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external
questions. (Carnap 1956a: 206)
There has been an extensive debate about the nature of Carnapian frameworks,
but it is widely accepted that they are best understood as (fragments of) lan-
guages, which differ from natural language primarily in that they come with
explicitly formulated linguistic rules.8 What Carnap means by linguistic rules,
however, is not straightforward. For expository purposes it is convenient to
regard a framework as a formal theory with axioms and inference rules, even
though we will see in the next chapter that Carnap actually has a broader un-
derstanding of what frameworks and their rules are.
Based on the notion of a linguistic framework Carnap then introduces the
distinction between internal and external questions. By an internal question he
means a question about whether some statement, such as ”there are numbers”
is true in a particular linguistic framework – i.e. given the axioms and inference
rules the framework provides. External questions are more problematic, since
here Carnap distinguishes two readings. In the quote above, Carnap says that
they concern the reality of the system as a whole. What he has in mind is that
external questions are not about whether some sentence is true given the frame-
work, but instead concern whether the framework itself is true or false. One
can read this as asking whether the axioms and inference rules provided by the
8 For more on the nature of Carnapian frameworks see Broughton forthcoming. Eklund 2013
considers an alternative to the standard reading which construes Carnap as a relativist, and
according to Flocke 2020 and Kraut 2020 Carnap should be understood as a non-cognitivist
about ontology.
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framework are correct, where correctness is understood in an objective sense. For
the Model-in-the-Sky Platonist I introduced earlier, for instance, the relevant ex-
ternal question would be whether some framework we have constructed is such
that the Model-in-the-Sky makes its axioms true and its rules truth-preserving –
hence my suggestion to call this view external Platonism.
Call external questions of this kind factual external questions, since they pre-
suppose that there are objective standards by which frameworks as a whole can
be judged to be correct or incorrect, or at least better or worse. One crucial
claim of ESO is that there is something defective about factual external questions,
although Carnap is somewhat ambiguous about the nature of this defect. At
some points he calls them ”pseudo-statement without cognitive content” (Car-
nap 1956a: 214), which suggests that he regards them as meaningless. Another
passage about an imagined dispute between a metaphysical Platonist and a nom-
inalist sounds less damning:
I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as rel-
evant by both philosophers, and therefore, if actually found, would
decide the controversy or at least make one of the opposite theses
more probable than the other. [...] Therefore I feel compelled to re-
gard the external question as a pseudo-question, until both parties
to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question as a
cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evi-
dence regarded as relevant by both sides. (Carnap 1956a: 219)
Here the problem seems to be not that external questions are literally meaning-
less, but rather that they are unanswerable, since we have no clue what counts as
evidence for or against a particular answer.9
A second kind of external question are pragmatic external questions. Like fac-
tual external questions they concern frameworks as a whole, but instead of ask-
ing whether a framework is true or correct they concern whether it is useful for
some practical purpose. Carnap thinks that there is nothing wrong with such
questions, since there is obviously a sense in which it is better to adopt a frame-
work which includes mathematics if we are interested in conducting calculations
than to use one without. So there can be comparisons between frameworks, but,
Carnap stresses, the choice of a framework can never be wrong but merely in-
9 See Bradley 2018 for a reading of ESO that stresses the epistemological aspects of Carnap’s
critique of metaphysics. A contemporary view according to which metaphysical questions
are meaningful but unanswerable can be found in Bennett 2009.
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convenient.10
This is a good moment to address an issue that will likely occur to anyone
with some background knowledge of logical empiricism and the Vienna Cir-
cle. Carnap is known to have endorsed a verificationist theory of meaning, and
even though he became more liberal as time went on, he continued to endorse
a form of empiricism that has few adherents nowadays. This raises the ques-
tion whether Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics depends on his verificationism
and empiricism, or whether his position is relatively independent of these other
commitments.
Some philosophers have had strong opinions concerning this matter. Car-
nap’s rejection of factual external questions is not an innovation of ESO, but can
already be found in Logical Syntax. Carnap had not yet adopted the terminol-
ogy of frameworks and internal/external questions, but the thought that there
is no objectively correct system of logic, and hence no need to provide epistemic
reasons for the adoption of such a system, is expressed very forcefully:
The fact that no attempts have been made to venture still further
from the classical forms [of logic and mathematics] is perhaps due
to the widely held opinion that any such deviation must be justified
– that is, that the new language-form must be proved to be ’correct’
and to constitute a faithful rendering of ’the true logic’. To eliminate
this standpoint, together with the pseudo-problems and wearisome
controversies which arise as a result of it, is one of the chief tasks of
this book. (Carnap 1937a: xiv-xv)
Principle of Tolerance: It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to
arrive at conventions. [...] In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at
liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he
wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it,
he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead
of philosophical arguments. (Carnap 1937a: 51-52)
The so-called principle of tolerance has been widely discussed, and we will look
at it in much more detail in chapter 4. What is worth considering now is that
Hilary Putnam has claimed that Carnapian tolerance is not only is a consequence
of the verification principle, but even identical to it:
10 This of course raises the question in which (if any) framework the comparison between frame-
works is supposed to proceed. For some illuminating discussions see Steinberger 2016 and
Carus 2017.
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However, this principle of tolerance, as Carnap called it, presupposes
the verification principle. For the doctrine that no rational reconstruc-
tion is uniquely correct or corresponds to the way things ’really are’,
the doctrine that all ’external questions’ are without cognitive sense,
is just the verification principle. (Putnam 1983: 191n)
I think that there is some truth in Putnam’s claim. For Carnap needs to deny
that we can make sense of the idea that a Model-in-the-Sky determines which
framework is objectively correct, or at least he needs to say that we have no
conception of what would count as evidence in favour or against such a hypoth-
esis. And it seems that any argument to such a conclusion needs to make some
broadly empiricist assumptions, such as that all evidence is empirical evidence
we get through our senses, and that there is no special faculty of mathematical
intuition.11
We should, however, not be tempted to overemphasise the role of Carnap’s
empiricist commitments for his philosophy of mathematics. It would be mis-
taken to think, as Putnam’s remark may suggest, that anyone who rejects veri-
ficationism can with good conscience ignore Carnap’s project as refuted. To see
why it is useful to distinguish between the positive and the negative (or polem-
ical) aspects of Carnap’s position. The detailed reconstruction of the positive
view will occupy us for long stretches of this thesis, but at this point it can be
summed up as follows: according to Carnap we can make sense of mathematics
without relying on a Model-in-the-Sky, since only framework-internal resources
are needed in the end. And the success of this positive project is in principle
compatible with the mere existence of something like a Model-in-the-Sky, as long
as it doesn’t play a theoretical role in the account of mathematics.
Now it is clear from Carnap’s writings that he didn’t merely want to be
agnostic about whether there is a Model-in-the-Sky but deny that there is one,
and the way he supports this negative thesis does plausibly rely on empiricism.
But we should not spend too much time on this aspect of his view, for two
reasons: first, the positive project is of great interest regardless of whether we
also want to accept the negative thesis. Secondly, if the positive project actually
succeeds, we can even argue for the negative thesis in a way that does not rely
on empiricism, but on more innocuous considerations of theoretical economy.
For if it really were true that we can give an account of mathematics that doesn’t
rely on something like a Model-in-the-Sky, why suppose that such a thing exists
11 For more on the connection between Carnap’s views on ontology and his empiricist episte-
mology, see Alspector-Kelly 2001 and Wilson 2011.
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in the first place? This combination of views would be like accepting David
Lewis’s modal realism without having concrete possible worlds do any work in
one’s modal semantics, and could thus be set aside as a coherent but utterly
unmotivated package.
Since the main aim of this thesis is to understand and evaluate Carnap’s pos-
itive position, Carnap’s verificationism will consequently not play a major role
in the argumentation. Having settled this we can now continue the exposition
of Carnap’s internalism.
1.1.3 Internal Platonism
Even though Carnap himself does not use this terminology, it is apt to describe
the view he espouses in ESO as internal Platonism: he thinks that we we can
adopt a linguistic framework that is Platonistic since it allows us to quantify
over numbers, but since the quantified statements are internal they are free of
any problematic metaphysical commitments. The first step on the way to this
internal Platonism is the adoption of a framework that has rules and axioms to
talk about numbers:
The system of numbers. As an example of a system which is of a logical
rather than a factual nature let us take the system of natural num-
bers. The framework for this system is constructed by introducing
into the language new expressions with suitable rules: (1) numer-
als like ”five” and sentence forms like ”there are five books on the
table”; (2) the general term ”number” for the new entities, and sen-
tence forms like ”five is a number”; (3) expressions for properties of
numbers (e.g. ”odd,” ”prime”), relations (e.g., ”greater than”) and
functions (e.g. ”plus”), and sentence forms like ”two plus three is
five”; (4) numerical variables (”m,” ”n,” etc.) and quantifiers for uni-
versal sentences (”for every n . . . ”) and existential sentences (”there
is an n such that . . .”) with the customary deductive rules. (Carnap
1956a: 208)
Adopting such a framework settles the internal question of whether there are
numbers: since Carnap takes ”five is a number” to follow from the rules of
the framework, it is trivial that ”there is a number” is true in the framework.
The framework is hence Platonistic in the sense that it allows quantification over
numbers.
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We already saw some quotes in which Carnap went beyond saying that num-
bers and other abstract objects exist. In addition he for instance asserts that nu-
merals refer to numbers, and that numbers are mind-independent. Although these
sound like metaphysical claims at first sight, we can now see that for Carnap
such statements are actually innocent since they are merely consequences of yet
more linguistic rules.
I mentioned that by the time he wrote ESO, Carnap had accepted Tarski-
style semantics as a successful formal explication of the notions of truth and
reference. Consequently he is happy to use frameworks which include semantic
notions such as ’truth’ and ’refers’, provided that when constructing the relevant
framework we give rules for how to use these terms. If we set up a framework
for semantics in the right way, we should for instance be able to derive
’s’ designates s
for every singular term s. And if we have a combined framework which provides
rules for mathematics and semantics, we will then be able to derive the following:
(1) Five is a number.
(2) ’Five’ designates five.
Putting them together we then get the following claim, which appears to be a
metaphysical thesis, but in the current context is just a harmless consequence of
the rules for talking about numbers and reference:
(3) ’Five’ designates a number.
So not only can Carnapian frameworks be Platonist in the sense of quantifying
over numbers, they also allow us to say that numerals designate numbers.12
How about the claim that numbers, propositions, etc., are not subjective or
mental, but rather mind-independent entities? For Carnap such claims are also
consequences of the linguistic rules of a framework, albeit in a slightly more in-
direct way. The issue of mind-independence was already a matter of controversy
among the logical empiricists in the 1930s, and it is instructive to consider the
following passage in which Carnap discusses the claim that the existence and
behaviour of stars is independent of the existence of minds and people. In this
12 For a much more detailed exposition and defence of Carnap’s treatment of ontology in ESO
see Ebbs 2017a and Ebbs 2019. Ebbs addresses some issues I will not go into here, such as
Carnap’s surprising claim that some statements about the existence of physical objects are
analytic.
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example the predicate ’P3(t)’ means ”there are no living beings in the world
at time t”, and ’P2(t)’ roughly means something like ”the cosmos will be in a
specific state P2 at time t”:
(S5) P3(t0 + d) ⊃ P2(t0 + d)
S5 may be taken as a convenient formulation of the following sentence
discussed by Lewis and Schlick: ”If all living minds (or: living be-
ings) should disappear from the universe, the stars would still go on
in their courses”. [...] We have no well-confirmed predictions about
the existence or non-existence of organisms at the time t0 + d; but the
laws C of celestial mechanics are quite independent of this question. There-
fore, irrespective of its first part, S5 is confirmed to the same degree
as its second part, [...] and hence, as C. [...] Therefore I agree with the
following conclusion of Schlick concerning the sentence mentioned
above (though not with his reasoning): ”We are as sure of it as of
the best founded physical laws that science has discovered.” (Carnap
1937b: 37f, my emphasis)
The salient point Carnap makes is as follows: we are justified to maintain that
there is no connection between the existence of minds and the behaviour of plan-
ets, since the laws of celestial mechanics do not refer to human beings or their
minds anywhere. In this sense stars and planets are thus mind-independent
entities, unlike, presumably, social entities such as money or the state.
Understood in this way there is thus nothing objectionably metaphysical
about assertions of mind-independence, and this is also what Carnap wants
to stress when he describes properties and propositions as objective: the linguis-
tic rules for proposition-talk merely specify that propositions are entities that
are true or false, and, like the laws of celestial mechanics, do not invoke humans
anywhere. Once again metaphysical-sounding claims, when rightly understood,
boil down to mundane claims about linguistic rules.
Based on these clarifications we can now revisit the concerns Neurath and
Sellars had about Carnap’s acceptance of the reference relation. As I already
suggested their line of reasoning seemed to be as follows: the reference relation
is a word-world relation, hence if we accept that numerals refer to numbers we
must assume that reality contains a realm of abstract objects to refer to, and so we
immediately end up in metaphysical waters. Neurath was in general strongly
opposed to the idea that the world consists of objects in itself, independently
18
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of our means of representation, in the style of Kant’s noumena.13 To Carnap’s
dismay Neurath even went so far as to complain about the existential quantifier
for this reason:
You remember, I always have been full of mistrust, as far as Russell’s
Existence symbol was concerned, and Russell [...] is just extending
this start, which is closely related to your and Tarski’s and Aristote-
les’ start: THERE EXIST SOMETHING IN ITSELF, this statement I
thought is in a language not acknowledged by us (?) or by me (sure).
(Neurath, Letter to Carnap from January 15, 1943 (Cat and Tuboly
2019: 571))
I think that Carnap can easily defuse this kind of worry though. He should
agree that the reference relation is a world-word relation, but deny that this im-
mediately leads to a commitment to anything like Kantian things in themselves.
What Neurath (and also Sellars) fail to appreciate is that for Carnap semantics is
just another linguistic framework like any other, and hence claims about words
referring to objects are simply consequences of disquotation principles that are
part of the linguistic rules governing ’refers’ talk. A framework for semantics
will typically include a rule that allows one to derive
’n’ refers to n
for any singular term n.14 Since numerals are singular terms, the conclusion
that they refer to objects thus immediately follows. One might therefore reject
semantics as unnecessary or impractical, but it cannot sensibly be dismissed as
metaphysical, since, thanks to Tarski, there are clear and explicit rules for the
use of semantic terms.15
For other philosophers the reference relation has a much more fundamental
role: it is supposed to explain how language makes contact with reality in the
13 See Stang 2016: section 6 for an overview.
14 Carnap himself never considers the possibility of empty names, for such cases different dis-
quotation principles would be needed.
15 This internalist approach to truth and reference is central to Carnap’s position, but it is
difficult to formulate and hence easily misunderstood. Goldfarb and Ricketts for instance
tend to describe Carnap as rejecting a “language-transcendent notion of empirical fact” and
holding that “it is only given the apparatus of a linguistic framework that we can formulate
the notion of the realm of empirical facts” (Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992: 65, see also Ricketts
1994). As Matti Eklund points out, it is tempting to misread this as amounting to no more
than the trivial claim that we cannot talk about the world without using a language (Eklund
2012: 839n17).
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first place.16 In that case talking about metaphysics and the structure of the
world in itself cannot easily be avoided. But this is not Carnap’s view. For him,
using a slogan from a slightly later debate, it is better to think of semantics as
just more theory.17 Even before he accepted the notions of truth and reference he
makes a similar point concerning ostensions:
Examples (2) are ostensive definitions; here the term is defined by the
stipulation that the objects comprehended by the term must have a
certain relation (for instance, congruence or likeness) to a certain in-
dicated object; in linguistic formulation the ostension takes the form
of a statement of the spatiotemporal position. It is to be noted that,
according to this, an ostensive definition likewise defines a symbol by means
of other symbols (and not by means of extra-linguistic things). (Carnap
1937a: 80, my emphasis)
Initially this seems confused, since ostensive definition seems to be the paradig-
matic example of defining something by means of an extra-linguistic things, such
as when one stipulates the referent of a new name by pointing at the intended
referent. But I think what Carnap rejects here is a view of language that has
sometimes been ascribed to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, according to which mere
signs become meaningful symbols by associating them with objects through a
mysterious act of ostension (Pears 1987: chapter 5).18
This last point raises an obvious and fundamental question: if for Carnap
reference and ostension are not what brings language into contact with reality,
how exactly do we manage to talk about the world then? I will come back to this
issue in chapter 9, when we are in a position to consider the relationship between
the linguistic frameworks discussed in this section and natural language. First,
16 Bertrand Russell is plausibly a philosopher who falls into this category, as for him con-
tact with the world is established through direct acquaintance with individual objects (Hylton
2006):
The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main char-
acteristic of a mind. Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation
between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes
the mind’s power of knowing things. (Russell 1912: 22)
17 Here I am alluding to Putnam’s famous just-more-theory manœuvre in his critique of meta-
physical realism. See Putnam 1980: 477 for one of Putnam’s own formulations, and Taylor
1991 and Button 2013 for a comprehensive discussion.
18 Whether this so-called realist interpretation of the Tractatus is what Wittgenstein actually had
in mind is controverisal. For a helpful overview of the exegetical options see the first few
sections of Bronzo 2017.
20
Carnap’s Internalism Analyticity and Conventionalism
however, we need to consider another essential and controversial component of
Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction.
1.2 Analyticity and Conventionalism
1.2.1 Truth and Linguistic Rules
In my exposition of Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics I have so far focussed
on the internal/external-distinction. It would be mistaken to interpret Carnap
as arguing in the following way, however:
Mathematical statements only make sense when read internally, there-
fore we must accept mathematics as true once we have adopted a
mathematical framework.
This would be a fallacy since, according to Carnap, it is not only mathematical
statements that need to be construed internally, but all statements whatsoever,
including those about the empirical world. And if we adopt a framework in
which we can talk about tigers, we obviously wouldn’t expect or want that the
truth values of all statements about tigers are settled by the mere adoption of
the framework. Whether ”there are no tigers in Africa” is true or false should
depend on the way the world is after all, and determining its truth value requires
empirical investigations.
There is thus an important difference between statements about the empiri-
cal world and statements about abstract objects. Whereas in the empirical case
a linguistic framework merely determines the truth conditions, in the case of
abstract object the framework directly determines the truth values of the rele-
vant statements. And in order to draw this distinction, Carnap relies on the
analytic/synthetic-distinction.19
Carnap expresses the general idea behind classifying some statements as an-
alytic and others as synthetic as follows:
In material interpretation, an analytic sentence is absolutely true what-
ever the empirical facts may be. Hence, it does not state anything
about facts. [...] A synthetic sentence is sometimes true – namely,
19 Could one accept the internal/external-distinction without also distinguishing between ana-
lytic and synthetic statements? This question has been discussed by Haack 1976 and George
2000, who suggest that Quine’s position can be understood in this way. I come back to this
issue in chapter 8, where we will see that Quine indeed rejects a certain external perspective
on the relationship between language and the world.
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when certain facts exist – and sometimes false; hence it says some-
thing as to what facts exist. Synthetic sentences are the genuine state-
ments about reality. (Carnap 1937a: 41 (§14))
That Carnap uses the notion of analyticity is probably one of the most well-
known facts about his position, thanks to Quine’s hugely influential ”Two Dog-
mas of Empiricism” (Quine 1951). Even though it is common to regard Quine
as the winner of this debate, evaluating the exact nature of their dispute is ac-
tually quite difficult, and I will postpone going into the details until chapter
3. For now it is important to keep in mind that Carnap’s use of analyticity of-
ten differs from what contemporary philosophers have in mind, even though
this is not always obvious on the surface. One target of Quine’s objections, as
well as Timothy Williamson’s more recent arguments (Williamson 2007), for in-
stance, is the claim that we can classify sentences of natural languages such as
English or German into analytic and synthetic. But when Carnap invokes the
analytic/synthetic distinction, he nearly always intends it to apply to linguistic
frameworks with explicitly formalised rules. Furthermore, he explicitly states
that whether we look at natural languages or linguistic frameworks makes an
important difference for how to draw the distinction:
Our explication, as mentioned above, will refer to semantical language-
systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most
of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in
modern logic, e.g., Tarski’s explication of truth. It seems to me that
the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural lan-
guages are of an entirely different nature. (Carnap 1952: 66)
For now I will therefore only discuss the role of analyticity within Carnapian
frameworks. In the quote above Carnap writes that analytic sentences are ”ab-
solutely true whatever the empirical facts may be”, so let us start by considering
in what sense they are immune from revision in light of incoming evidence. This
is important since the idea that adopting a mathematical framework settles all
there is to say about mathematics only makes sense if, once a such a framework
is adopted, there are no empirical considerations that could speak in favour or
against accepting certain mathematical statements. In other words, we need
some explanation of why, within a framework, there can be empirical evidence
for a sentence like ”there are tigers in Africa” but not ”there are infinitely many
prime numbers”.
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In order to appreciate how this works, we need to understand how Carnap
deals with evidence in general. There are two crucial tenets. Firstly, for Carnap
all evidence is empirical evidence, and secondly, evidence is linguistically medi-
ated. The first point should be clear enough, but the second requires further
elaboration. Frameworks which can talk about the empirical world require there
to be a class of protocol-sentences:
Syntactical rules will have to be stated concerning the forms which
the protocol-sentences, by means of which the results of observation
are expressed, may take. (Carnap 1937a: 317)
These protocol-sentences are then connected to events in the empirical world by
treating some of the predicates that occur in them as observable, which amounts
to the following:
A predicate ’P’ of a language L is called observable for an organism
(e.g. a person) N, if, for suitable arguments, e.g. ’b’, N is able under
suitable circumstances to come to a decision with the help of few
observations about a full sentence, say ’P(b)’, i.e. to a confirmation of
either ’P(b)’ or ’~P(b)’ of such a high degree that he will either accept
or reject ’P(b)’. (Carnap 1936: 454f)
With respect to their relation to protocol-sentences, analytic sentences then have
the following property:
If, however, we assume that every new protocol-sentence which ap-
pears within a language is synthetic, there is this difference between
an L-valid, and therefore analytic, sentence S1 and a P-valid sen-
tence S2, namely, that such a new protocol-sentence – independently
of whether it is acknowledged as valid or not – can be, at most, in-
compatible with S2 but never with S1. (Carnap 1937a: 318f (§82))
The P-rules Carnap mentions are supposed to be laws of nature, but we can set
these aside here in order not to complicate the discussion. The crucial point is
that Carnap identifies analytic sentences with logically valid (L-valid) sentences,
and claims that they cannot stand in conflict with protocol-sentences, which in
turn entails that there can be no empirical evidence that speaks against an ana-
lytic sentence. Why exactly is this the case? Carnap first assumes that protocol-
sentences are synthetic, which just means that they are not analytic, i.e. L-valid.
For an L-valid sentence to be incompatible with a synthetic sentence S, it would
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have to entail ¬S. Since the negation of a synthetic sentence is also synthetic,
there would thus need to be an analytic sentence that entails a synthetic sentence.
But that is impossible, since all the consequences of an L-valid sentence must be
L-valid, and hence analytic, themselves.
The effect of this is that analytic sentences become immune to revision, as
Carnap himself describes it here:
Since the truth of an analytic sentence depends on the meaning, and
is determined by the language rules and not the observed facts, then
an analytic sentence is indeed ”unrevisable” in another sense: it re-
mains true and analytic as long as the language rules are not changed.
The attribution of truth values to synthetic sentences changes contin-
ually, induced by new observations, even during a period in which
the logical structure of language remains unchanged. A revision of
this sort is not possible for the analytic sentences. (Carnap 1990: 432)
And this explains why for analytic sentences, there is no gap between accepting
a framework that contains them, and accepting them as true: the only factor that
might prevent us from regarding them as true would be empirical evidence to
the contrary, but by design there can be no such thing.
We have now seen what kind of work the distinction between analytic and
synthetic sentences is supposed to do within a Carnapian framework. What
remains to be seen, however, is how the extension of the predicate ’analytic’ is
determined – i.e. how exactly the rules of the framework settle which sentences
are analytic. In ESO, Carnap writes that in order to answer questions about
mathematics, we need to employ ”logical analysis based on the rules for the
new expressions” (Carnap 1956a: 209), which sounds straightforward. But we
will soon see that Carnap’s aim is to declare all purely mathematical sentences
to be either analytic or contradictory, and this is not a trivial task at all given
the limitative results Gödel proved in the 1930s. Carnap’s proposal for dealing
with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems will therefore be the focus of the next
chapter, but before we come to that I want to situate Carnap’s position in the
established theoretical landscape some more. We started by looking at Carnap’s
relation to Platonism, and now is a good time to ask whether his philosophy of
mathematics should be classified as a form of linguistic conventionalism.
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1.2.2 Is this Conventionalism?
Linguistic conventionalism about an area of discourse is the thesis that, in some
sense, the statements of that area do not describe reality or state facts, but are
rather true in virtue of, or can be explained by, certain linguistic conventions.
Linguistic conventionalism has been historically popular when applied to logic
and mathematics, especially among advocates of empiricism. This is not surpris-
ing, since on the surface logical and mathematical knowledge seems quite differ-
ent from empirical knowledge. While the latter is based on sense experience and
concerns contingent matters of facts, the former is often regarded as a priori and
concerns necessary truths and falsehoods. Some empiricist, such as John Stuart
Mill and later Quine, denied that there is a sharp dividing line between logic
and mathematics on the one hand, and empirical matters on the other. Among
the logical empiricists, however, the favoured strategy was to retain the intuition
that there is something distinctive about logic and mathematics, but to try to
explain this difference without compromising empiricism.
A. J. Ayer sums up the idea behind linguistic conventionalism succinctly in
his influential Language, Truth, and Logic. With regards to the ”the a priori propo-
sitions of logic and pure mathematics” he writes that
[...] I allow [them] to be necessary and certain only because they are
analytic. That is, I maintain that the reason why these propositions
cannot be confuted in experience is that they do not make any asser-
tion about the empirical world, but simply record our determination
to use symbols in a certain fashion. (Ayer 1936: 31)
The underlying thought is that by classifying logic and mathematics as analytic,
and hence as obtaining in virtue of linguistic conventions, their necessity and a
priority becomes palatable even for an empiricist. For to call the laws of logic
necessary means nothing more than that they follow from certain rules for using
signs we have adopted as a convention, not that there are certain features of the
world that make these truths necessary. And they are a priori since it is assumed
that we can know what linguistic rules we are following without using obser-
vation. It is hence common to find formulations similar to Ayer’s in the 1930s,
not only in the writings of the Vienna Circle but also expressed by American
philosophers such as C. I. Lewis.20
Carnap seems to fall squarely into the camp of linguistic conventionalists. We
already saw that he wants to classify all of logic and mathematics as analytic,
20 See Lewy 1940 for a collection of representative quotes.
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and regards analytic sentences as true in virtue of framework rules. In a paper
from the mid-1930s, he also stresses that he considers the formal sciences of logic
and mathematics to be empty of content:
In adjoining the formal sciences to the factual sciences no new area
of subject matter is introduced, despite the contrary opinion of some
philosophers who believe that the ”real” objects of the factual sciences
must be contrasted with the ”formal”, ”geistig” or ”ideal” objects of
the formal sciences. The formal sciences do not have any objects at all;
they are systems of auxiliary statements without objects and without
content. (Carnap 1953: 128)
If Carnap is a linguistic conventionalist, then this raises some troubling ques-
tions. For nowadays conventionalism about logic and mathematics is not a pop-
ular view anymore, since it is usually thought that there are compelling and
near-insurmountable objections to the position. In the following I will briefly in-
troduce the two most well-known arguments against conventionalism: Quine’s
circularity argument from his ”Truth by Convention”, and what I call the Master
Argument against the very idea of conventionalism. Then I will discuss whether
these arguments in fact apply to Carnap’s own position.
The gist of Quine’s argument can be summed up as follows: if logic is true
by convention, then each logical truth must be stipulated to be true. There
are infinitely many logical truths, however, whereas no one can make infinitely
many stipulations. The only way out, so Quine, would be to stipulate infinitely
many sentences to be true by using some finite mode of expression:
It would appear that we sit down to a list of expressions and check
off as arbitrarily true all those which, under ordinary usage, are true
statements involving only our logical primitives essentially; but this
picture wanes when we reflect that the number of such statements is
infinite. If the convention whereby those statements are singled out
as true is to be formulated in finite terms, we must avail ourselves of
conditions finite in length which determine infinite classes of expres-
sions. (Quine 1949: 262f)
And at first sight that doesn’t seem to be a grave difficulty, for we could appar-
ently use the following stipulations:
(I) Let every instance of the following schema be true: pφ→ φq.
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(II) If a statement φ and a statement pφ → ψq are true, then let ψ be true as
well.
Quine thinks that this move would defeat the whole purpose of logical conven-
tionalism, however. For it seems that in order to establish that, for instance,
(p→ p)→ (p→ p)
is a logical truth, one already needs to use some logic. It needs to be shown that
”(p→ p)→ (p→ p)” is an instance of (I),
and then we can infer that
”(p→ p)→ (p→ p)” is true.
But the first step requires the use of something like universal instantiation, and
the second step is plausibly just reasoning according to modus ponens. Quine
sums up the issue as follows:
In a word, the difficulty is that if logic is to proceed mediately from
conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions.
(Quine 1949: 271)
His conclusion is thus that logical conventionalism fails to provide a non-circular
explanation of the nature of logic, for there appears to be no way to account for
the logical truth of infinitely many sentences without already presupposing at
least a limited number of logical principles.
What is notable about Quine’s argument is that he grants that we can stipu-
late individual sentences to be true, and the problem only arises due to the infinity
of logical truths. The second major argument against conventionalism, however,
goes further and targets the fundamental assumption that truth in virtue of con-
ventions is a coherent notion at all – hence I call it the Master Argument. Its
exact origins are not so clear, but Stephen Yablo has attributed it to a book by
Casimir Lewy from 1976:
Near the middle of his book Meaning and Modality, Casimir Lewy
takes up the theory that ”necessary propositions. . . ’ owe their truth
to’ linguistic conventions.” All that conventions can do, he protests,
is help to determine what a sentence says, or what proposition it ex-
presses; whether the proposition holds true is then another question,
to which rules of usage are quite irrelevant. [...] With doubtful his-
torical accuracy I will call this the Lewy point. (Yablo 1992: 878)
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Nowadays this kind of argument is probably more strongly associated with Paul
Boghossian’s paper ”Analyticity Reconsidered” from 1996, which stresses the
same general point: everyone can agree that conventions determine that a sen-
tence s means that p – but whether p is true is then a separate question, and
in most cases conventions are not a plausible candidate for explaining why p is
true:
Are we to suppose that, prior to our stipulating a meaning for the
sentence
Either snow is white or it isn’t
it wasn’t the case that either snow was white or it wasn’t? Isn’t it
overwhelmingly obvious that this claim was true before such an act
of meaning, and that it would have been true even if no one had
thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences?
(Boghossian 2017: 583)
For the thesis that logic and mathematics are true in virtue of conventions to
be philosophically interesting, it should neither amount to the uncontroversial
claim that conventions fix the meaning of logical vocabulary, nor to the crazy
claim that we literally made it the case that logical laws obtain. The very idea of
conventionalism is thus in jeopardy, since, so Boghossian, it is hard to see what
alternative to these two unpalatable options remains.
1.2.3 Carnap’s Deflationism
Quine’s circularity problem and the Master Argument have been very influen-
tial, and as a consequence there are hardly any card-carrying conventionalists
around today.21 The important question for us is whether these arguments also
discredit Carnap’s internalism. I think the answer is no, for a reason that many
Carnap scholars have stressed in recent decades: namely that Carnap’s overall
approach to philosophy is often deflationary. He doesn’t see himself as answering
traditional philosophical questions, but rather sets them aside as too unclear, and
proposes to replace them with more tractable kinds of enquiries. In this section
we will see how this general point applies to the issue of conventionalism.
21 Things might change, however, as a book-length defence of conventionalism has just ap-
peared (Warren 2020b). I briefly discuss the relation of Warren’s project to Carnap’s position
in section 7.4.
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I characterised linguistic conventionalism as the thesis that conventions can
explain logical and mathematical truths, or that logical and mathematical state-
ments are true in virtue of linguistic conventions. These formulations are com-
mon in the literature, but without further elaboration the notions of explana-
tion and true in virtue of are hardly unproblematic. A number of commentators
have consequently argued that Carnap would reject these notions outright, and
should for this reason not be classified as a conventionalist:
We can now appreciate the deflationary character of Carnap’s philos-
ophy of mathematics. Gödel’s conventionalist target contrasts empiri-
cal truth with the truth conferred by conventional stipulation. Carnap
rejects this contrast; he rejects any thick notion of truth-in-virtue-of.
(Ricketts 2007: 211)
Contrary to what many believe, [Carnap] rejects the confused thesis
that our acceptance of logical and mathematical sentences somehow
guarantees that those sentences are true. (Ebbs 2017b: 25)
This may seem surprising, since clearly Carnap does think that there is some
sense in which the truth values of analytic sentences are settled by the linguistic
rules of frameworks. The deflationary interpreters don’t want to deny this either,
for Goldfarb and Ricketts are perfectly happy to describe Carnap’s position as
one according to which ”mathematical truths [...] flow from the adoption of the
metalanguage” (Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992: 71).22 The point they want to make
is rather that we need to be careful not to read the claims Carnap’s makes in a
too metaphysically loaded way. And it is indeed important to keep this in mind,
for in light of the resurgence of interest in notions such as grounding and meta-
physical explanation it is tempting to read Carnap as trying to answer questions
he himself would probably have rejected as being ill-formed altogether.
The deflationary character of Carnap’s position enables him to set aside
Quine’s circularity objection and the Master Argument. In the case of Quine
this is relatively straightforward. His complaint was that conventionalism can-
not give a non-circular account of logical and mathematical truth, but it is clear
that giving an explanation of this kind cannot have been Carnap’s aim in the first
place. In the next chapter we will consider Carnap’s account of mathematical
truth in more detail, and see that he uses mathematics in the relevant definitions.
It can hardly have escaped his notice that there is something circular about this
22 See also Ebbs 2017b: 26 for an analysis of the notion of ”determination”.
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approach, and so there must be some truth to Goldfarb and Ricketts’ interpreta-
tion according to which Carnap had no interest in giving a non-circular account
of logic and mathematics:
Carnap’s position contains a circle, or, better, a regress: mathematics
is obtained from rules of syntax in a sense that can be made out only
if mathematics is taken for granted (in the metalanguage). Therefore,
no full exhibition of the syntactical nature of mathematics is possible.
This is not lethal, however, insofar as the structure of Carnap’s leaves
no place for the traditional foundational questions that such an an-
swer would certainly beg. (Goldfarb 1995: 330, see also Goldfarb and
Ricketts 1992: 71)23
How about the Master Argument though, which seems to show that there is no
sense in which a sentence can be true by convention that is both interesting and
plausible? It is intriguing to see that on one occasion Carnap himself argues in
an analogous way to Lewy and Boghossian:
[...] the logical truth of the sentence ”all black dogs are dogs” is not a
matter of convention [...]. Once the meanings of the individual words
in a sentence of this form are given (which may be regarded as a
matter of convention), then it is no longer a matter of convention or
of arbitrary choice whether or not to regard the sentence as true; the
truth of such a sentence is determined by the logical relations holding
between the given meanings. (Carnap 1963b: 916)
The thought here is that if one considers the sentence ”all black dogs are dogs”
together with its actual meaning – which one could also describe as the proposi-
tion expressed by it – then its truth is no longer a matter of convention. And this
suggests that Carnap himself holds the moderate view that all that conventions
do is to fix the meanings of sentences, while truth is another matter.
I think that this description is partly correct, but partly misleading as well.
Boghossian seems to assume that moderate conventionalism is philosophically
uninteresting since it fails to draw a distinction between empirical truth, on the
one hand, and logical and mathematical truth, on the other. In both cases sen-
tences need to be connected to propositions by conventions, after all, and hence
it is hard to see why truth in the one case would be more a matter of convention
23 For a discussion of whether Quine himself had Carnap as his target in mind when writing
”Truth by Convention” see Ebbs 2011.
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than the other. And while this sounds very compelling, I think that the underly-
ing conception of sentences and their relation to propositions is not as innocent
as it seems. Jared Warren expresses this well in the following passage:
This picture seems to assume that there are the propositions, some-
where out there all arrayed. They toil not, they spin not; they are
timeless and forever. We corporeal beings work not with propositions
but with sentences. Our conventions generate meaningful sentences
simply by attaching them to particular propositions—like price tags
at the grocery store. (Warren 2015b: 90f)
This way of thinking about propositions is very different from Carnap’s. While
he is happy to grant that there are such entities, he conceives of them in an inter-
nalist manner, namely as being constituted by the rules of linguistic frameworks:
The system of propositions. New variables, ”p,” ”q,” etc., are introduced
with a role to the effect that any (declarative) sentence may be sub-
stituted for a variable of this kind; [...]. Further, the general term
”proposition” is introduced. ”p is a proposition” may be defined by
”p or not p” (or by any other sentence form yielding only analytic
sentences) . Therefore every sentence of the form ". . . is a propo-
sition" (where any sentence may stand in the place of the dots) is
analytic. (Carnap 1956a: 209f)
This is important to note since it shows that, for Carnap, there is a sense in
which sentences are prior to propositions. For while every Carnapian frame-
work will consist of sentences, propositions are merely useful but optional addi-
tions, which, furthermore, are characterised by reference to sentences. And this
deflationary conception of propositions makes room for a reply to the Master
Argument that was not so obvious before we explicitly discussed their status.
I think that, when pressed, Carnap should say the following: there is clear
a sense in which it is false that linguistic conventions make it the case that
propositions obtain. For, in analogy with the earlier discussion of the mind-
independence of stars, within the frameworks Carnap proposes it will be false
to claim that, for instance, 2+2=4 holds because of a convention. But this is
not to say that all propositions – both logico-mathematical and empirical – are
alike in all relevant respects, contra to what Boghossian suggests. For linguistic
frameworks can be set up in such a way that logical and mathematical sentences
are analytic, which guarantees their truth. And since propositions are defined in
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terms of sentences, there is a derived sense in which those propositions can also
said to be true in virtue of linguistic conventions. It is, however, preferable to
avoid this way of speaking, since it misleadingly suggests that we literally make
the laws of logic obtain. A more innocuous formulation, then, would be to say
that we can set up linguistic frameworks in such a way that some sentences –
namely the analytic ones – are guaranteed to express true propositions.24 Naturally
this claim can only be expressed from the perspective of someone who stands
outside of the framework whose properties are being discussed, and hence there
is no tension with the earlier denial of conventionalism from within the frame-
work.
In this section I have argued that, thanks to his deflationary conception of
philosophy, Carnap can answer the two most influential arguments against lin-
guistic conventionalism. In a way the strategy pursued here raises more ques-
tions than it answers, however. For it is easy to worry that through rejecting
more substantial explanatory projects, Carnap’s own position has become so de-
flationary that nothing of interest remains.25 Less drastically speaking, there is
at least a serious questions as to what sort of positive claims Carnap did want
to make, and why he thought these to be important. The next chapter will start
to answer some of these concerns by looking at Carnap’s conception of linguis-
tic rules more closely, with a focus on his treatment of Gödel’s incompleteness
results.
24 This idea also plays a role in Gillian Russell’s recent attempts to rehabilitate truth in virtue
of meaning (Russell 2008).
25 Quine indeed ends his ”Truth by Convention” by raising the worry that conventionalism
becomes an ”idle label” without any explanatory force (Quine 1949: 273). I will come back




In the previous chapter we have seen that the aim of Carnap’s internalism is to
allow the use of mathematics while avoiding any commitment to metaphysical
forms of Platonism. This is to be achieved by construing all true mathematical
statements as analytic. But since analyticity is spelled out in term of what follows
from linguistic rules, one might think that Carnap’s project is doomed from the
start. By Gödel’s incompleteness theorems there is no formal system such that
for every mathematical sentence either it or its negation is derivable. What is the
status of these undecidable sentences then? Carnap seems forced to either hold
that they have no truth value at all, or that they are synthetic sentences like those
about the empirical world.
Carnap thought that he had a way out of this apparent dilemma, and in this
chapter I will describe his strategy of overcoming Gödel’s limitative results. The
main idea is to broaden one’s conception of linguistic rules in such a way that
non-recursive and infinitary rules can be used to characterise what the analytic
sentences are. Even though this strategy was a direct result of suggestions by
Gödel, Gödel himself was not at all convinced by it, and argued that the second
incompleteness theorem undermines Carnap’s approach after all. In the second
half of the chapter I will review Gödel’s argument from consistency, and discuss
some replies to it that have been given on Carnap’s behalf.
2.1 Linguistic Rules Revisited
2.1.1 Syntactic Rules and Their Limits
Let us begin by stating Carnap’s goal in a more precise way. Call a sentence
analytic if it follows from the rules of a linguistic framework, contradictory if its
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negation follows, and synthetic if it is independent of the rules. What Carnap
wants to account for is the following claim (Carnap 1937a: 116):
Classical Mathematics
Every purely mathematical sentence, i.e. every sentence which only
contains mathematical vocabulary, is either analytic or contradictory.
This is supposed to capture the classical idea that every purely mathematical
sentence is either determinately true or determinately false. Note that Carnap
does not want to deny that other, more constructivist or formalist conceptions
of mathematics, according to which bivalence does not hold, are possible. He
would have no objection against someone who adopts a framework for doing
intuitionist mathematics, for instance. But what Carnap denies is that there is
something philosophically problematic about classical mathematics, and that we
therefore have to opt for a constructivist alternative. And in order to achieve this,
he needs to establish that there is a linguistic framework which captures classical
mathematics in the way I described, even though this is not the only legitimate
framework.1
Having clarified Carnap’s aim, we now need to take a closer look at what
it means for sentences to follow from the linguistic rules of a framework. I al-
ready mentioned that, based on ESO, it is very tempting to identify a framework
with the kind of formal theories logicians typically study, i.e. a set of axioms
and inference rules. Putting these ideas together, it is then natural to spell out
analyticity in the following way:
A sentence S is analytic iff it can be derived from the axioms that are
constitutive of the framework using the inference rules the framework
provides.
This conception is intuitive, but immediately leads to trouble. If frameworks are
formal theories in this sense, then it seems that the framework of arithmetic just
is something like Peano arithmetic (PA). So suppose we identify analyticity with
what is derivable from the axioms of PA:
Syntactic Proposal
φ is analytic iff PA ` φ.
1 We will later see that the dialectical situation is actually a bit more complicated, but in order
to keep the exposition of Carnap’s position straightforward I postpone further discussion to
chapter 6.
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At this point Gödelian incompleteness strikes. For if we assume that PA is
in fact consistent, one can show that there is some sentence G, formulated in
arithmetic vocabulary, such that PA neither proves G nor ¬G. From the way we
characterised analyticity it follows that, on the Syntactic Proposal, G counts as
synthetic. And this is just the kind of result we didn’t want in a framework for
classical mathematics.2
What makes this case worrisome is that PA is just a special case. In its most
general form, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that there is no theory T
which has all of the following properties:
(1) T is consistent
(2) T is recursively formalised
(3) T is strong enough to do basic arithmetic
(4) T is complete, i.e. for any T-sentence φ, either T proves φ or T
proves ¬φ
And this seems to preclude the possibility of identifying analyticity with what
it provable in any theory, not just PA, as long as we stick to the requirement that
every mathematical sentence is either analytic or contradictory.
The Syntactic Proposal of analyticity is useful to illustrate this challenge, but,
ever since the 1930s, Carnap’s actual conception of analyticity was more sophis-
ticated. For he was very aware of Gödel’s incompleteness results; Carnap indeed
seems to have been one of the first people Gödel talked to about this matter in
a Vienna coffee shop, and they frequently discussed the philosophical implica-
tions afterwards.3 Carnap thought that he had found a way to overcome these
limitations, and we will turn to his own proposal now.
In order to understand Carnap’s strategy, it is useful to consider condition
(2) from above – that theories are recursively formalised – in more detail. Panu
Raatikainen helpfully sums up what kinds of formal theories the incompleteness
theorems apply to as follows:
Roughly, a formal system is a system of axioms equipped with rules
of inference, which allow one to generate new theorems. The set of
2 For a philosophically informed discussion of Gödel’s theorems and other limitative results
see Smith 2013.
3 In a diary entry from 26th August 1930, Carnap writes: ”Gödel’s discovery: incompleteness
of the system of PM; the difficulty of a consistency proof” (Carnap forthcoming: 818, my
translation). For more background on the early interactions between Carnap and Gödel see
Köhler 2002, Goldfarb 2005, and Awodey and Carus 2010.
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axioms is required to be finite or at least decidable, i.e., there must be
an algorithm (an effective method) which enables one to mechanically
decide whether a given statement is an axiom or not. If this condi-
tion is satisfied, the theory is called ”recursively axiomatizable”, or,
simply, ”axiomatizable”. The rules of inference (of a formal system)
are also effective operations, such that it can always be mechanically
decided whether one has a legitimate application of a rule of infer-
ence at hand. Consequently, it is also possible to decide for any given
finite sequence of formulas, whether it constitutes a genuine deriva-
tion, or a proof, in the system – given the axioms and the rules of
inference of the system. (Raatikainen 2020: section 1.1)
This is important to keep in mind, since one can also talk about formal systems
or theories in a looser sense. Consider True Arithmetic (TA): the theory whose
axioms are all the true arithmetical sentences. TA is not incomplete, since –
assuming arithmetical truth is classical – for every arithmetical sentence S, either
S is true and is hence an axiom of TA, or S is false, and hence the negation of
S is an axiom. TA is not a formal system in the sense of Raatikainen, however,
i.e. it is not recursively formalised, since there no effective way to list its axioms.
For theories like TA, there is no way to represent the notion of ’provable-in-the-
theory’ within the language of arithmetic, which is what any proof of Gödel’s
theorems relies on.
At a high level of abstraction, one can understand Carnap’s approach as char-
acterising analyticity by means of a non-recursive theory. To make this more
concrete, let us look at how Carnap sets things up in The Logical Syntax of Lan-
guage (Carnap 1937a). In the book he introduces two formal theories called lan-
guage I and II, of which the former is a version of primitive recursive arithmetic,
whereas the latter is a version of the simple theory of types with higher-order
quantifiers.4 In the following I will continue to talk about PA, however, since this
theory is very familiar and hence a useful example. No harm is done by this,
since the typed nature of language II is not important when it comes to Carnap’s
strategy of resolving incompleteness.
By Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, one example of a sentence inde-
pendent from the axioms of PA is ConPA – the sentence which encodes the claim
that PA is consistent. It is possible to define a predicate PrPA that represents PA’s
provability-relation within the language of arithmetic, such that PrPA(pΣq, pφq)
4 At that time Carnap had not adopted the terminology of ESO yet, but what he calls ’lan-
guages’ in Logical Syntax are in effect linguistic frameworks.
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is true if and only if Σ is a PA-proof of φ.5 Letting ’⊥’ stand for some arbi-
trary contradiction, the sentence ConPA is then an abbreviation of the following
all-quantified claim:
ConPA =de f ∀x¬PrPA(x, p⊥q)
In Logical Syntax, Carnap likewise picks out ConPA6 as an example of a sentence
that is analytic despite not being derivable. In order to see why he is allowed to
say this, Carnap’s definition of analyticity for quantified statements of the form
’∀xP1(x)’ is relevant. It is given after analyticity has already been defined for
monadic predications, and relies on an infinite class of accented expressions or
numerals 0, 0′, 0′′, . . . . In order to determine whether ’∀xP1(x)’ is analytic, one
needs to
refer for instance from ‘P1(x)’ to the sentences of the infinite senten-
tial class {‘P1(0)’,‘P1(0′)’,‘P1(0′′)’, ...}. In this manner, the numerical
variable is eliminated. (Carnap 1937a: 106 (§34c))
This is then supposed to settle the analyticity of ConPA. For all instances of this
universal generalisation – i.e. ¬PrPA(0, p⊥q), ¬PrPA(0′, p⊥q), ... – are provable
in PA, and thus analytic. The definition of analyticity in the metalanguage thus
has the effect that if all instances of some formula φ(x) are true in virtue of the
framework rules, then so is the universal generalisation ∀xφ(x), which in turn
settles the truth value of ConPA.
The general idea behind this move is that while PA+ConPA and PA+¬ConPA
are both consistent, the theory that results from adding ¬ConPA only has non-
standard models – i.e. models which are not isomorphic to the natural numbers,
but contain additional non-standard elements. ConPA, on the other hand, is true
in the standard model. The truth of ConPA can thus be secured if we are in a
position to set non-standard models aside as irrelevant. And indeed, Carnap’s
definition from above only works if the infinite stock of numerals ‘0’, ‘0′’, ‘0′′’,
... he refers to is isomorphic to the natural numbers, and thus comprises only
standard numerals. He clearly assumes this to be so, but the discussion of Beth’s
arguments in chapter 4 will show that this presupposition is not without its
problems.
Earlier I already mentioned Carnap’s transition from his syntactic to his se-
mantic period. Logical Syntax is still part of the syntactic period during which
5 The Quine-corners ’p q’ map an expression in the language of arithmetic to its Gödel-number.
6 Or rather the consistency sentence of language II, but I will not flag this every time.
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he rejected semantic notions such as truth and reference. The acceptance of se-
mantics does not make a substantial difference for the issues under discussion,
however. The definition of analyticity we just saw, even though called syntac-
tic, is in effect a notational variant of a Tarskian truth-definition (Coffa 1987,
Koellner ms). Carnap invokes a particular set of numerals at a crucial juncture
of his definition, and this quasi-semantic approach just became more explicit
once he officially accepted semantics. In a later summary of his views, he for
instance suggests that in the metalanguage we should just describe the intended
interpretation for the object language under consideration (Carnap 1963b: 900f).
The sentence ConPA is just one particular example here, even though an es-
pecially interesting one. But the approach generalises, for every arithmetical
sentence is either true or false in the standard model of arithmetic N. If one
wanted to sum up Carnap’s conception of analyticity in Logical Syntax in one
sentence, the following proposal would be the most accurate:
Semantic Proposal
φ is analytic iff N  φ.
The Syntactic Proposal only relied on the syntactic notion of derivability (sym-
bolised as ’`’), and hence suggested that Carnapian frameworks can be identi-
fied with a formal language plus a deductive system. The Semantic Proposal
shows this interpretation to be misguided. It uses the semantic notion of truth
in a model, symbolised as ’’, and understood in this way a linguistic framework
must also include a particular semantics.
In one sense this strategy is not that surprising: it is pretty much the norm to
interpret Gödel’s incompleteness results as showing that there are true but un-
provable sentences in mathematics – where truth is in effect understood as truth
in the standard model. So far Carnap’s approach is in line with the mainstream.
What is surprising, however, that he thinks that the moves he makes are com-
patible with conceiving of mathematical truth as a matter of linguistic rules, for
it may seem that relying on a particular model is rather to give up on this idea.
In the next section we will therefore need to investigate this issue in more detail.
2.1.2 The Nature of Frameworks
The most important result of the previous discussion is that Carnap’s conception
of what linguistic rules are is very generous. It has been noted before that some
of Carnap’s moves are bound to surprise contemporary readers. He frequently
suggests that he thinks of analyticity as a kind of logical truth, for instance,
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which does not easily fit the proposal we just encountered. Logical truth is
usually spelled out as truth in all models, after all, rather than truth in one
particular interpretation. Frost-Arnold thus rightly stresses that Carnap has an
unusually broad conception of what can rightfully count as analytic:
This difficulty is solved by recognizing that Carnap does not charac-
terize analytic truth as truth-in-all-interpretations. Analytic truth for
Carnap, as we have seen, is truth in virtue of the semantic rules; and
one of the semantic rules specifies the universe of discourse. (Frost-
Arnold 2013: 77)
What has been more controversial, however, is whether this way of dealing with
Gödel’s incompleteness results is not just unusual but also misguided. There
has certainly been no shortage of critics, one who is particularly blunt is John
von Neumann:
[...] I regard Carnap’s things as naive and feeble. Carnap simply does
not possess the knowledge minimally required to address such mat-
ters – let alone to say something new. [...] I am specifically annoyed
that, while Gödel’s name is constantly on Carnap’s lips, it is obvious
that he absolutely did not understand the real meaning of Gödel’s
results. (von Neumann 2005: 203)
The dialectical situation is very intricate, however, especially given the deflation-
ary nature of Carnap’s position I discussed in the previous chapter. If he were
a traditional conventionalist who wanted to account for mathematical truth in a
non-circular way – i.e. without already presupposing any mathematical notions
in the explanation – then it would be easy to object to Carnap’s use of infinite
sets of numerals or intended models. But since this is clearly not his ambition, it
is harder to pin down what, if anything, is wrong with his liberal conception of
linguistic rules. In the course of this thesis I will argue that there in fact is a prob-
lem, but it will take a while to reach that point. We are, however, in a position
to reconsider the question of what Carnapian frameworks are supposed to be,
which will also shed light on the issue of whether any traces of conventionalism
remain in Carnap’s position.
Contrary to what I assumed for expository purposes, a Carnapian framework
is not one formal theory (understood as a set of axioms and inference rules), but
rather a package of such theories: in particular a framework consists of an object
language and a metalanguage, or even a hierarchy of metalanguages (Leitgeb
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and Carus 2020: section 1.2). So while the theory of Peano arithmetic may well
be the object language of a framework for doing mathematics, we should bet-
ter not call PA itself the framework. This is because in many frameworks the
metalanguage will play an essential role. The definition of analyticity which
secures the truth of ConPA, for instance, is stated in a metalanguage, and Log-
ical Syntax in fact contains a proof that no sufficiently powerful and consistent
object language can contain its own analyticity-predicate, which is a version of
Tarski’s argument for the indefinability of truth (Carnap 1937a: 219).7 So we
should understand the framework of mathematics as the combination of PA and
a particular metalanguage.
Earlier I pointed out that when Carnap talks about mathematical truth being
determined by, or flowing from, linguistic rules, this should not be read as a
metaphysical thesis. I did not say anything positive about what Carnap does
mean by such claims then, but we are now in a position to do so. One can
in fact distinguish two senses of determination here. Sentences like ”2+2=4”
and ”there are infinitely many primes” can be syntactically derived from the
Peano axioms, and so there is one sense of determination that coincides with
derivability. In the terminology Carnap uses, we can say that the truth of many
mathematical sentences is determined by the rules of derivation (d-rules) of a
framework (Carnap 1937a: 99).
Sentences like ConPA, on the other hand, do not follow from the d-rules, but
rather from what Carnap calls rules of consequence or c-rules (Carnap 1937a: 100).
The definition of analyticity we saw earlier is an example of such a c-rule. It is
important to note that the relevant rule was essentially infinitary and non-effective,
since the analyticity of an all-quantified claim is established on the basis of the
analyticity of infinitely many other sentences. This is then the sense in which
Carnap overcomes Gödel’s incompleteness result by relaxing the requirement
that theories need to be recursively presented: since on his conception linguistic
frameworks can include non-effective infinitary rules, there is no way to recur-
sively represent a relation such as ’analytic in the framework of mathematics’.8
Carnap’s approach has struck many philosophers as outlandish, however, in-
cluding Gödel himself. In a paper to which we will turn soon, Gödel writes that
for mathematics to be determined by linguistic rules in any meaningful sense,
the relevant rules need to use ”only finitary concepts referring to finite com-
7 Based on the historical evidence available it is not easy to tell whether Carnap developed this
argument independently of Tarski. For a timeline see Woleński 2005.
8 One feature of this view that will be very important later is that there can be frameworks
with identical d- but different c-rules.
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binations of symbols”, and maintains that this requirement ”should be beyond
dispute” (Gödel 1995a: 341). A well-known example of an inference that fails
to meet this requirement is the so-called ω-rule, which allows one to infer a
universal generalisation based on infinitely many premises:
ω-Rule
φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), ...
∀xφ(x)
In Logical Syntax Carnap explicitly discusses this rule, and his attitude is diamet-
rically opposed to that of Gödel:
Tarski discusses [... the ω-rule] and rightly attributes to it an ”infini-
tist character”. In his opinion: ”it cannot easily be harmonized with
the interpretation of the deductive method that has been accepted up
to the present”; and this is so far as this rule differs fundamentally
from the [... finitary rules] which have hitherto been exclusively used.
In my opinion however, there is nothing to prevent the practical ap-
plication of such a rule. (Carnap 1937a: 173)
Adjudicating this disagreement will be a complex matter, and I will soon move
on to discuss various objections to Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, starting
with Gödel’s own. It should be stressed though that, on its own terms, the
position Carnap recommends seems at least coherent. His aim was to argue that
there is a linguistic framework in which each purely mathematical sentence is
either analytic or synthetic, including undecidable ones such as ConPA. And
given his liberal conception of linguistic rules, he seems to have succeeded. The
claim that ConPA is analytic in a mathematical framework requires that in the
metalanguage M of this framework ConPA can be established – and Carnap has
presented a metalanguage which achieves this, even though with the help of a
non-recursive rule.
Before moving on to objections we will now briefly look into the history and
development of Carnap’s position, for this will elucidate how he came to give
up the requirement that all legitimate theoretical notions must be decidable.
2.1.3 Towards Internalism
It is possible to construe the issues raised by Carnap’s response to Gödel’s in-
completeness results as a debate about how quantification works. One important
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upshot of Gödel’s theorems is that no recursive first-order theory is such that it
only has the standard model of arithmetic, or models isomorphic to it, as its do-
main. This raises the question whether we are justified to hold that despite this
underdetermination the quantifiers of our preferred arithmetical theory range
only over the standard numbers, which can in turn explain why we regard some
mathematical sentences as true even though they are independent of the axioms.
Initially it might seem that anyone who answers this question in the affirmative
must be a Model-in-the-Sky Platonist, who thinks that the world provides a dis-
tinguished domain of quantification of mathematical objects. But according to
Carnap’s internal Platonism we can have a determinate domain of quantification
without buying into the metaphysics: to say that we quantify over the standard
numbers is no metaphysical posit, but just a claim made in the metalanguage.
Carnap’s acceptance of this position seems to have been the result of an ex-
change with Gödel about second-order quantification and impredicative defini-
tions. This had been a hot topic in the philosophy of mathematics in the 1920s,
but we only need a very brief introduction for our purposes. A definition is
called impredicative if ”it generalizes over a totality to which the entity being
defined belongs” (Linnebo 2020b). Consider the following example:
Let n be the least natural number such that n cannot be written as the
sum of at most four cubes. (Linnebo 2020b).
The entity to which this definition applies is a particular natural number, and
since the definiendum includes quantification over natural numbers we are deal-
ing with an impredicative definition. Analogously, a definition that characterises
a certain property is called impredicative if its definiendum contains quantifica-
tion over all properties.
To many philosophers impredicative definitions had seemed suspicious, at
least when used in mathematics. But, as Ramsey famously observed, it is not so
clear why, since in the realm of concrete objects they seem perfectly in order:
[...] we may refer to a man as the tallest in a group, thus identifying
him by means of a totality of which he is himself a member without
there being any vicious circle. (Ramsey 1925: 368)
It seems that the ontological status of the entities or properties that are being
quantified over matters. As Gödel sums it up in retrospect, if one accepts a
constructivist view of mathematics, according to which definitions not merely
describe entities but rather bring them into existence in the first place, then
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[...] there must clearly exist a definition (namely the description of
the construction) which does not refer to a totality to which the ob-
ject defined belongs, because the construction of a thing can certainly
not be based on a totality of things to which the thing to be con-
structed itself belongs. If, however, it is a question of objects that
exist independently of our constructions, there is nothing in the least
absurd in the existence of totalities containing members, which can
be described (i.e., uniquely characterized) only by reference to this
totality[.] (Gödel 1983: 456)
In his ”Foundations of Mathematics” Ramsey assumed a realist conception of
properties. Carnap was familiar with this debate, and in a paper from 1931
comments as follows:
[...] I think we should not let ourselves be seduced by it into ac-
cepting Ramsey’s basic premise; viz., that the totality of properties
already exists before their characterization by definition. Such a con-
ception, I believe, is not far removed from a belief in a platonic realm
of ideas which exist in themselves, independently of if and how fi-
nite human beings are able to think them. [... It seems to me that]
we should call Ramsey’s mathematics ”theological mathematics”, for
when he speaks of the totality of properties he elevates himself above
the actually knowable and definable and in certain respects reasons
from the standpoint of an infinite mind which is not bound by the
wretched necessity of building every structure step by step. (Carnap
1983: 50)
This passage is intriguing, since here Carnap’s position appears to be perfectly
in line with what was, and mostly still is, widely accepted among philosophers
of mathematics: namely that the price of giving up constructivism is a certain
degree of Platonism, which may then be questioned on metaphysical grounds.
Within a few years, however, Carnap’s attitude changed radically, so let us see
how that came about.
Carnap had sent an early draft of his Logical Syntax to Gödel, which contained
a substitutional definition of second-order quantification. Gödel identified a
problem with this approach: for Carnap’s definition to work correctly, every
use of higher-order quantification must ultimately be reducible to a formula
which does not itself contain higher-order quantifiers. As Gödel pointed out,
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however, Carnap’s definition does not actually deliver this result (Gödel 2003a:
347). Consider the following formula:
(1) ∀P P(0).
If we use substitutional second-order quantification, the truth of (1) depends on
the truth of all substitution instances of (1). Gödel now draws attention to the
fact that since ’∀F(F(x))’ is a predicate definable in the language of (1), it can be
substituted for P, and hence the following is a substitution instance of (1):
(2) ∀F F(0)
But (2) is obviously just a notational variant of (1) in which second-order quan-
tification is still present, and a repeated application of Carnap’s definitions
would not make any difference. His method thus fails to eliminate second-order
quantification in the way that is required.9
To solve this problem Gödel recommends the following solution:
In my judgment, this error may only be avoided by regarding the
domain of the function variables not as the predicates of a definite
language, but rather as all sets and relations whatever. (Gödel, Letter
to Carnap, 11 September 1932 (Gödel 2003a: 347))
The suggestion is thus to read the second-order quantifier objectually, and in
such a way that it also ranges over properties that are not definable within the
relevant language. This seems to be an endorsement of Ramsey-style realism
about properties, however, and it is hence understandable that Carnap’s first
reaction to this proposal is a certain amount of hesitancy and confusion:
You say: it [= the universal quantifier] must range over ”all sets”; but
what does that mean? (Carnap, Letter to Gödel, 25 September 1932
(Gödel 2003a: 351))
While working through Gödel’s suggestion, Carnap eventually realises that he
needs a semantics in which the second-order quantifiers range over valuations.
As he explains in later work, valuations are sets of numerals (or natural num-
bers):
9 See Goldfarb 2003: 338 and Flocke 2019 for discussion.
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By a possible valuation (syntactical designation, B) for ’F’ (i.e. a value
assigned to ’F’) we shall here understand a class (that is to say, a
syntactical property) of accented expressions. (Carnap 1937a: 107)10
Carnap is still concerned about the fact that while there are uncountably many
valuations, in each particular language only countably many of them will be
describable, and expresses his reservations as follows:
It seems to me not questionable if ”analytic in the language S” can-
not be defined in a semantics that is formalised in S, but only in a
semantics that is formalised in a more extended language S2. But to
operate with a concept for which there is no language at all in which
it can be rigorously defined is certainly rather questionable. (Carnap,
Letter to Gödel, 25 September 1932 (Gödel 2003a: 351))
Only two days later, however, Carnap writes another letter to Gödel, in which
he announces that he has overcome the problem:
Yesterday I found the solution: The locution ”for every valuation ...”
that occurs in the definition can still be expressed in a semantics for-
mulated in a definite language, namely by ”[F](...)”, since a valuation
is of course a semantic predicate. This is possible even though in
the semantics under consideration not all possible valuations, that is,
predicates, can be defined. (Carnap, Letter to Gödel, 27 September
1932 (Gödel 2003a: 355))
What is the crucial insight Carnap had between these two letters? Apparently it
was that all we need to do in order to give a satisfactory semantics of second-
order quantification is to have a language in which we can quantify over all
valuations. And since valuations are just sets of numbers, this only requires that
we can use a language in which (first-order) quantification over those kinds of
entities is possible, which Carnap here seems to presuppose. The indefinability
of some of the valuations would be a problem if we could only quantify over
things we can pick out using a description, an assumption Carnap now rejects.
It is interesting to note that in the first version of Logical Syntax that Gödel
criticised, Carnap still seemed to have a quite different conception of what a se-
mantics for second-order language is supposed to achieve. The idea behind the
10 See Flocke 2019: 398f for more on Carnap’s terminology.
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substitutional semantics given was presumably to eliminate second-order quan-
tifiers by way of a decidable procedure of reduction. The new approach clearly
doesn’t deliver as much, as Carnap is now happy to leave second-order quan-
tifiers unreduced, and only demands that there is a clear specification of their
truth-conditions. In the version of Logical Syntax that appeared in print, Carnap
describes his considered approach as follows:
[...] the definition must not be limited to the syntactical properties
which are definable in S, but must refer to all syntactical properties
whatsoever. [... The question then becomes]: can the phrase ”for all
properties ...” (interpreted as ”for all properties whatsoever”, and
not ”for all properties which are definable in S”) be formulated in
the symbolic syntax-language S? This question may be answered in
the affirmative. The formulation is effected by the help of a universal
operator with a variable p, i.e. by means of ’(F)(...)’, for example.
(Carnap 1937a: 113f)
Furthermore Carnap refers back to his earlier criticism of Ramsey, and stresses
that his account of second-order quantification is strictly non-metaphysical:
But do we not by this means arrive at a Platonic absolutism of ideas,
that is, at the conception that the totality of all properties, which is
non-denumerable and therefore can never be exhausted by defini-
tions, is something which subsists in itself, independent of all con-
struction and definition? From our point of view, this metaphysical
conception – as it is maintained by Ramsey for instance (see Carnap
[Logizismus] p. 102) – is definitely excluded. We have here absolutely
nothing to do with the metaphysical question as to whether prop-
erties exist in themselves or whether they are created by definition.
(Carnap 1937a: 114)
There is something puzzling about this attitude, however. For Carnap explains
second-order quantifiers in terms of numbers and sets, where some of the rele-
vant sets (valuations) will of necessity be indefinable. And, one might reasonably
think, isn’t this just as problematic as postulating a realm of indefinable proper-
ties? Carnap’s response to this would presumably be to re-apply his internalist
treatment to the language in which the definition of second-order quantifiers is
given, and hence make these worries disappears. In the end the viability of his
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treatment of second-order quantifiers thus depends on his treatment of arith-
metic and set theory.
At the moment I want to stress another point though. It is striking that in
one of his letters Gödel himself seems to agree that the strategy he suggests to
Carnap is distinct from, and hence an alternative to, mathematical Platonism:
This doesn’t necessarily involve a Platonistic standpoint, for I assert
only that this definition (for ”analytic”) be carried out within a def-
inite language in which one already has the concepts ”set” and ”re-
lation”. (Gödel, Letter to Carnap, 11 September 1932 (Gödel 2003a:
347))
Given that Gödel is generally known as the archetypical Platonist, this raises
many questions. Did Gödel actually think that Carnap’s account in Logical Syn-
tax was viable at the time, and only changed his mind about this later? If so,
was he even opposed to Platonism itself in the 1930s, and only came to endorse
it later on? I think it would be a mistake to make too much of Gödel’s remark,
however, even though Carnap was presumably very pleased to hear it.11 For
it seems to me that some of the agreement between Carnap and Gödel in the
letters is merely apparent. In the same letter in which Gödel writes that ”you
have understood my suggestions about the definition of ’analytic’ entirely as I
meant them”, he also makes the following comment:
I believe moreover that the interest of this definition does not lie in
a clarification of the concept ”analytic”, since one employs in it the
concepts ”arbitrary sets”, etc., which are just as problematic. (Gödel,
Letter to Carnap, 28 November 1932 (Gödel 2003a: 357))
This sounds like a version of the objection I hinted at above, according to which
nothing is won by moving from indefinable properties to indefinable sets. And
I therefore think that at a fundamental point, Carnap and Gödel’s positions are
opposed to each other already in 1932. Carnap wants to use the concept of
analyticity in order to elucidate mathematical truth, whereas Gödel thinks that,
11 Of course it is hardly obvious what exactly Gödel’s own Platonism amounts too, see for
instance Potter 2001. Goldfarb provides some evidence to support the view that Gödel was
a less committed Platonist in the 1930s than he later became (Goldfarb 2005: 191fn5), but
Gödel himself maintained that he was already a Platonist during the Vienna period (Awodey
and Carus 2010: 260fn13).
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if this notion is of any interest at all, it definitely cannot play the theoretical role
Carnap has in mind.12
While this is somewhat speculative, it is uncontroversial that by the 1950s
Gödel explicitly rejected Carnap’s position of Logical Syntax. We will now move
on to the second part of this chapter in which Gödel’s later arguments, and some
Carnapian rejoinders, are discussed.13
2.2 Gödel’s Consistency Argument
2.2.1 Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?
In 1953, Paul Arthur Schilpp asked Gödel for a contribution to the volume on
Carnap’s philosophy, and suggested the title ”Carnap and the Ontology of Math-
ematics”. In response, Gödel wrote that he wouldn’t be able to produce of paper
of such broad scope, but agreed to make a smaller contribution for which he gave
the provisional title ”Some Observations on the Nominalistic View of the Nature
of Mathematics”. Over the next few years he went on to produce six drafts of
this paper which all have the title ”Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?”. In
1959, Gödel then let Schilpp know that he won’t be able to deliver the promised
paper after all. Gödel gives the following reason for his dissatisfaction with what
he had written so far:
It is easy to allege very weighty and striking arguments in favor of
my views, but a complete elucidation of the situation turned out to be
more difficult than I had anticipated, doubtless in consequence of the
fact that the subject matter is closely related to, and in part identical
with, one of the basic problems of philosophy, namely the question
of the objective reality of concepts and their relations. (Gödel, Letter
to Schilpp, February 3rd 1959 (Gödel 2003b: 244))
12 Goldfarb interprets this letter in a different way: he reads Gödel as having reservations about
the notions of analyticity and arbitrary sets themselves, and hence writes that ”[t]his may
be the only time that Gödel expresses a position that is less ontologically exuberant than
Carnap’s” (Goldfarb 2009: 120fn5). On my reading Gödel has no qualms with the notion of
arbitrary sets as such, but merely points out that the notion of analyticity is of no help in
understanding such mathematical concepts.
13 The relevance of Carnap’s account of impredicative definitions to his views on ontology has
recently been debated in the secondary literature. Gregory Lavers has argued that Carnap’s
approach does not really avoid Platonism, since it ”only pushes the problem back a step”
(Lavers 2015: 274f), and refers to Beth’s much later paper. In response, Vera Flocke has
argued that Lavers’ objection is not the same as Beth’s (Flocke 2019: 397fn86). As I will show
in section 4.2.2 there is indeed a connection between Beth’s point and questions of ontology,
but it is not obvious whether my reconstruction matches what Lavers had in mind.
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Four of Gödel’s drafts were published in the 1990s, and they have generated a
good amount of discussion. The drafts are of differing length, and some contain
more than a single argument. In the following I will focus on a line of reasoning
that can be found in all versions, and has also been most widely commented
upon in the secondary literature: namely the argument from consistency, which
purports to show that the second incompleteness theorem refutes the project of
Logical Syntax. In this part of the chapter I will present the argument, introduce
some responses that have been given on Carnap’s behalf, and then evaluate how
forceful Gödel’s considerations are in light of these rejoinders.
Another topic that is prominent in some of Gödel’s drafts, but which I will
not focus on here, concerns the application of mathematics. Briefly put, one point
Gödel makes is that Carnap’s claim that mathematics has no empirical content
is false or at least misguided, since often mathematical claims do have empirical
consequences:
[...] on the grounds of a proof for Goldbach’s conjecture (which says
that every even number is the sum of two primes), it can be predicted
that a computing machine which is empirically known to work reli-
ably will find two primes whose sum is some given large number N.
(Gödel 1995a: 339)
This suggests that even if Carnap could maintain that all of mathematics is ana-
lytic, he should refrain from doing so, since this way of setting things up doesn’t
actually capture how we normally construe the relationship between mathemat-
ics and the empirical world. This is certainly an important consideration, and
Gödel’s line of reasoning sometimes resembles the more well-known arguments
for holism by Quine.14 I will focus on the part of Gödel’s argument that concerns
the question of consistency, however, since this will naturally lead us to E. W.
Beth’s related but distinct – and, so I will argue, more successful – argument in
chapter 4.
What Gödel wants to refute is the thesis that mathematics is syntax of language,
which he thinks can be found in Carnap’s Logical Syntax. He characterises it as
follows:
I. Mathematical intuition, for all scientifically relevant purposes, in
particular for drawing the conclusions as to observable facts occur-
ring in applied mathematics, can be replaced by conventions about
the use of symbols and their application.
14 See Lavers 2019 for more discussion.
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II. In contradistinction to the other sciences, which describe certain
objects and facts, there do not exist any mathematical objects or facts.
Mathematical propositions, because they are nothing but consequences
of conventions about the use of symbols and, therefore, are compati-
ble with all possible experiences, are void of content.
III. The conception of mathematics as a system of conventions makes
the a priori validity of mathematics compatible with strict empiri-
cism. For we know a priori, without having to appeal to any a priori
intuition, that conventions about the use of symbols cannot be dis-
proved by experience. (Gödel 1995a: 356)
It is doubtful whether Carnap himself would have accepted this characterisation
of his aims in Logical Syntax without any revisions. Since Gödel did not submit
any draft in the end, Carnap apparently never got so see the argument, and so
we can only speculate how he would have reacted. While one might quibble
with some of Gödel’s formulations, I-III are nevertheless not completely off the
mark or uncharitable. For it is clearly true that Carnap thinks we neither need to
postulate a faculty of mathematical intuition nor mathematical objects, and also
holds that his account makes mathematics acceptable for empiricists.
The case of mathematical objects is especially interesting, since Gödel seems
to believe that Carnap has changed his mind about this point since the 1930s:
From what he says in [... Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology] it fol-
lows that at present he does not object to associating, in scientific se-
mantics, mathematical objects to formulae as their denotation. How-
ever he maintains that the philosophical question about the objective
existence of mathematical objects does not refer to this ”internal” ex-
istence, but means whether these objects formally introduced by ax-
ioms ”really” exist. An answer to this question is asserted to have no
”cognitive content”, i.e., the question is considered to be meaning-
less, while formerly it was answered negatively; or else Carnap has
changed his opinion about internal existence in mathematics. (Gödel
1995a: 355)
I think that Gödel here overestimates the impact of Carnap’s turn to semantics,
however. It is true that during the time of Logical Syntax, Carnap did not explic-
itly have something like the internal/external-distinction, and would also not
have asserted that numerals refer to numbers, since he rejected the notion of
50
Gödel and Incompleteness Gödel’s Consistency Argument
reference outright. On the other hand, even during the syntactic period he could
already have said that there is an unproblematic sense in which it is true that
numbers exist, since sentences like ”∃x(x = 1)” are true in language II of Logical
Syntax. This seems to correspond to the internal existence statements of ESO,
and when pressed whether there is not more to the existence of numbers than
is captured by statements of his kind, Carnap would likely have dismissed this
worry as meaningless and confused as well. There is thus much more continuity
between Carnap’s earlier and later views than Gödel makes it out to be.
This means, on the other hand, that Gödel’s argument against Logical Syntax
also applies to ESO, and so let us turn to it now. For a concise presentation it
will be useful to introduce the notion of a conservative extension:
Theory T* is a conservative extension of a theory T iff
(i) every theorem of T is a also theorem of T* and
(ii) every theorem of T* that is expressed in the language of T is also
a theorem of T.
In order to appreciate Gödel’s consistency argument, it is best to imagine that
we accept some theory of the world – I call this the base theory – which does not
already contain mathematics. Suppose we now want to extend the base theory
by a mathematical theory. The argument against the idea that mathematics is
syntax of language now runs as follows:
(1) If some theory is adopted as a convention, it must be known that
it is a conservative extension of the base theory.
(2) A theory that extends a consistent base theory is conservative
only if the former theory is consistent.
(3) So: A mathematical theory can be adopted as a convention only
if it is known whether this theory is consistent.
(4) We know from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems that for any
sufficiently strong mathematical theory, we need even stronger
mathematics to prove that theory’s consistency.
(5) So we need to rely on mathematical intuition at some point in
order to know that the theory we want to adopt as a convention
is consistent.
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(2) is obviously true if we accept the principle of explosion, as Gödel and Car-
nap both do. The step from (4) to (5) relies on several background assumptions,
which I will briefly discuss and then aside, in order to focus on the most con-
troversial premise (1) for the rest of the chapter. Gödel’s thinking seems to be
that the only way to gain knowledge of consistency is through a consistency proof,
or through somehow recognising that the axioms of a mathematical theory are
true, which entails that they are consistent. The latter act of grasping the truth
of axioms is what he calls mathematical intuition. Gödel does consider a third
option, namely coming to know the consistency of a system through empirical
observation, and comments on this as follows:
[...] it may be argued that, although transfinite mathematical axioms
clearly must not be used, it is permissible to use empirical induction.
E.g., consistency might be based on the fact that no contradiction has
arisen so far. Now it is true that, if consistency is interpreted to refer
to the handling of physical symbols, it is empirically verifiable like a
law of nature. However, if this empirical consistency is used, math-
ematical axioms and sentences completely lose their ”conventional”
character, their ”voidness of content” and their ”apriority” [...] and
rather become expressions of empirical facts. (Gödel 1995a: 342)
This seems a reasonable point in general, and is definitely justified when it comes
to Carnap. For we have already seen that one consequence of treating mathe-
matics as analytic is that empirical evidence – which for Carnap is expressed by
means of protocol sentences – can neither support nor undermine mathemati-
cal sentences. Defenders of Carnap have therefore focussed their attention on
criticising Gödel’s premise (1), so let us therefore move on to scrutinising it.
2.2.2 Content and Knowledge
Gödel thinks that we should accept the following claim:
(1) If some theory is adopted as a convention, it must be known that it is a
conservative extension of the base theory.
His own explanation for why (1) is plausible goes as follows:
Moreover a rule about the truth of sentences can be called syntactical
only if it is clear from its formulation, or if it somehow can be known
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beforehand, that it does not imply the truth or falsehood of any ”fac-
tual” sentence (i.e., one whose truth, owing to the semantical rules of
the language, depends on extralinguistic facts). [...] The requirement
under discussion implies that the rules of syntax must be demonstra-
bly consistent, since from an inconsistency every proposition follows,
all factual propositions included. (Gödel 1995a: 339)
To illustrate this, assume we have a non-mathematical and consistent base theory
in which we can talk about physical objects and their properties. Suppose we
now extend this theory by adding mathematics. If the mathematical theory we
add happens to be inconsistent, then the whole theory becomes inconsistent as
well, and hence we can suddenly derive various empirical claims about physical
objects, some which we would regard as false: ”there are seventeen blue tables
in room R45”, for instance. But this, so Gödel, shows that the acceptance of
the mathematical theory cannot have been a matter of convention after all, since
he regards it as definitional of a convention that its adoption cannot imply any
empirical predictions. This is because such predictions would make the conven-
tion refutable, and hence the distinction between a hypothesis and a convention
is blurred. As a consequence of this, so Gödel, a mathematical theory can only
be adopted as a convention if it is known to be consistent.
Scholars of Carnap have pushed back against this argument. Since the 1990s
Goldfarb and Ricketts have variously argued that for Carnap it is not in fact
true that ”from an inconsistency every proposition follows, all factual proposi-
tions included”, an assumption without which Gödel’s argument loses its force
(Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992, Goldfarb 1995). By this Goldfarb and Ricketts don’t
mean to say that Carnap accepts some form of paraconsistent logic in which the
principle of explosion fails, however. So what do they have in mind? To under-
stand their response it is useful to consider what Carnap means by the empirical
content of a sentence:
The content of a sentence S is the set of non-valid sentences which
follows from S. (adapted from Carnap 1937a: 175 (§49)).
It is a consequence of this conception that in an inconsistent framework, in which
every sentence is valid, no sentence has any empirical content. And, so Goldfarb
and Ricketts stress, this means that an inconsistent framework really makes no
claims about the empirical world at all, contrary to what Gödel supposes. Con-
sider again the consistent base theory to talk about physical objects, and suppose
that the sentence ”there are seventeen blue tables in room R45” is false in it. It
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is of course the case that once we extend the base theory by an inconsistent
mathematical theory, the sentence ”there are seventeen blue tables in room R45”
will now be derivable. But this sentence, so to speak, does not express the same
empirical proposition which it does express in the consistent base theory. In the
inconsistent theory, every sentence can rather be said to express one and the
same trivial proposition. Rightly understood, the adoption of an inconsistent
mathematical theory does therefore not result in any false empirical predictions
after all.
One might express this by saying that for Carnap the notion of an empirical
fact only makes sense within a particular framework, as Goldfarb does here:
[...] applied to Logical Syntax, Gödel’s argument would presuppose
a notion of empirical fact that transcends or cuts across different lin-
guistic frameworks. However, as the Principle of Tolerance strongly
suggests, it is central to the view of Logical Syntax that any such
language-transcendent notion be rejected. Rather, the notion of em-
pirical fact is given by way of the distinction between what follows
from the rules of a particular language and what does not. Thus, on
this reading Carnap’s view undercuts the very formulation of Gödel’s
argument. (Goldfarb 1995: 328)
While Gödel worried that an inconsistent theory would make various false claims
about the empirical world, the real issue with inconsistent theories is rather that
they cannot make any claims with empirical content at all.
In itself this is an effective reply, for it does seem true that Gödel presupposes
that sentences express certain propositions in a way that is not directly mediated
by the rules of the theory the sentences are a part of.15 But one can question
whether this move is really a defence of Carnap’s overall philosophy, or rather
points towards an even more fundamental problem. Michael Potter illustrates
this concern with the following scenario:
Imagine the case of a language which has been used for many years
with apparent success despite the existence within its mathematical
part of an abstruse and as yet undiscovered contradiction (the Burali-
Forti paradox, say). We seem to be forced by Carnap’s account to say
that despite appearances this language is not succeeding in saying
anything about the world. (Potter 2000: 276)
15 The relationship between sentences and propositions also plays an important role in contem-
porary discussions of conventionalism, see for instance Warren 2015b.
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Generalising from this, Potter argues as follows: it seems to be an undeniable
fact that our language contains at least some sentences that make empirical claims
about the world, as an example take ”this table is black”. On Carnap’s concep-
tion only consistent languages can say anything about the world. Hence in order
to know that ”this table is black” makes an empirical claim, I need to know that
our language is consistent. But if we suppose that our language contains mathe-
matics, this knowledge is hard to come by – we have at most inductive evidence
for consistency, but no certainty. This leads to the result that we only have defea-
sible reasons to think that ”this table is black” makes a claim about the empirical
world at all. Carnap is therefore committed to a radical form of holism about
empirical content, which Potter regards as absurd:
Carnap’s view makes it an experimental fact that I have a conception
of an empirical world at all. That is as close to a straightforward
contradiction as one is likely to encounter in philosophy. (Potter 2000:
277)
It therefore seems that what Goldfarb and Ricketts intended to be a defence of
Carnap’s position, namely the fact that the notion of empirical content is char-
acterised in a framework-dependent and holistic way, has been turned into an
improved version of Gödel’s consistency argument. Once again we have arrived
at the conclusion that Carnap is in trouble because, due to the second incom-
pleteness theorem, we cannot have the secure knowledge of consistency one
would need for Carnap’s position to be viable.
Potter’s improved version of Gödel’s argument has in turn been criticised
by Steve Awodey and André Carus, and I will discuss their reaction to it in the
next section. They also propose another response to Gödel, however, since they
speculate that the strategy pursued by Goldfarb and Ricketts is very different
from what Carnap himself would have said. Awodey and Carus’s suggested
response is to maintain that where Gödel demands known consistency, Carnap
only needs de facto consistency:
In short, where Gödel says “the rules of syntax must be demonstra-
bly consistent, since from an inconsistency every proposition follows”
(ibid.), he should correctly say “the rules of syntax must be consis-
tent, since from an inconsistency every proposition follows”. (Awodey
and Carus 2004: 208, my emphasis in bold)
Applying this strategy to my earlier reconstruction of Gödel’s argument yields
the following replacement for premise (1):
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(1*) If some theory is adopted as a convention, it must be a conser-
vative extension of the base theory.
Revised in this way, Gödel’s argument is no longer a challenge for Carnap.
Awodey and Carus assume that many mathematical theories are in fact con-
sistent, even if we cannot prove them to be so in a non-circular way. Given (1*)
there is hence no obstacle to adopting them as a convention.
Does this response suffice as a defence of Carnap? I think not. For one
thing, the assumption that there are determinate facts about consistency, and
matters of syntax more broadly, is not as innocent as Awodey and Carus seem
to assume. It is certainly plausible that Carnap needs such facts, for otherwise
a non-epistemological version of Potter’s argument could be given: if there is
no fact of the matter whether our language is consistent, then there is no fact
of the matter whether we talk about an empirical world either, which seems to
be an even more bizarre consequence. As I will argue in section 4.2.3, however,
accounting for facts about syntax is actually very hard for an internalist like
Carnap.
Let us provisionally take syntactic facts for granted though. Even then Awodey
and Carus’ reply only suffices to deal with Gödel’s argument as it was originally
presented, while the objection Potter raises nevertheless remains salient. Carnap
still seems stuck with a conception of language according to which we can never
be certain that we manage to talk about the empirical world at all, and fur-
ther arguments are needed to dispel the worry that this is an unpalatable view.
Awodey and Carus are aware of this, and I will discuss their response to Potter
in the next section.
2.2.3 Frameworks and Natural Language
Awodey and Carus’s reply to Potter has two parts. The first part seems to mis-
construe the nature of Potter’s argument, however, and so I will set it aside
relatively quickly. The second part of their reply is more interesting, but since
it concerns core assumptions about how linguistic frameworks relate to natural
language it will not be possible to conclusively evaluate whether it is a successful
defence of Carnap right here. This topic will occupy us throughout the thesis,
however, and hence introducing it at this point is useful.
The first part of Awodey and Carus’s reply to Potter attacks the idea that
there is such a thing as an indefeasibly descriptive sentence:
It is fundamental to the later Carnap’s view [...] that there is no fixed
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partition, antecedent to any language, of sentences into analytic ones
and synthetic ones. Any sentence whatever, including Potter’s fa-
vorite “This table is black”, could, if it were for some reason con-
venient, be made into a constitutive language rule, and thereby de-
prived of its descriptive capacity within that language. No sentence,
regarded in isolation, is inherently descriptive. (Awodey and Carus
2004: 212f)
What is again stressed here is that for Carnap, each sentence can be considered
as meaningful only in the context of a framework. Whether a particular sentence
counts as descriptive is settled by the framework rules, and is not an intrinsic
property of that sentence in isolation. Furthermore, Awodey and Carus allude
to Carnap’s idea that we could even construct frameworks in which synthetic
sentences about observations are linguistic rules. Carnap calls such rules P-rules,
and primarily envisaged laws of nature to play this role. This suggestion has led
to some confusion, since it might seem that if we can construe laws of nature as
framework rules, this amounts to stipulating that certain laws of nature actually
hold – which is obviously not within our power (Coffa 1991: 351f). Rightly
understood the role of P-rules is much more mundane, however. In practice the
only difference between using a framework with P-rules and using one without
is that we might have to switch between frameworks more frequently:
Relative to such a language, these “P-rules” as he called them [...],
could not be falsified (if we had some reason to doubt them, we
would have to change the language). (Awodey and Carus 2004: 206fn10)
The question now is, however, whether any of this undermines Potter’s argu-
ment. I think not, for it seems to me that Awodey and Carus commit a kind of
quantifier shift fallacy, and thus misinterpret the role of Potter’s example sen-
tence ”this table is black”. Contrary to what they suggest, the idea was presum-
ably not that this particular sentence is descriptive in every framework. If this
were the claim, then Awodey and Carus’s objection to intrinsically descriptive
sentences would have force. But I take it that Potter’s thought was rather that for
every framework which is sufficiently rich to purport to make sense of the em-
pirical world – i.e. setting aside purely mathematical frameworks – there is some
sentence which every user of this framework will want to classify as descriptive.
Applied to our own language, this means that it does not really matter
whether ”this table is black” is such a sentence, it was just a convenient and
plausible example. All that Potter really needs is the following assumption:
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There is at least one sentence of our language that uncontroversially
describes the empirical world.
And this is a weak claim which, I think, everyone should agree to, and which is
also not undermined by the observation that being descriptive is not an intrinsic
but rather a framework-relative notion. I therefore conclude that the first part of
Awodey and Carus’s reply fails to get at the core of the improved consistency
argument.
The second part of their reply is, on the one hand, much more promising,
but, on the other hand, also harder to evaluate. One fundamental assumption we
have been making is that the things Carnap says about linguistic frameworks – in
particular that inconsistent frameworks have no empirical content – also apply to
natural language, i.e. the language we are speaking. Without this assumption the
charge that, according to Carnap, we have at most defeasible inductive evidence
for thinking that we are talking about an empirical world would not stick. And
it is this presupposition that Awodey and Carus go on to attack:
Though his conception of the scientific, theoretical language was holis-
tic [...], he specifically saw the practical, intuitive part of language as
distinct from it and serving a different purpose. The ordinary linguis-
tic competence of human language user communities is the practical
setting (not a precise framework) within which theoretical languages
are precisely specified [...]. The descriptive capacity of a language
is not destroyed by the discovery of an inconsistency since we can
change the rules or postulates of the theoretical language without
also changing the vocabulary of ordinary objects in our our everyday
language. The purely descriptive sentences in the latter are unaf-
fected by an inconsistency in the theoretical language. (Awodey and
Carus 2004: 213)
Their suggestion seems to be that since ordinary language is not a precise lin-
guistic framework, questions of consistency and empirical content cannot even
arise in the way they do for formalised frameworks. And in this way the ap-
parently absurd conclusion that we can only know that we’re talking about any-
thing empirical at all if we know that our language is consistent can be averted.
Even though we can never be completely sure that some sophisticated formal
language manages to be descriptive, we can at least rest content with our intu-
itive ordinary language – a move that brings Quine’s acquiescence in one’s home
58
Gödel and Incompleteness Gödel’s Consistency Argument
language to mind (Quine 1969b: 49).16
If successful, the natural language is different reply would indeed make the
problem posed by Potter much less pressing. In order to properly evaluate it we
need to know more about how exactly Carnap conceives of the role of natural
language and its relation to linguistic frameworks, however, and we will look
into this matter in chapter 4. One can already note two reasons to be skeptical
about this reply though, one exegetical and the other systematic.
On the exegetical side, the worry is that the reply assumes that there is some
essential difference between natural and formal languages that makes the former
immune to Potter’s objection, whereas Carnap himself seems to deny that there
is such a difference. This emerges quite clearly in an exchange between Carnap
and Strawson on the point of explicating natural language concepts. Carnap
introduces a position called linguistic naturalism, which he describes as follows:
In my view, a language, whether natural or artificial, is an instrument
that may be replaced or modified according to our needs, like any
other instrument. For the naturalists, ordinary language seems to have an
essentially fixed character and therefore to be basically indispensable, just
like our body with its organs, to which we may add accessories like
eyeglasses, hearing aides, and the like, but which we cannot essen-
tially change or replace. [...] Some naturalists seem to think that it
is in principle impossible to learn an artificial language in any other
way than by a translation into our mother tongue. (Carnap 1963b:
938, my emphasis)
Carnap then describes ways in which a group of speakers could learn a con-
structed language which do not involve translating the new language into some
natural language. He sums up the point of this discussion as follows:
My intention in making this point is not, of course, to propose the ac-
tual use of this method for learning a logical language, but merely to
point out the theoretical possibility of such a procedure, and thereby
to refute the widespread view that constructed languages are not autonomous,
but essentially parasitic, based on natural languages. (Carnap 1963b: 938,
my emphasis)
16 This connection is also drawn in Ricketts 2004: 199, albeit in a different context. Interestingly
Carus distances himself from the parallel with Quine in his book (Carus 2007: 291), which I
will discuss some more in section 5.2.3.
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These remarks strike me as being incompatible with an exceptionalist treatment of
natural language, according to which certain questions and problems that arise
for linguistic frameworks do not apply to natural languages at all. There is thus
a tension between Awodey and Carus’s strategy and Carnap’s self-proclaimed
anti-exceptionalism.
On a systematic level there is something unsatisfactory about the proposal
as well. For unless we hear some more about how Carnap conceives of natural
language, and in particular its ability to make contact with the world, it will
seem that natural language here acts as a deus ex machina that is conveniently
wheeled in to solve a problem for Carnap, but about whose inner functioning
we know too little to say whether this move is more than ad hoc. If natural
language remains a black box, critics of Carnap are therefore unlikely to find
Awodey and Carus’s response convincing, and justifiably so.
What is the upshot of Gödel’s argument from incompleteness then? Nei-
ther Gödel’s original nor Potter’s improved version can directly refute Carnap’s
philosophy of mathematics, since his defenders have developed some power-
ful counterarguments. The suspicion that there is some deep problem brought
about by the incompleteness theorems remains, however, since Carnap is pushed
towards positions about the relationship between language, frameworks, and
the world that are hardly innocent and uncontroversial. In a way this confirms
Gödel’s own assessment of the dialectical situation from the letter to Schilpp: a
”complete elucidation of the situation” is very difficult, since ”the subject mat-
ter is closely related to, and in part identical with, one of the basic problems
of philosophy, namely the question of the objective reality of concepts and their




In this chapter I will briefly discuss what is probably the most famous challenge
ever raised to Carnap’s philosophy: Quine’s arguments against the viability of a
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. The aim is not a compre-
hensive evaluation of Quine’s position, about which I will say more in chapter
8. It will be helpful to get a sense of the shape Quine’s arguments take, however,
in order to better appreciate the similarities and differences to Beth’s argument.
Like in the previous discussion of Gödel’s argument from consistency, Carnap
seems to be in a position to defend himself by rejecting some of Quine’s basic
assumptions, and so once again the case against the analyticity of mathematics
remains inconclusive.
3.1 The Carnap-Quine Debate
That Quine rejected the notion of analyticity, which for Carnap plays a major
role, is very well known.1 But what exactly Quine’s reasons for this rejection
were, and how compelling his arguments are, is less well understood. There has
been a lot of scholarship on the Carnap-Quine debate in recent years, and there
is a reasonably broad consensus on the following points:2
(1) Quine thought that for the notion of analyticity to be philosophi-
cally viable, we need to explain the application conditions of the
predicate ’analytic’ for natural languages in behavouristic terms.
1 In his later work Quine was in fact happy to grant that there is some notion of analyticity that
is coherent and may even be useful (Quine 1990: 54f, Quine 1997: 45), but it doesn’t play the
same theoretical role as the kind of analyticity he had attacked earlier.
2 For an overview see Creath 2007. Some of the most important recent papers are Creath 1991,
Stein 1992, O’Grady 1999, George 2000 and Gregory 2003b.
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(2) Quine thought that the task described in (1) cannot be achieved.
(3) Carnap was willing to agree with (2), but rejected the assump-
tion (1), i.e. that without such a behaviourist explication the no-
tion of analyticity is philosophically useless.
(4) This disagreement demonstrates that Carnap and Quine have
quite different conceptions of the relationship between formal
languages with explicit rules and natural language, which reflect
different conceptions of the task of philosophy.
(4) naturally makes the dialectical situation very complex, and it becomes hard
to declare a winner in this debate – instead it is tempting to conclude that both
are right on their own terms. Before we try to adjudicate the dispute, let us look
into (1)–(4) in some more detail though.
If one only reads ”Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Quine 1951) it will probably
not be immediately obvious that the bone of contention is the possibility of
giving behavioural criteria for the application of ’analytic’. In the paper Quine
discards various proposed definitions (relying, for instance, on the notion of
synonomy) of ’analytic’ as uninformative, but those attempted definitions are
not actually ones Carnap himself advocated.
As we have seen, Carnap defines analyticity for specific languages or lin-
guistic frameworks with explicit rules, since this allows him to characterise the
analytic sentences as those that follow from the rules. He stresses the importance
of this in an unpublished response to Quine’s criticisms:
It follows from this clarification that the analytic-synthetic distinction
can be drawn always and only with respect to a language system,
i.e., a language organized according to explicitly formulated rules,
not with respect to a historically given natural language. (Carnap
1990: 432)
In ”Two Dogmas”, Quine’s objection to this approach seems to be as follows:
Carnap only manages to define predicates like ’analytic-in-L1’, ’analytic-in-L2’,
..., where L1 and L2 are specific linguistic frameworks. What would be needed to
vindicate the notion of analyticity, so Quine apparently demands, is a definition
of ’analytic’ for variable languages L.
If this were the heart of the issue then Carnap could plausibly reject Quine’s
demand as unreasonable. This is in fact this what he did on one occasion:
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In case Quine’s remarks are meant as a demand to be given one def-
inition applicable to all systems, then such a demand is manifestly
unreasonable; it is certainly neither fulfilled nor fulfillable for seman-
tic and syntactic concepts, as Quine knows. (Carnap 1990: 430)
The paradigm case of a semantic concept Carnap is alluding to here is truth as
treated by Tarski. The thought is that while Tarski’s machinery allows us to
characterise truth for specific languages, it does not give us a way to define a
truth-predicate that can be applied to sentences of arbitrary languages. Quine
doesn’t seem to have a problem with Tarski’s theory of truth, however, and so it
is understandable that Carnap doesn’t regard the fact that ’analytic’ needs to be
defined for each particular framework as problematic either.
That the disagreement between Carnap and Quine fundamentally concerns
their different conceptions of language comes out more clearly if one looks be-
yond ”Two Dogmas”. While trying to respond to Quine’s criticisms, Carnap in
fact asked Quine whether the target of his objections are definitions of analytic-
ity for natural or formal languages with explicit rules. Quine responds that for
him this distinction is not essential:
You ask whether I mean ”(a) natural languages” or ”(b) codified lan-
guages . . . based on explicitly formulated rules.” [...] It is indifferent
to my purpose whether the notation be traditional or artificial, so long as
the artificiality is not made to exceed the scope of ”language” ordinarily so-
called, and beg the analyticity question itself. [...] The languages I am
talking about comprise natural languages and any (used, or inter-
preted) artificial notations you like, e.g. that of my Mathematical Logic
plus extra-logical predicates. They are not uninterpreted notations.
(Quine, Letter to Carnap on August 9th, 1954 (Creath 1990: 438f), my
emphasis)
This view, according to which natural and formal languages are continuous with
each other, is a major departure from Carnap’s conception. Quine already noted
this crucial difference in the 1940s:
[M]y attitude toward ‘formal’ languages is very different from Car-
nap’s. Serious artificial notations, e.g. in mathematics or in your logic
or mine, I consider supplementary but integral parts of natural lan-
guage. [...] Thus it is that I would consider an empirical criterion
[...] a solution of the problem of synonymy in general. And thus it is
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also that [...] I am unmoved by constructions by Carnap in terms of
so-called ‘semantical rules of a language’. (Quine, Letter to Church
from August 14, 1943, quoted in Verhaegh 2018: 74f)
For Carnap the distinction between natural language, which is messy and often
imprecise, and formal languages, which come with explicit rules, is very im-
portant. While it might be interesting to study natural language directly and
try to come up with behavioural criteria for the application of certain concepts,
this is not what Carnap is chiefly concerned with. Instead he develops formal
languages in which there are clear explicit definitions for analyticity. This is
not to say, however, that analyticity in formal languages is just an arbitrarily
defined notion with no relation whatsoever to anything we do in natural lan-
guage. Carnap rather thinks that we have a reasonably clear understanding of
which natural language sentences we typically regard as analytic, even though
we cannot capture this imprecise notion directly by explicitly defining it in other
terms (Carnap 1990: 431). And even if this were not so, Carnap thinks that the
concept of analyticity might nevertheless prove to be theoretically useful despite
not corresponding to any natural language notion. He thus helpfully sums up
his disagreement with Quine as follows:
Especially Quine’s criticism does not concern the formal correctness
of the definitions in pure semantics; rather, he doubts whether there
are any clear and fruitful corresponding pragmatical concepts which
could serve as explicanda. That is the reason why he demands that
these pragmatical concepts be shown to be scientifically legitimate
by stating empirical, behavioristic criteria for them. If I understand
him correctly, he believes that, without this pragmatical substructure,
the semantical intension concepts, even if formally correct, are arbi-
trary and without purpose. I do not think that a semantical concept,
in order to be fruitful, must necessarily possess a prior pragmatical
counterpart. It is theoretically possible to demonstrate its fruitful-
ness through its application in the further development of language
systems. (Carnap 1955: 35)
Does the Carnap-Quine debate have a winner? It seems not, since on their
own terms Quine and Carnap are both vindicated. One might of course won-
der whose conception of language is to be preferred, but it is not easy to see
how to adjudicate such a question, since it is entangled with two very different
conceptions of the role of philosophy. For Carnap one of the primary tasks of
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philosophy is to study and develop formal languages to be used for science and
by scientists. According to Quine’s naturalism, on the other hand, philosophy
is continuous with science, and there is thus no sense in which philosophy can
stand outside of science and deal with the construction of the language of sci-
ence. It is hardly clear what sort of criteria one could use to evaluate the costs
and benefits of the respective conceptions.
3.2 Quine’s Triviality Objection
The summary I provided hopefully demonstrates that it is too simplistic to re-
gard Quine as the winner of the debate over analyticity. However I think it would
also be too quick to conclude that there was really no disagreement between
Carnap and Quine at all, since they start from different but equally acceptable
background assumptions. It is not very promising to tackle questions such as
”what should we demand of a definition of analyticity?” or ”whose conception
of language is superior?” directly, since in the abstract it is difficult to state what
the criteria of success are. Instead my plan to look at the one specific use Carnap
has for the notion of analyticity that is the topic of this thesis: namely to declare
mathematics to be true in virtue of linguistic rules. Since Quine also objected to
this specific employment, it makes for a useful and more tractable case study.
As we already know, Carnap wants to define analyticity in such a way that
all mathematical statements come out as either analytic, i.e. true, or contradic-
tory, i.e. false. In light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems this task can only
be achieved by stating the definition in a metalanguage which itself contains
mathematics and is stronger than the object language to whose sentences the
predicate ’analytic’ will be applied. It is of course easy to feel that there is some-
thing objectionably circular about this approach. And this is indeed the kind
of objection Quine raises in his ”Carnap and Logical Truth”, since he thinks
that Carnap’s approach trivialises the claim that mathematics is true in virtue of
linguistic rules:3
So construed, however, the thesis that logico-mathematical truth is
syntactically specifiable becomes uninteresting. For, what it says is
that logico-mathematical truth is specifiable in a notation consisting
solely of (a) [names of signs], (b) [an operator expressing concatena-
tion of expressions], and the whole logico-mathematical vocabulary
3 For further discussion of this paper see Isaacson 1992, Creath 2003 and Gregory 2003a.
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itself. But this thesis would hold equally if ”logico-mathematical”
were broadened (at both places in the thesis) to include physics, eco-
nomics, and anything else under the sun; Tarski’s routine of truth-
definition would still carry through just as well. No special trait of
logic and mathematics has been singled out after all. (Quine 1963:
400)4
This sounds like a compelling objection, but the situation is not as straight-
forward as it appears to be. Quine is clearly correct that Carnap’s account of
mathematical truth is not as interesting as the more ambitious attempt to make
sense of mathematics without employing any mathematical concepts at all. But,
as discussed in section 1.2.3, this was not Carnap’s aim.
The question Quine’s complaint raises is definitely a good one. For if it is fine
to use a metalanguage that includes a translation of the object language, then
the metalanguage for a physical theory can include physical notions. And this
makes it natural to think that we can define an analyticity-predicate for physics
as well, which would undermine the claim that analyticity is a distinguishing fea-
ture of mathematics. If so, then Quine would have identified a problem Carnap
should be worried about on his own terms. For if Quine is right, then it seems
that the decision to call mathematics but not physics analytic is an entirely arbi-
trary one, and it is hard to see why we should attach any theoretical importance
to the notion of analyticity.5
I think, however, that without supplementation Quine fails to establish the
result that Carnap’s characterisation of analyticity is trivial and uninteresting.
In order to see why, remember that at its core Carnap’s definition of ’analytic’
for mathematics amounts to the following proposal:
Mathematical Analyticity
φ is analytic iff N  φ, where N is the standard model of arithmetic.
4 More recently, the same point has been made by Peter Koellner:
[...] Carnap revised the account [of the distinction between logical and factual
truth] by replacing this notion with the notion of a truth value being determined
by semantical rules. However, this is hardly an improvement. The semantical
rules are just a Tarskian truth definition which is, in effect, simply a translation
of the object language into the meta-language. It is quite unclear what it means
to say that these rules determine the truth value of a given statement. (Koellner
ms: 34)
5 For this reason Goldfarb thinks that Carnap’s acceptance of semantics was an unwise move,
since the ”semantical approach gives uniform treatment to the logical/mathematical vocab-
ulary and the empirical vocabulary [... which] makes it much harder to distinguish between
[...] analytic and synthetic” (Goldfarb 1997: 63).
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As I understand Quine’s objection, it rests on the assumption that one can
equally apply Carnap’s definition of analyticity to physics or any other science.
But in order to do that in an analogous way, there would need to be something
like a standard model of physics, which, like the standard model of arithmetic, de-
termines all the truth values of physical sentences. And there does not seem
to be such a thing. Of course there is what is called the standard model of
particle physics, but it does not play the same role as standard models do in
mathematical contexts. The standard model of particle physics describes what
fundamental forces and kinds of particles exist, but the model itself, without
adding any empirical hypotheses, does not settle all particular physical claims.
It is a model of the physical world, and hence it would be odd to say that ”there
are 3728 neutrons” is true in the standard model of physics. This is a very dif-
ferent conception from that found in mathematics, since the standard model of
arithmetic just is the universe of natural numbers, it does not merely describe it.
This point can be put in another way. A metalanguage for mathematics will
include mathematical concepts, and one for physics will contain physical con-
cepts – so far so analogous. But as Carnap sets things up, the mathematical
metalanguage will be such that it settles all the truth values of the mathematical
sentences, whereas – at least for some cases – the physical metalanguage merely
states truth-conditions in a disquotational way:
’Ψ(x, y, z, t)’ is true if and only if space-time point < x, y, z > instan-
tiantes the fundamental property Ψ at t.
In this case we will hence not be able to settle whether some specific claim such
as ’Ψ(a, b, c, d)’ is true or false merely by drawing on the rules stated in the
metalanguage.
In a dry but important passage from his Introduction to Semantics, Carnap
spells out what the claim that some sentence is analytic (here called L-true) in a
framework (here called semantical system) amounts to in a precise way:
In our previous discussion we found a characteristic feature of the L-
true sentences of a semantical system S, their truth follows from the
rules of S alone. This characterization as it stands cannot be taken as
a definition of ’L-true in S’. If we expand the phrase ’the truth of Sı
follows from the semantical rules of S’, we see that it does not belong
to the metalanguage M, in which the definition ’L-true in S’ has to
be formulated, but to the metametalanguage MM, i.e. the language
in which the rules for M are formulated. [...] we may reformulate the
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above phrase in this way: ”The sentence ’Sı is true in S’ is L-true in
M”. This phrase, however, speaks about M and hence belongs to MM
but not to M. Therefore it cannot be taken as a definiens for ’Sı is
L-true in S’. It rather expresses a requirement which must be fulfilled
for all sentences of S if the term ’L-true in S’ is to be in agreement
with our intention and traditional use, or, as we may say briefly, if the
definition of ’L-true in S’ is to be accepted as adequate. Therefore we
shall formulate the requirement as a definition (in MM) of adequacy
(in M). (Carnap 1942: 83f)
This can be summed up as follows: a sentence S of some object language is
analytic if and only if the truth of S can be established in the metalanguage
using only the linguistic rules of this metalanguage, i.e. without relying on any
empirical facts. And this conception precisely matches the distinction between
mathematics and physics I described above. As we saw in section 2.1.2, Carnap
considers the specification of the standard model of arithmetic to be a linguis-
tic rule, and therefore the truth values of mathematical sentences follow from
the linguistic rules of the metalanguage – hence they count as analytic. For
physics, on the other hand, the metalanguage merely gives disquotational truth-
conditions using physical vocabulary, and hence the truth values of the object
language statements will in many cases depend on empirical factors. Physics
thus counts as synthetic.
I therefore think that Quine overstates his case in the earlier quote. The
considerations he gives do not establish that Carnap’s distinction is completely
arbitrary and therefore trivial, and so Quine’s advice to “stop tugging at our
bootstraps altogether” (Quine 1951: 33) seems premature. In fact, Quine himself
seems to have had some reservations about the effectiveness of his arguments.
”Carnap and Logical Truth” begins with a striking caveat:
My dissent from Carnap’s philosophy of logical truth is hard to state
and argue in Carnap’s terms. This circumstance perhaps counts in
favor of Carnap’s position. (Quine 1963: 385)6
It is therefore not surprising that in his reply from the Schilpp-volume, Carnap
struggles to see which aspect of his position Quine wants to reject for what
reason. In an uncharacteristically sarcastic passage, Carnap writes the following:
6 Quine’s paper was originally written in 1954, but since the publication of the Schilpp-volume
was delayed by many years Quine in the meantime published it in Synthese (Quine 1960a).
This version, as well as later reprints, do not contain the preamble I am quoting.
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[... Quine] himself says soon afterwards: ”I do not suggest that the
linguistic doctrine is false”. I presume that he wants to say that the
doctrine is not false. (If so, I wish he had said so!) He nowhere
says that the doctrine is meaningless; [...] Therefore we may presume
that he regards the doctrine as true. (If so, ...!) The main point of his
criticism seems rather to be that the doctrine is ”empty” and ”without
experimental meaning”. With this remark I would certainly agree,
and I am surprised that Quine deems it necessary to support this
view by detailed arguments. (Carnap 1963b: 917)
It is easy to sympathise with Carnap’s reaction here. For while Quine’s argu-
ments may work against some ways of drawing the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion, they do not seem very effective against the way Carnap makes use of it, and
consequently it becomes hard to see the relevance of many of Quine’s points.
We thus end up in a similar situation as we did in the previous chapter: just
as Gödel’s argument based on the incompleteness theorems was shown to rely
on un-Carnapian background assumptions, the same seems to hold for Quine.
There remains the nagging feeling that Gödel and Quine have correctly identi-
fied some deep problem for Carnap’s position, but we have not yet found a clear
formulation of it.
In the next part of the thesis I will try to improve on this messy situation by
showing that there is a way to argue against Carnap’s claim that mathematics
is analytic without begging any questions. The argument I ascribe to Beth com-
bines elements of both Gödel and Quine. Like the argument from consistency
it is based on the incompleteness theorems, and like Quine it makes use of the
idea that, on cost of triviality, there need to be behavioural criteria for the use
of ’analytic’. In the next chapter I will start by giving my own reconstruction






Beth’s Argument from Non-Standard
Models
In this chapter I introduce the hero of my thesis: the Dutch philosopher and logi-
cian E. W. Beth. My aim is to show that what I call his argument from non-standard
models successfully demonstrates that Carnap’s response to Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorem fails. Rightly understood, so I will claim, Beth’s argument is more
forceful than both Gödel’s own argument from incompleteness and Quine’s in-
fluential objections to the notion of analyticity.
Beth’s own presentation of his argument is not straightforward, and so the
first half of the chapter contains a detailed reconstruction of Beth’s line of rea-
soning, as well as discussion of Carnap’s response to it. In the course of this
we will revisit an issue that already arose in previous chapters, namely the re-
lationship between linguistic frameworks and natural language. In the second
half of the chapter I then argue that Carnap’s response to Beth is unsatisfactory.
I demonstrate this by focusing on two of the central tenets of Carnap’s philoso-
phy: the principle of tolerance and the internalist treatment of abstract objects.
In the end we will see that Beth’s controversial claim that Carnap cannot treat
all ontological questions as merely pragmatic can be vindicated.
4.1 Carnap and Carnap*
4.1.1 Introducing Carnap*
The argument from non-standard models is contained in Beth’s contribution to
the Schilpp-volume on Carnap, whose unexciting title is ”Carnap’s Views on the
Advantages of Constructed Systems over Natural Languages in the Philosophy
Beth’s Argument from Non-Standard Models Carnap and Carnap*
of Science” (Beth 1963). It is a relatively detailed study of a number of aspects
of Carnap’s philosophy, and also covers topics like the development of Carnap’s
views on mathematics from his days as a student of Frege to the writing of
Logical Syntax, and the consequences of his acceptance of semantics.
For our purposes the relevant sections are VI, VII, and the usually ignored
section X on ”Ontological Commitments”. Broadly speaking, Beth suggests that
the possibility of interpreting formal languages in a model-theoretically non-
standard way poses a problem for Carnap’s philosophy of logic and mathemat-
ics. More specifically, Beth claims that this possibility shows the following:
Beth’s Thesis
Carnap needs to rely on an intuitive interpretation of the metalan-
guage in The Logical Syntax of Language that is not fully captured by
the explicitly formulated rules. This entails that the Principle of Toler-
ance cannot be maintained without restrictions, and also that not all
ontological questions can be treated as matters of pragmatic decision.
(after Beth 1963: 479f, 500f)
It would obviously a major blow to Carnap if Beth’s Thesis were correct, for
both the principle of tolerance and the rejection of ontological questions are core
tenets of his position.
In this chapter I will use first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) as the example
theory to reconstruct Beth’s argument, since it is much more familiar than Car-
nap’s language II towards which the original paper is targeted. The stress on
first-order is important, for one may well think that many of the problems Beth
diagnoses can be avoided by moving to second-order Peano arithmetic (PA2). I
think that this is ultimately incorrect, but postpone further discussion to section
7.3. In order not to get lost it in the details of Beth’s presentation it makes sense
to first describe the overall strategy in broad strokes. The main result Beth relies
on is that theories can be interpreted in unintended ways. He introduces the
following distinction:
In a treatise such as Logical Syntax, natural language can be used in
two different ways, which I should like to denote as strict usage and
amplified usage, respectively. In strict usage of natural language, we
refer to a definite model of the theory to which our statements belong;
it is this model which has been called the intuitive model. In amplified
usage of natural language – and in all usage of formalised languages
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– on the other hand, we refer to any model of this theory. (Beth 1963:
479f)
Let us apply this to Peano arithmetic. Users of PA will usually want to use this
system in a strict way, i.e. with a particular fixed interpretation in mind, namely
the standard model of arithmetic.1 But it is a consequence of both the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems that PA also has mod-
els which are usually called non-standard since they are not isomorphic to the
intended interpretation. As we will soon see, one could in principle imagine
someone using PA in a strict way with a fixed but non-standard model in mind.
And finally there’s amplified usage, in which theories are treated purely alge-
braically, without a particular intended interpretation, as when Hilbert writes to
Frege that the axioms of geometry might apply to point and lines, but also to
”love, law, chimney sweep” (Hilbert, letter to Frege from 21.12.1899, Frege 1980:
40).2
The important observation is that often we do want to use a formal system in
a strict way, but that the intended interpretation is not determined purely by the
axioms and inference rules. Based on this Beth argues as follows:
(1) What Carnap says in Logical Syntax must be read as involving
strict usage of language, i.e. Carnap has one particular intended
interpretation in mind.
(2) This intended interpretation is not pinned down by the explicit
statements Carnap makes in Logical Syntax: someone could read
the book but interpret it in an unintended way.
(3) This shows that there is a sense in which Carnap cannot replace
all appeals to an intuitive notion of interpretation by explicit
rules.
In order to make these points Beth introduces the fictitious protagonist Carnap*,
who reads Carnap’s Logical Syntax but interprets it in an unintended way. (Beth’s
1 The notion of a standard model of arithmetic is potentially ambiguous: one might mean
precisely the natural numbers, in which case there is exactly one standard model, or count
any model that is isomorphic to the natural numbers as standard. As I discuss in section 5.1.1,
Carnap’s approach only requires pinning down a model which is standard in the second,
more liberal sense. Throughout the text I also assume that arithmetical terms and functions
are interpreted in the usual way.
2 In Word and Object (Quine 1960b: 273) Quine complains about a passage by Russell in which
the latter defines mathematics as the subject in which ”we never know what we are talking
about, nor whether what we are saying is true” (Russell 1918: 75). At this point Russell
presumably thought that it is characteristic of mathematics that it is only used in what Beth
calls an amplified way.
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discussion is targeted towards Carnap’s language II, but I will continue to use
PA.) Beth begins by making the uncontroversial point that PA has non-standard
models in which some sentences get assigned different truth value from the
ones they have in the standard model. Calling the standard model of PA M, he
generates such a non-standard model M* by adding ¬ConPA to the axioms of
PA. He then describes Carnap* as a logician ”whose logical and mathematical
intuitions are in accordance with model M*” (Beth 1963: 478). The main task of
this section will be to understand what exactly Beth means by this.
One is tempted to construe the scenario as follows: Carnap and Carnap* both
look at the axioms of PA. Carnap interprets those as being about the natural
numbers, while Carnap* thinks that they should be interpreted with respect to
the non-standard model M*. If they consider the truth of ConPA, for instance,
they will have different opinions. This simple interpretation, however, is at odds
with some of the subsequent remarks Beth makes. Consider the following quote,
where WI I is the consistency sentence for language II:
We made an error in supposing that, for Carnap*, all theorems of
II* are intuitively true; for Carnap*’s set of all theorems of II* does
not coincide with our set of all theorems of II*. Roughly speaking,
Carnap*’s set contains more theorems than ours, and for some of these
additional theorems M* is not a model.
It is easy to see, that for Carnap* non-WI I is a theorem of language
II; hence, for him, II* coincides with II and S* coincides with S. (Beth
1963: 478)
Language II here corresponds to PA, while language II* is PA+¬ConPA. Beth
therefore says that Carnap and Carnap* disagree about what the theorems of
PA+¬ConPA are, and, more specifically, Carnap* thinks that PA+¬ConPA has
more theorems than Carnap supposes. On the face of it these claims are hard
to make sense of. For while initially Carnap and Carnap* were introduced as
differing on the semantic interpretation of certain formal theories, they are now
presented as differing on merely syntactic properties as well.
Beth must therefore have something more than the straightforward interpre-
tation I gave in mind, as Carnap himself helpfully clarifies in his own response
to Beth:
But now Beth proceeds to make a number of further statements about
Carnap* which at first glance appear as obviously false, e.g., the state-
ment that the set of all axioms of II* is different for Carnap* and for
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us, i.e. Carnap and Beth, and the statement that for Carnap* the lan-
guages II* and II coincide. These statements certainly do not follow
from the sole assumption that Carnap* applies the interpretation Int*
to the object languages. (Carnap 1963b: 928f)
Carnap also sums up the solution to these initially puzzling remarks in a more
concise way than Beth himself:
Beth’s statements are understandable only on the basis of an addi-
tional assumption, namely that Carnap* interprets not only the sym-
bolic object languages but also the metalanguage ML in a way differ-
ent from Carnap. Therefore I suppose that Beth makes this additional
assumption, although he does not state it explicitly. And I presume,
more specifically, that Beth assumes that the interpretation of ML by
Carnap* is analogous to his interpretation Int* of II (and II*). (Carnap
1963b: 928f)
This seems correct: for Beth’s description to make any sense, it must be the case
that the metalanguage Carnap* uses is non-standard in some way. In particular,
Carnap*’s metalanguage ML* must be such that in it Carnap* can conclude that
PA is inconsistent. For then it would be clear why he cannot distinguish between
PA and PA+¬ConPA: adding a sentence to an inconsistent theory just gives us
the same inconsistent theory once again.
The question then becomes how exactly Carnap* manages to prove the incon-
sistency of PA in his metalanguage though. As Beth describes it, when Carnap
and Carnap* both go through Logical Syntax, they will agree up to the following
point:
The first place where real trouble arises is indicated by Carnap him-
self on page 113. Carnap there points out that a certain point in the
given definition of ‘analytic in II’ may appear dubious. This defini-
tion contains certain phrases meaning ”for all syntactical properties
of accented expressions . . . ” Now the meaning of such phrases for
Carnap and for Carnap* is different, as for Carnap* the set of all ac-
cented expressions is larger than it is for Carnap. It follows that Carnap
will make (or accept) certain statements concerning the set of all syn-
tactical properties of accented expressions which Carnap* must reject.
(Beth 1963: 480f, my emphasis)
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Beth then writes that this difference in how to interpret the meaning of ’for all
syntactical properties of accented expressions’ has the consequence that Carnap*
will reject Theorem 36.6 of Logical Syntax. And this theorem is the statement that
ConPA is true even though not derivable, which we already discussed in section
2.1.1 when explaining how Carnap intends to overcome Gödelian incomplete-
ness.
Why does Carnap* disagree with Carnap on this point? Remember that the
consistency sentence ConPA is the following universal claim:
∀x¬PrPA(x, p⊥q)
And although its instances ’¬PrPA(0, p⊥q)’, ’¬PrPA(0′, p⊥q) , ... are derivable in
PA, ConPA is not. Carnap solved this problem by having a rule in the metalan-
guage that allowed one to conclude that a universal generalisation is analytic,
and hence true, if all its instances are analytic. Earlier we already noted that
in giving this rule Carnap relied on an infinite class of accented expressions
or numerals 0, 0′, 0′′, ..., which he assumes to be isomorphic to the standard
numbers.
It is precisely this last point that Carnap* takes issue with. For he interprets
the range of the quantifiers differently from Carnap, and admits some numerals
as substitution instances that are non-standard in that they are not generated in
a finite number of steps starting from ’0’. And not only does Carnap* believe
that there are such non-standard numerals, but he furthermore holds that one
of them encodes the proof of a contradiction from the axioms of PA. In his
metalanguage ML*, Carnap* is thus able to show that for some non-standard
numeral ξ, PrPA(ξ, p⊥q) is analytic, and hence he holds the universal claim
ConPA to be false.
The case of Carnap* will appear very peculiar, for it seems that his belief
that there is an instance ’PrPA(ξ, p⊥q)’ does not follow from any other general
principles he accepts, but is rather an independent and brute conviction. Beth
happily admits that this is a strange – even ’psychopathic’ (Beth 1963: 484) –
opinion to have, in particular since Carnap* is not able to actually produce a
syntactic proof of a contradiction from the axioms of PA (Beth 1963: 481). But,
importantly, while it is psychologically implausible that someone like Carnap*
actually exists, the scenario is not incoherent.
There are admittedly some other passages in Beth’s paper that cast doubt on
whether the scenario he envisaged is precisely the one I have described here,
and I will come back to these in section 5.1.3. But for now the more important
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question is why the case of Carnap* should amount to an objection to Carnap’s
position at all.
4.1.2 What’s the Problem?
Carnap* has now been introduced in great detail. But what consequences can
be derived from the possibility of such a character? According to Beth the im-
plications are substantial indeed, for he takes himself to have established the
following three theses:
(B1) Carnap needs to rely on an intuitive interpretation of the meta-
language in The Logical Syntax of Language that is not fully cap-
tured by explicit rules (Beth 1963: 479f).
(B2) The Principle of Tolerance cannot be maintained without restric-
tions (Beth 1963: 479).
(B3) Carnap cannot treat all questions concerning ontology as a merely
pragmatic matter (Beth 1963: 500f).
Why (B1) follows from the possibility of Carnap* is relatively easy to see. If one
thought that the explicitly stated rules that of Logical Syntax uniquely determine
a particular intended interpretation, then Beth successfully shows that this is not
the case. This part of Beth’s argument has also been discussed in the secondary
literature, and in principle commentators tend to agree with Beth’s conclusion:
Clearly, if the metalanguage is a rich one, and if our understanding
of it cannot be exhaustively explicated in terms of rules, deductive
procedures in axiomatic systems, or the like, then Carnap’s ”presup-
position” is an admission that much can never be made explicit, but
must simply be tacitly relied upon. This fits poorly with Carnap’s
proclaimed standards of exactitude and rigor. (Goldfarb and Ricketts
1992: 72)
[...] since no amount of purely syntactical or inferential behavior will
guarantee that [... two investigators] share a metalanguage, they must
trust their practical identifications of shared vocabulary and inference
rules. This ”mystical” trust seems in tension with Carnap’s recom-
mendation that we construct language systems whose logical syntax
is fixed and unambiguous. (Ebbs 2017b: 31)
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What becomes apparent in these representative passages, however, is that Beth’s
objection has not been regarded as a deep challenge that goes at the heart of
Carnap’s view. Instead, Beth has largely been read as flagging that Carnap
overstates his case when he exclusively praises the virtues of exact rules. This is
of course not ideal, but more a case of misleading advertising than a challenge
to the coherence of his position.
For Beth’s argument to have more bite there needs to be a way to get to claims
(B2) and (B3) based on (B1), for these are more damaging to Carnap’s position.
Unfortunately Beth’s own arguments relating to (B2) and (B3) are very brief and
elusive, and so the connection between the need for an intuitive interpretation,
and the principle of tolerance and ontological questions, has been largely ig-
nored. In the second half of this chapter I will show that it is possible to defend
these further claims, but some build-up is required before we get there, since
the dialectical situation is complex. Unlike with Gödel’s ”Is Mathematics Syntax
of Language?” we are in the lucky position to have a reply to Beth’s arguments
from Carnap himself, and it will be helpful to discuss this first.
Carnap begins by agreeing with one of Beth’s main points, namely that when
using a language as a metalanguage, we need to do so with a particular intended
interpretation:
[...] Beth’s thesis says that it is essential for the purposes of my theory
that the English words of my metalanguage ML are sometimes used
with a fixed interpretation. I emphatically agree; I would even say
that this is the case not only sometimes but practically always. For
the reasons explained earlier, this seems to me so obvious that I am
surprised that Beth should regard it as necessary to demonstrate it
by particular examples. (Carnap 1963b: 930)
Furthermore, Carnap is also happy to grant that someone like Carnap* who uses
an unintended metalanguage ML* is possible. He does not regard this possibility
as a reason to worry, however, for he thinks that it is reasonable to assume that he
and the readers of his book use a metalanguage with the standard interpretation
of syntax, i.e. something like ML. The assumption, in other words, is that we are
like Carnap, whereas Carnap* is just a fiction:
Since the metalanguage ML serves as a means of communication [...]
I always presupposed both in syntax and in semantics that a fixed
interpretation of ML, which is shared by all participants, is given.
This interpretation is usually not formulated explicitly; but since ML
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uses English words, it is assumed that these words are understood
in their ordinary senses. The necessity of this presupposition of a
common interpreted metalanguage seems to me obvious. (Carnap
1963b: 929)
This of course raises the question of how we managed to arrive at the intended
interpretation rather than a devious one in the first place. Carnap admits that
there is no fool-proof method, but points out that it would be overdemanding to
require that any misinterpretation of Logical Syntax is impossible. It is for instance
very important that readers of Logical Syntax do not interpret the expression
”no occurrence” as meaning ”at least one occurrence” (Carnap 1963b: 929), but
surely the mere possibility that someone could read the book in such an unin-
tended way does not amount to an objection.3 What matters is that we do not
actually misinterpret each other in the way Beth envisages, and the possibility
of misinterpretation in itself cannot undermine our shared understanding of the
metalanguage ML.
Let us call this response the we actually speak ML reply. On the face of it
seems extremely simple, and one might worry that Carnap fails to fully engage
with Beth’s reasoning. As I will argue later this is true to some extent, but it is
important to appreciate that the reply is a very powerful move. In fact, I think
that if Carnap were justified to maintain that we actually speak Carnap’s ML
rather than Carnap*’s ML*, he would also be in a position to set Beth’s concerns
about the principle of tolerance and ontology aside. This also demonstrates,
however, that to presuppose that we speak metalanguage ML rather than ML*
is not as innocent as Carnap makes it out to be. He writes as if this fact is
as uncontentious as the fact that we all speak some natural language such as
English or German, which is a misleading analogoy. In the end I will maintain
that Carnap is not in a position to hold on to the crucial presupposition of his
reply.
That Carnap doesn’t mention the principle of tolerance in his reply anywhere
is a bit surprising, given that it is so central to his philosophical outlook. One
can try to reconstruct why he did not take Beth’s claim that the principle must be
3 Many years later Paul Benacerraf made a similar point with the help of T. S. Eliot:
. . . I gotta use words when I talk to you
But if you understand or if you don’t
That’s nothing to me and nothing to you
We gotta do what we gotta do . . .
(T.S. Eliot, quoted in Benacerraf 1985: 111)
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restricted seriously, however. One of Beth’s most explicit passages in this regard
is the following:
It should be noted that we also meet here with a limitation regard-
ing the Principle of Tolerance. Indeed, Carnap could be tolerant with
respect to Carnap*, for Carnap would be able to understand why
Carnap adopting for certain personal reasons additional axioms for
Language II is compelled to accept additional theorems and to reject
certain (and indeed all) models for language II. But Carnap* would
never be able to understand why Carnap, having accepted certain ax-
ioms and certain rules of inference, as stated in Logical Syntax, stub-
bornly refuses to accept [the negation of the consistency sentence]
non-WI I as a theorem and believes Language II to have a model.
(Beth 1963: 478)
This elucidates what the connection to the possibility of non-standard interpre-
tations is: namely that the principle of tolerance itself can be interpreted non-
standardly, since it relies on a particular conception of what syntax is. Carnap
demands that logicians ”give syntactical rules instead of philosophical argu-
ments”, but the case of Carnap* shows that someone’s understanding of syntax
might diverge from ours.
It is tempting to construe Beth as making the following point: if we want to
follow the principle of tolerance we need to make sure that we share a common
understanding of syntax, for otherwise inexplicable disagreements like that be-
tween Carnap and Carnap* will arise. And if this is the only upshot of Beth’s
paper, then Carnap can just agree with its conclusion. It is clear from his reply
that he thinks that we do share a common conception of syntax, and hence en-
counters like that between Carnap and Carnap* do not actually arise. Carnap
will admit that they are possible, but it seems fair to say that such cases do not
really demonstrate a limitation of the principle of tolerance in any problematic
sense. For it would surely be unreasonable to demand that there is no possibility
of misinterpreting the principle, and have it resolve any case of miscommunica-
tion. Carnap thus has good reasons to set aside Beth’s (B2) as non-threatening.
This response relies on the we actually speak ML reply, however, and thus
demonstrates how important this assumption is for Carnap’s overall attitude to-
wards Beth’s arguments. In the next section I will scrutinise what, from Carnap’s
perspective, it even means to claim that we speak a particular metalanguage.
This will then enable me to defend Beth’s objections by arguing against the we
actually speak ML reply.
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4.1.3 Metalanguages and How to Use Them
We can approach the topic of using metalanguages by looking into Beth’s claim
that the principle of tolerance faces certain limitations some more. In general
Beth is sympathetic towards Carnap’s tolerant attitude concerning different sys-
tems of logic, so his objection to the principle is not that Carnap fails to recognise
that there is one true logic. After expressing this partial agreement with Carnap,
Beth continues as follows:
But there are, in my opinion, certain natural limitations which go
farther than those which Carnap would be ready to accept. And this
is in particular the case, if the language under consideration is to be
used as a metalanguage. (Beth 1963: 498)
I think that this innocent remark is of great importance, for reflecting on why
the use of a certain language as a metalanguage should be more problematic than
other uses will give us the clue to properly understanding the challenge posed
by Carnap*.
Carnap’s response to Beth was that we do not need to be worried about
Carnap*, since the metalanguage we actually speak is ML and not ML*. This
sounds straightforward at first, until we remember some of ML’s features. In ML
we were able to establish that ConPA is true using a non-recursive and infinitary
rule, for instance. Does it make sense to say that the language we actually speak
– which is first and foremost a natural language such as English or German – has
this ability as well? This question is hard to answer, since natural languages seem
quite different from formal languages with explicit rules such as ML. Carnap’s
reply thus needs to be reconsidered. First we need to understand what it even
means to say that we use a formal system like ML as the metalanguage. And,
secondly, we then need to assess whether Carnap’s claim that we in fact do so is
plausible in light of the answer to the first question.
In order to proceed we need to look at the relationship between natural lan-
guage and linguistic frameworks in more detail. In most of his work Carnap
focusses exlcusively on the formalised frameworks with explicit rules, but his
”Foundations of Logic and Mathematics” contains a discussion of how one can
use such frameworks. It becomes clear that Carnap understands natural lan-
guages in a broadly behaviouristic way:
A language, as, e.g., English, is a system of activities or, rather, of
habits, i.e., dispositions to certain activities, serving mainly for the
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purposes of communication and of co-ordination of activities among
the members of a group. (Carnap 1939: 3)
Obviously natural language understood in this sense cannot be the same kind
of thing as linguistic frameworks, since the latter are constituted by linguistic
rules. But the two notions of language are not completely unrelated either. Car-
nap thinks that we can coordinate languages understood as formal calculi with
languages understood as systems of dispositions. He describes this process of
coordination as a kind of radical translation, where we observe a population of
speakers and their behaviour, and then construct a linguistic framework with
rules that correspond to the speakers’ linguistic dispositions.4 He stresses that
the interpreters should not think of themselves as literally investigating the rules
of the actually spoken natural language, but rather as offering a rational recon-
struction:
Strictly speaking, the rules which we shall lay down are not rules
of the factually given language B; they rather constitute a language
system corresponding to B which we will call the semantical system
B-S. (Carnap 1939: 6f)
Despite this caveat we can now give some content to the claim that we, or some
other group of people, speak a particular formal language or adopt a linguistic
framework. For it amounts to the claim that the explicit linguistic rules of the
relevant framework correspond to the linguistic dispositions the speakers actu-
ally have. If, to take a simple example, speakers are disposed to reason in accord
with modus ponens, then it is appropriate to capture this fact using a calculus
that contains modus ponens as an inference rule.
The situation is complicated by the fact that our linguistic behaviour does not
unambiguously determine one unique framework to be the best reconstruction.
As Carnap points out, the dispositions of speakers can usually be captured by
various competing framework rules:
Suppose we have found that the word ’mond’ of B was used in 98 per
cent of the cases for the moon and in 2 per cent for a certain lantern.
Now it is a matter of our decision whether we construct the rules
4 I rely on Ricketts’ view that for Carnap logical calculi need to be coordinated with the ’log-
ically amorphous’ natural language (Ricketts 2003). This interpretation has been challenged
by Carus, who holds that instead of a sharp divide between natural and formal languages
Carnap sees their relationship as continuous (Carus 2004, Carus 2007, for discussion see
Richardson 2012 and Wagner 2012). I discuss Carus’s views some more in section 5.2.3.
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in such a way that both the moon and the lantern are designata of
’mond’ or only the moon. If we choose the first, the use of ’mond’ in
those 2 per cent of cases was right – with respect to our rules; if we
choose the second, it was wrong. (Carnap 1939: 6)
It is tempting to conclude that this underdetermination of frameworks by lin-
guistic behaviour leads to the kind of problems Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgen-
stein’s rule-following considerations brings out (Kripke 1982). Suppose we ob-
serve a population of speakers who seem to use addition, for instance, but never
deal with numbers greater than 10,000. It might seem that ascribing a frame-
work that includes rules for addition to them would be as correct as the ascrip-
tion of a deviant framework with rules for quaddition based on the following
quus-function:
x quus y =
{
x + y if x ≤ 10,000 and y ≤ 10,000
137 otherwise
What would Carnap say about this case? At times he seems to endorse the
radical thesis that there are no standards of correctness at all when it comes to
coordinating linguistic frameworks with speech behaviour:
The facts [about linguistic behaviour] do not determine whether the
use of a certain expression is right or wrong but only how often it
occurs and how often it leads to the effect intended, and the like. A
question of right or wrong must always refer to a system of rules.
(Carnap 1939: 6f)
In a way this would fit Carnap’s attitude to framework choice in general: just as
there are no non-pragmatic standards of correctness when it comes to framework
adoption, there are no factual external questions about framework coordination
either. But this view has radical consequences, for we seem forced to say that
there are no semantic facts about natural language at all – not even facts like in
German, the word ’Mond’ refers to the moon.
In Carnap’s ”Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages” from 1954, it
becomes clear that this radical non-factualism is not what Carnap has in mind.5
Carnap there argues that while the extension of some terms may not be com-
pletely precise, there are nevertheless empirical facts about what natural lan-
5 Some commentators suggest that Carnap should have embraced this option, however, and I
will hence come back to this topic in in chapter 6.
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guage expressions refer to (Carnap 1955: 34). More than that, he even intends to
defend the existence of facts about intensions against the criticisms of Quine:
The intensionalist thesis in pragmatics, which I am defending, says
that the assignment of an intension is an empirical hypothesis which,
like any other hypothesis in linguistics, can be tested by observa-
tions of language behavior. On the other hand, the extensionalist thesis
asserts that the assignment of an intension, on the basis of the pre-
viously determined extension is not a question of fact but merely a
matter of choice. The thesis holds that the linguist is free to choose
any of those properties which fit to the given extension; he may be
guided in his choice by a consideration of simplicity, but there is no
question of right or wrong. Quine seems to maintain this thesis [...]
(Carnap 1955: 37)6
In general Carnap thus seems happy to accept semantic facts about natural lan-
guage, which is good since they are required by his reply to Beth – that we speak
metalanguage ML rather than ML* – as well.
For the purposes of my argument I will also assume that Carnap can respond
to Kripke’s challenge somehow, and maintain that our linguistic behaviour is
best captured by an addition rather than a quaddition framework, by a modus
ponens framework rather than some deviant alternative inference rule, and so
on. Whether this assumption is justified in light of Carnap’s actual view is
admittedly doubtful. If there is any difference between a population that uses
addition and one that uses quaddition even though they never actually calculate
with numbers larger than 10,000, this difference must presumably consist in the
presence of certain dispositions to calculate in such-and-such ways. And Carnap’s
theory of dispositions makes it quite hard to account for dispositions of this
kind. In ”Testability and Meaning” he explains disposition predicates such as ’x
is soluble’ in terms of so-called reduction sentences:
’Q3’ cannot be defined by D, nor by any other definition. But we can
introduce it by the following sentence:
(R:) (x)(t)[Q1(x, t) ⊃ (Q3(x) ≡ Q2(x, t))],
6 On another occasion, Carnap also writes that ”Quine’s arguments to the effect that the lexi-
cographers actually have no criterion for their determinations [of the meanings of words] did
not seem at all convincing to me” (Carnap 1963b: 920).
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in words: ”if any thing x is put into water at any time t, then, if x is
soluble in water, x dissolves at the time t, and if x is not soluble in
water, it does not.” This sentence belongs to that kind of sentences
which we shall call reduction sentences. (Carnap 1936: 440f)
Reduction sentences are in effect conditionals which, even though they cannot
be used to eliminate the disposition predicate as an explicit definition would,
state in what circumstances the disposition predicate does or does not apply.
The reduction sentences usually involve a test condition, in this case ’x is put in
water’. And as Carnap himself stresses, one consequence of his account is that
for many objects it will be indeterminate whether they are soluble or not, since
they are never put into water at all:
If we establish one reduction pair (or one bilateral reduction sentence)
as valid in order to introduce a predicate ’Q3’, the meaning of ’Q3’ is
not established completely, but only for the cases in which the test
condition is fulfilled. [...] In the case of the predicate ’soluble in wa-
ter’ we may perhaps add the law stating that two bodies of the same
substance are either both soluble or both not soluble. This law would
help in the instance of the match; it would, in accordance with com-
mon usage, lead to the result ”the match c is not soluble,” because
other pieces of wood are found to be insoluble on the basis of the
first reduction sentence. Nevertheless, a region of indeterminateness
remains, though a smaller one. (Carnap 1936: 445)
By the same kind of reasoning, so it seems, it would be indeterminate whether
’x is disposed to respond 137 when asked to calculate with number larger than
10,000’ applies to anyone who has never actually done so – at least unless we
can find any general laws of nature which settle this matter.7
We will revisit Carnap’s account of dispositions in section 7.4, but for now
I will make the dialectically generous assumption that he can respond to rule-
following skepticism à la Kripkenstein in some way. The point I will make in
the following is that the case of metalanguages ML versus ML* is relevantly
unlike the case of addition versus quaddition. The assumption that Carnap has
a solution to the rule-following problem on its own thus does not enable him to
rebut the challenge posed by Beth.
7 In Carnap 1955 Carnap sounds very optimistic about invoking general laws of nature to
account for dispositions about linguistic behaviour. For a more wide-ranging survey of Car-
nap’s position on dispositions see Schmitz 2007.
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4.2 Tolerance and Abstract Objects
4.2.1 Against Infinitary Rules
I am now in a position to present my interpretation of Beth’s argument. In
this section I will give a reading of Beth’s second thesis that turns it into a real
challenge to Carnap:
(B2) The Principle of Tolerance cannot be maintained without restric-
tions (Beth 1963: 479).
The line of thought can be summed up as follows: even if we grant that linguis-
tic dispositions can be coordinated with framework rules for cases like modus
ponens or addition, this strategy does not suffice to substantiate the claim that
we speak ML rather than ML*. This is because these metalanguages contain
non-recursive inference rules, and, given some natural assumptions, there are
no linguistic dispositions that these rules could correspond to. When it comes to
metalanguages, tolerance thus needs to be restricted to languages with recursive
rules – which undermines Carnap’s approach to the philosophy of mathematics.
Remember that the aim of the strong metalanguage in Logical Syntax is to
define analyticity in such a way that each purely mathematical sentence is either
analytic or contradictory. And it is clear that there is no straightforward sense in
which we have dispositions that correspond to this feature of the metalanguage,
as Ricketts also points out:
It is implausible to hold that a classical mathematician who uses Car-
nap’s Language II [...] is in any sense disposed to affirm or deny each
mathematical sentence of this language. And nothing Carnap says
suggests he believes mathematicians are so disposed. Speech habits
thus do not fix the L-rules for a calculus instantiated by a language.
(Ricketts 2003: 262)
One can argue, moreover, that this lack of a disposition to assert all true math-
ematical sentences is not just a contingent fact, but that – for us finite human
beings at least – it is impossible to have such dispositions. While it is relatively
uncontroversial to think that there are dispositions corresponding to finitary and
recursive inference rules such as modus ponens, it is widely held that human
beings do not have the capacity to follow non-recursive and infinitary rules such
as the ω-rule. This has been called the Cognitive Constraint: ”humans cannot be
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attributed non-computational causal powers” (Warren and Waxman 2020: 485).
It is motivated by McGee in the following way:
Human beings are products of nature. They are finite systems whose
behavioral responses to environmental stimuli are produced by the
mechanical operation of natural forces. Thus, according to Church’s
Thesis, human behavior ought to be simulable by a Turing machine.
This will hold even for idealized humans who never make mistakes
and who are allowed unlimited time, patience, and memory. (McGee
1991: 117)
To ascribe the ability to assert all true mathematical sentences to someone would
violate the Cognitive Constraint. For since no Turing machine can enumerate all
the true mathematical sentences, it would be impossible to model the relevant
ability. And this observation also casts doubt on a claim by Carnap we already
encountered in section 2.1.2, namely that ”there is nothing to prevent the practi-
cal application of” infinitary rules such as the ω-rule. Whatever Carnap had in
mind when he wrote this, there is a clear sense in which we cannot just use the
ω-rule like any other rule. For Turing machines cannot use rules with infinitely
many premises, and if the Cognitive Constraint is correct, then neither can we.8
The natural conclusion is that our dispositions can at most correspond to
recursive inference rules of linguistic frameworks, not to non-recursive ones.
But since the latter are crucial to establish the analyticity of mathematics in
the metalanguage ML, this undermines the claim that we actually speak this
particular metalanguage.
Ultimately I think that this conclusion is not only natural, but indeed correct.
When read in the way I propose, Beth’s argument successfully establishes that
Carnap’s reliance on non-recursive inference rules is in tension with his own
conception of language. This claim can be further substantiated by consider-
ing Ricketts’ reaction to the lack of dispositions corresponding to non-recursive
rules. He suggests that there is nevertheless a sense in which our speech be-
haviour can match a non-recursive frameworks, even though the relevant kind
of agreement is quite loose:
We see, then, that as regards transformation rules, the agreement
between a calculus and speech habits in virtue of which a language
8 This is at least the orthodox view among philosophers of mathematics (Field 1994,
Raatikainen 2005, Smith 2013: 332, Button and Walsh 2018: chapter 7). In section 7.4 I discuss
Jared Warren’s recent argument that following the ω-rule is possible without violating the
Cognitive Constraint.
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can be taken to instantiate a calculus is rather loose. For a speaker’s
habits to agree with a calculus, Carnap appears to require little more
than that the speaker not be disposed to affirm any contravalid [=
false] sentence nor to deny any valid [= true] sentence. (Ricketts 2003:
262)
Is it possible to argue that our speech dispositions correspond to ML rather
than ML* on this basis? At first sight one might think that the answer is yes.
For ConPA is true in ML and false in ML*. With few exceptions everyone who
understands what it means either accepts ConPA or is neutral about its truth
value. So by Ricketts’ criterion ML* is not compatible with our dispositions.
This argument does not go far enough to help Carnap, however, for at least
three reasons. Firstly, one must keep in mind that ConPA is just one exam-
ple of an undecidable sentence, even though of course an especially interesting
one. But there are infinitely many other purely mathematical sentences which are
independent of the axioms of PA, and for most of them we will have no inclina-
tion to either assert or deny them. So even if our speech behaviour excludes the
particular metalanguage ML* Beth describes, there will still be infinitely many
alternative metalanguages ML**, ML***, etc., that are compatible with it, and
which differ concerning the truth value of some undecidable sentence. Using
Ricketts’ criterion, one can thus at most argue that we do not speak ML*, but we
cannot draw the further conclusion that we do speak ML, rather than one of the
infinitely many other non-standard metalanguages.
Secondly, consider the following hypothetical scenario: as a matter of fact
Goldbach’s conjecture can be derived from the Peano axioms, but the mathemat-
ical public has been convinced by a proof with an as yet undiscovered mistake
in it that the negation of Goldbach’s conjecture is provable in PA. In this case,
should we conclude that PA is not an adequate way to capture the language of
these mathematicians, since they a sentence that is false in PA? That does not
seem right. What the mathematicians mistakenly believe is that their disposi-
tions to reason in line with the Peano axioms commit them to also accept the
negation of the Goldbach conjecture. The latter disposition is not supposed to
be a wholly independent addition to these more basic dispositions, but rather a
consequence of them. If this line of thought is correct, then Carnap would at least
have to argue that our acceptance of ConPA is not a brute fact, but somehow
flows from the more basic dispositions that constitute our acceptance of the ax-
ioms of PA. And it is hard to see how this could be done, given that the axioms
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corresponding to the basic dispositions don’t entail ConPA.9
Thirdly, there are further problems for Carnap if we look at theories stronger
than Peano arithmetic. It is indeed plausible that we in fact accept ConPA, since
the consistency of PA is regarded as well-established. But the case of PA was
just one convenient example, and, in light of the principle of tolerance, we can
also use and discuss various other logical systems, such as Zermelo-Fraenckel
set theory (ZFC). If Carnap wants to treat ZFC in analogy to the case of PA, he
needs to claim that we use a metalanguage which settles the consistency sentence
ConZFC, and in general for any theory T we want to use, we would need to speak
a metalanguage in which ConT is true. But for many logical systems, such as
ZFC plus some large cardinal axiom, it will be an open question whether the
system is consistent or not, and hence there will be no established disposition to
either assert or deny the relevant consistency sentence. So even if we grant that
we speak a metalanguage that settles the consistency claim for the specific case
of PA, this strategy does not generalise in the way Carnap’s overall philosophy
of mathematics requires.10
Let me sum up my interpretation of Beth’s objection. Carnap’s broadly be-
haviourist conception of the relationship between natural and formal languages
can accommodate the using and sharing of weak metalanguages with recursive
axioms. But, as we saw, in Logical Syntax Carnap uses a strong metalanguage
which includes infinitary inference rules. And for metalanguages of this kind
Carnap does not in general seem to be in a position to say that we have adopted
one – such as ML – rather than another – such as ML* – since our linguistic
dispositions cannot single out one over the other. Consequently no sense can be
made of sharing such a metalanguage either – and hence Carnap’s reply to Beth
fails to address the real problem.
The argument demonstrates that there is a tension between the two distinct
9 This kind of worry is similar to issues that arise in discussions of what has been called the
normatively of meaning. It seems that when we understand the word ’red’, for instance, there
is a sense in which we should only apply the word to red things and not to non-red things,
regardless of whether we actually are disposed to do so. Kripke has forcefully argued that
it is not easy to account for the relevant normativity (Kripke 1982), however. See Boghossian
1989 for a useful survey.
10 Some general remarks on the relationship between theories and their consistency sentences
are in order here. In the main text I frequently use ConPA as an example of an undecidable
sentence, since it is indeed independent from PA (as is ConZFC from ZFC). It is not the
case, however, that for every theory T its consistency sentence ConT is independent of it. The
theory that results from adding ¬ConPA to PA, for instance, is such that it proves the negation
of its own consistency sentence, i.e. ¬ConPA+¬ConPA . It is hard to imagine anyone seriously
using a theories of this kind, however, and I will therefore set them aside. See Warren 2015a
for a scenario in which Martians reason in accordance with PA+¬ConPA though.
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roles Carnap has for metalanguages. In the first instance they are needed to
make communication possible:
Means of Communication
Unless participants in a discussion use the same metalanguage, there
is no genuine communication between them.
And it is hard to deny that there must be some language which plays this role.
What is distinctive of Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, however, is that he
thinks that metalanguages also play a second role:
Resolves Incompleteness
Since by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems no recursive mathematical
theory is complete, a strong metalanguage with infinitary rules needs
to settle the truth and falsity of undecidable sentences.
This move is supposed to capture the idea that mathematical truth is a matter of
linguistic rules. Carnap seems to have assumed that relying on strong metalan-
guages for this task is unproblematic, since objections to their use would have to
rely on philosophical considerations, and are hence excluded by the principle of
tolerance. But Beth’s argument shows that this is too quick. For when a formal
language is actually to be used as a metalanguage, there needs to be a sense in
which our linguistic dispositions correspond to the rules of this language. And
this requirement severely limits what languages can be employed in this role.
If this is correct, Carnap thus faces a dilemma: resolving incompleteness
requires strong metalanguages, using a metalanguage to communicate requires
weak metalanguages.
4.2.2 Ontology and Ontological Commitments
In addition to the principle of tolerance, Beth also raised an objection against
Carnap’s attitude towards ontology:
(B3) Carnap cannot treat all questions concerning ontology as a merely
pragmatic matter (Beth 1963: 500f).
This point still requires a more detailed discussion, for it is not immediately clear
how the considerations about metalanguages, infinitary rules, and dispositions
that have occupied us so far are related to questions concerning ontology. It is
the aim of this and the next section to elucidate the matter, and to argue that
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Beth’s case for (B3) is strong as well. The overall idea is as follows: Carnap
cannot account account for determinate facts about syntax without relying on
ontological posits, understood in an external sense.
The following is probably the most explicit passage on this topic by Beth
himself:
And finally the notion of a standard model, if understood in accor-
dance with strict usage, involves an appeal to certain ontological com-
mitments. Therefore, in connection with the problem of the method
of semantics, a discussion on the acceptance or rejection of certain
ontological commitments cannot be avoided. And such a discus-
sion cannot be restricted, as Logical Syntax suggests, to the question
whether a certain phrase ”for all properties ...” can be formulated in
S (or M2); for it remains to be seen whether this phrase ”for all prop-
erties ...” can be interpreted as ”for all properties whatsoever,” and,
if understood in accordance with strict usage, such an interpretation
is impossible without an appeal to certain ontological commitments.
(Beth 1963: 501)
Beth seems to be saying that we cannot use Carnapian metalanguages in accor-
dance with strict usage without appealing to ontological considerations. But un-
fortunately it remains unclear what exactly such an appeal to ontology amounts
to, and why this alleged connection between strict usage and ontology obtains.
To make matters worse, some of Beth’s remarks about the difference between the
ontological commitments of Carnap and Carnap* are apt to confuse the reader:
In particular, Carnap* will not accept the existence of our set of sym-
bols:
0, 0’, 0”, . . . etc.
by which we mean, the real set, without the additional elements
which Carnap* wrongly supposes to be contained in it. On the other
hand, we accept the existence of Carnap*’s so-called set of numerals,
but we know that, in addition to all numerals it must contain still
other elements. We even understand why Carnap*, because of his fa-
tal inclination for nonnormal ontological commitments, is unable to
see his own errors. As Spinoza said: veritas norma sui et falsi est. (Beth
1963: 499f)
91
Beth’s Argument from Non-Standard Models Tolerance and Abstract Objects
Since by construction Carnap* accepts the existence of more numerals than Car-
nap does, it is peculiar that Beth now claims that Carnap* rejects the existence
of the set of standard numerals, for this is just a subset of the set of numerals he
believes in.
There is a way to make sense of these remarks however, based on a technical
result known as the overspill lemma (Kaye 1991: section 6.1). The lemma shows
that in PA it is impossible to define a formula φ(x) such that, if PA is interpreted
in a non-standard model, φ(x) only applies to the standard elements. Instead
some non-standard elements always spill over into the extension of φ(x). This
result can be glossed as showing that it is impossible to characterise the standard
numbers from within PA. And it seems reasonable to interpret Beth’s claim that
Carnap* is ”unable to see his own errors” as alluding to precisely this fact: from
his perspective it is impossible to pick out the set of numerals Carnap considers
to be real – the standard ones, that is – and so there is some sense in which
Carnap* cannot accept the existence of these numerals.11
In itself this observation does not suffice to explain the alleged problem with
Carnap’s purely internal treatment of ontology, however. I think that the source
of the confusion is that Beth says too little about what he means by ontological
commitment (which is also what Carnap complains about in his reply). For this
notion was of course introduced and popularised by Quine, and so we need
to be careful when using it in a discussion of Carnap. Here is one of Quine’s
well-known definitions:
[A] theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the
bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order
that the affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine 1953: 13f)
In section 1.1.1 we already saw that Carnap was not happy with the terminol-
ogy Quine recommends, for he thought that using the name ’ontology’ makes
Quine’s project appear too similar to traditional kinds of metaphysics they both
reject. But, importantly, Carnap agreed with Quine that the connection between
quantification and what exists is of great importance:
11 The overspill lemma is frequently attributed to Abraham Robinson, but people rarely cite an
exact source. A lot of his work on non-standard models was done in the 1960s, however,
see for instance Robinson 1961: section 3.1 for discussion of something akin to the overspill
result, even though with a different terminology. This makes my proposed reading of Beth
somewhat anachronistic, since even though it only appeared in 1963, his paper must have
been written in the mid to late 1950s. This can be deduced from the fact that in a footnote of
his reply to Beth, Carnap has a note added in 1962 which refers to two books from 1958 and
1959 that have appeared ”in the meantime” (Carnap 1963b: 927fn24).
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W.V. Quine was the first to recognize the importance of the introduc-
tion of variables as indicating the acceptance of entities. “The ontol-
ogy to which one’s use of language commits him comprises simply
the objects that he treats as falling . . . within the range of values of
his variables.” (Carnap 1956a: 214n3)
In light of this Beth’s claim that Carnap needs to accept certain ontological com-
mitments seems correct but uninteresting. For if to be ontologically committed to
numbers, for instance, is just to use a theory in which numbers are being quanti-
fied over, then Carnap of course agrees that we can and should use a framework
which is ontologically committed in this way. In fact the whole point of Carnap’s
internal Platonism was to demonstrate that there is nothing objectionably meta-
physical about ontological commitments understood in this sense. It is therefore
understandable that in his reply to Beth, Carnap refers the reader to his distinc-
tion between internal and external existence questions (Carnap 1963b: 933).
I think that the point Beth intends to make is different, however. As I under-
stand him, he wants to argue that Carnap needs to allow for cases where what
exists is not just a purely framework-internal matter. In other words, Beth thinks
that the case of Carnap* shows that there must be some external questions about
ontology which cannot be treated as merely pragmatic.
In order to appreciate this argument, let us recall the overall strategy behind
Carnap’s internal Platonism. The idea was to make talking about abstract ob-
jects unproblematic by construing the relevant area of discourse as internal to
a linguistic framework and analytic. One important fact that I didn’t dwell on
earlier, but which has become especially salient in the meantime, is that syn-
tactic entities such as numerals, sentences, and proofs – and ultimately also the
frameworks themselves – are abstract entities too. As Friedman usefully sums
up, this is one of the important upshots of Beth’s Carnap* case:
The crux of Beth’s argument is that syntax is itself a kind of arith-
metic (as becomes especially clear in a Gödel numbering, for exam-
ple). And, viewed as an arithmetic, a Carnapian syntax language
or metalanguage may then have non-standard models – containing
non-finite numbers (non-finite sequences of expressions) beyond the
standard numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . (so that, in the case of syntax, there may
be more than a finite number of numerals 0, 0′, 0′′,..., for example, or
derivations may have more than a finite number of steps). (Friedman
2009: 238)
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I think that the best way to appreciate Beth’s argument for ontology in an ex-
ternal sense is to consider how Carnap’s internalist strategy can be applied to
syntax, which is what I will do in the rest of this chapter.
Before I move on I want to briefly reflect on the abstractness of syntax. From
time to time there have been attempts to construe syntactic entities as concrete,
such as that explored in Nelson Goodman and Quine’s well-known paper ”Steps
Towards a Constructive Nominalism” (Goodman and Quine 1947). Carnap him-
self was not uninterested in such radical forms of nominalism and finitism, and
he discussed this issue with Quine and Tarski in 1941. An obvious problem
quickly arises, however: for many purposes we need syntactic objects of arbi-
trary length, but identifying syntactic items with concrete entities threatens to
impose arbitrary upper bounds. Carnap makes this vivid using an example:
S1 is proved through a proof which more-or-less fills up the largest
star; further, a derivation of S2 from S1 more-or-less fills up the same
star. But the concatenation of both chains of sentences is nowhere.
Consequently, according to the proposed finitistic concepts, we can-
not say that we have proved S2. But every logician will surely want
to say that if S1 is proven and S2 is derived from S1, then S2 is also
proved (not merely ”provable,” which is inexpressible in this lan-
guage). (Carnap in Frost-Arnold 2013: 165)
Carnap seriously considered whether we can make sense of the idea that even in
a finite universe are there infinitely many arrangement-possibilities of the finitely
many things. He sketches this approach as follows:
I : If we have only finitely many things, and thus finitely many names
‘a,’ ‘b,’...‘Q,’ then we can build arbitrarily long sequences:
R(a, a)
S(a, a, a)
T(a, a, a, a)
...
Naturally, in the same world, we cannot write down arbitrarily long
sequences; but with the help of abbreviations, we can indeed talk
about them. With these, we can build an unrestricted arithmetic.
(Frost-Arnold 2013: 163)
94
Beth’s Argument from Non-Standard Models Tolerance and Abstract Objects
The idea that there is a potential infinity of such sequences in the absence of any
actual infinity of things is nothing new. In fact Hilbert’s finitism was based on
such a potential infinity of strokes (|, ||, |||, ...), as Bernays helpfully summarises:
[...] the objects of intuitive number theory, the number signs, are,
according to Hilbert, also not ”created by thought”. But this does
not mean that they exist independently of their intuitive construction,
to use the Kantian term that is quite appropriate here. But the con-
struction always only yields either a single determinate figure or a
procedure for obtaining a further figure from a given one (e.g. by
affixing ”+1”). But it does not lead to the idea of a simultaneous
existence of ”all” the number signs. (Bernays 1998: 226).
It seems that in the discussion at Harvard, Quine and Tarski – who were un-
sympathetic towards modal notions and the distinction between potential and
actual infinites anyway – convinced Carnap that this approach is unfruitful.12
While the consequence they drew was to take a closer look at nominalism, Car-
nap eventually concluded that the antipathy towards accepting the existence of
infinitely many objects was based on a confusion. We saw that by the time he
wrote ”Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Carnap had come to accept what
I called internal Platonism, according to which nominalist scruples are unmo-
tivated. In the following I will therefore focus on how the mature Carnap can
account for syntax, and set the earlier attempts to identify syntactic entities with
anything concrete aside.
4.2.3 The Determinacy of Syntax
Let us once again consider the theory of Peano arithmetic. Here are some prop-
erties PA has:
’2+2=4’ is derivable from PA.
’There are infinitely many primes’ is derivable from PA.
’0=1’ is not derivable from PA.
PA is consistent.
PA is a formal theory, and hence an abstract syntactic object. Consequently the
properties I just mentioned are properties of an abstract object. And this means
12 I will come back to the question whether modality can help Carnap in section 7.2, and argue
for a negative answer.
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that, if Carnap’s internalist treatment of all abstract objects is to succeed, he
needs to account for these properties by virtue of linguistic frameworks some-
how.
As I understand him, Beth thinks that the case of Carnap* demonstrates that
we run into problems when accounting for syntax in a way compatible with
internal Platonism. For using Gödelisation we can encode claims about what
PA does or does not entail in the language of arithmetic, and hence express
them within PA. And it appears to be a consequence of this that, depending
on what model we use to interpret PA, we can either regard it as consistent or
inconsistent:
This remark implies at once a positive solution to a problem which
I stated once in connection with a critical analysis of Logical Syntax:
do the syntactical properties of a given object language O depend on
the choice of a syntax language S? For, from our point of view, the
choice of S allows us to believe in the inconsistency of II, the choice of
S* allows us to prove the inconsistency of II, whereas the choice of a
suitable extension of II allows us to prove the consistency of II. (Beth
1963: 478)
This point can be made more clearly if one keeps in mind the distinction between
linguistic frameworks, which comprise both an object and a metalanguage, and
the mere object language PA. The internalist would have no problems with syn-
tax at all if any arithmetised claim about syntax would just be straightforwardly
derivable from PA. But by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem we know
that this is not so, with ConPA being the salient example. For this reason it is not
possible to account for all the syntactic facts about PA by adopting the following:
Syntactic Proposal
φ is true iff PA ` φ.
Carnap’s way out was to conceive of frameworks as bundles of object and strong
metalanguages, which jointly determine truth and falsity for mathematical sen-
tences. We thus ended up with a linguistic framework that combined the object
language PA with a metalanguage which referred to the standard model of arith-
metic, resulting in the following definition:
Semantic Proposal
φ is true iff N  φ.
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One might think that this solves the problem, for since the standard model N
settles the truth value of every arithmetical claim, it also settles the status of all
claims about syntax. The problem with this, however, is that one can construct
a non-standard model of PA M in which ConPA comes out false:
Competing Semantic Proposal
φ is true iff M  φ.
Since, as Beth stresses in the quote, the object language PA does not uniquely
determine one of these competing interpretations, we thus end up with two
distinct linguistic frameworks: one based on the Semantic Proposal, the other
on the Competing version. And so the internalist who wants to account for
syntax has to deal with an embarrassment of riches: if we want to stick to the
view that all syntactic claims have one determinate truth value, we need some
reason to discount the deviant framework based on the Competing Semantic
Proposal as being irrelevant for matters of syntax.
Based on this observation, we can begin to understand why Beth thinks that
there must be some ontological questions that are both factual and external. We
get there by combining the following two theses:
Determination Thesis
If the axioms of some object-language OL leave the truth value of
some sentence unsettled, and there are metalanguages M1 and M2
that determine different truth values for this sentence, then the sen-
tence simpliciter has no determinate truth value – unless some non-
linguistic factor settles the matter.
Determinate Consistency
The syntactic properties of object-languages such as PA, in particular
their consistency, are not indeterminate.
That Beth holds the Determination Thesis was already suggested by the quote
above. It is further supported by the fact that Beth cites a review of Logical Syntax
by Kleene, who reasons as follows:
If logic and mathematics are taken as wholly formal, one apparently
must reject the conception, that a sentence S of classical mathematics
is necessarily either true or false in such a sense that the problem, to
determine which is the case, belongs to logic and mathematics when
S (or "S is analytic") is irresoluble in terms of d-rules already stated.
(Kleene 1939: 84f)
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The d-rules are the purely syntactic rules of derivation in the object language,
and hence Kleene’s conclusion is in effect that mathematical sentences which are
undecidable in PA have no determinate truth value.
Beth doesn’t state the Determinate Consistency assumption explicitly any-
where, but we can be pretty sure that he would have agreed to it. For even a
conventionalist and proponent of tolerance, who thinks that we are free to adopt
any system of rules and axioms we like, will presumably say that once the rules
are accepted it is not a further matter of choice what follows from them. We in
fact already saw some evidence that Carnap endorses such a position in section
1.2.3, and Gödel also considers this assumption to be an obvious truism:
Some body of unconditional mathematical truth must be acknowl-
edged, because even if mathematics is to be interpreted to be a hypothetico-
deductive system, still the proposition which states that the axioms
imply the theorems must be unconditionally true. [...] For while
the definitions of 5, 7, 12 and the rules of computation for + and =
[...] seemingly can be interpreted as conventions, the statement that
5+7=12 follows from these conventions evidently expresses an objec-
tive (combinatorial) fact (Gödel 1995b: 200).
In chapter 6 we will encounter a form of radical conventionalism that denies this
assumption, but I will not question it for now.
The argument for external ontology now proceeds as follows: if we want
determinate consistency we need some language-external factor that settles the
truth values of sentences that are left indeterminate by the purely linguistic rules,
such as ConPA. And the obvious candidate to play this role would be something
like the Model-in-the-Sky of the external Platonist. If we had such a thing at
our disposal, we could set the aside the Competing Semantic Proposal on the
grounds that it misrepresents the realm of arithmetic, since it is committed to
non-standard syntactic entities to which nothing in the real model corresponds.
The price of this move, however, is to introduce a framework-external sense of
existence, and hence to give up on full-blown internalism. There needs to be an
exception at least for syntax.
Against this one might object that the Determination Thesis is false since it
relies on an implausible picture of how object languages are related to meta-
languages. It is of course true that the object language of PA does not in itself
somehow force us to adopt a metalanguage which settles the truth values of
undecidable sentences in one way rather than the other, otherwise the incom-
pleteness theorems would not be a challenge. But this result does not entail that
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all possible metalanguages are on a par. For one must describe an object language
from the perspective of a particular metalanguage after all, and so one possible
metalanguage is therefore privileged in virtue of being the one that is actually
used. There thus seems to be possibility Beth has overlooked, namely a way to
single out one of the many possible metalanguages without relying on external
ontological posits.
This is in fact how I understand Carnap’s own reply to Beth: he thinks
that we actually occupy the position of someone who uses metalanguage ML,
which encapsulates standard syntax, and can hence dismiss Carnap*’s concep-
tion of syntax as non-standard and unintended without relying on any wholly
language-transcendent notions. But here my objection to Carnap’s we in fact
speak ML response from section 4.2.1 strikes again. It is of course fine to main-
tain that we always speak from the perspective of one metalanguage or another.
But what we need here is a metalanguage that settles the truth values of all un-
decidable sentences of PA, and hence the argument from dispositions against
non-recursive inference rules applies. This being the case, Beth’s claim that only
external ontological assumptions can do the trick is actually well-supported. A
number of further attempts to avoid this conclusion will be discussed in chapter
7, but before that I will address some exegetical questions.
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Chapter 5
Alternative Interpretations of Beth
Beth’s argument from non-standard models has received some discussion in the
secondary literature, and a number of scholars have defended Carnap against
Beth’s objection. In this chapter I survey this literature and argue for the fol-
lowing two points: first, extant responses to Beth on behalf of Carnap cannot be
applied to defuse my interpretation of the argument, since it differs from those
others have given in important ways. Secondly, although the exegetical situation
is murky at times, there are good reasons to think that my interpretation also
better fits the argument Beth himself had in mind than competing readings.
In the first half of this chapter I compare Beth’s argument to other well-
known arguments that rely on model-theoretic considerations, namely Putnam’s
argument against metaphysical realism and Skolem’s paradox. I show that it is
tempting to read Beth’s argument as a version of these established argument,
but argue that the temptation should be resisted. In the second half I consider
attempts to attack Beth by arguing that he misrepresents the nature of Carnap’s
position. I show that these proposals are either unconvincing or do not suffice
to solve the underlying problem.
5.1 Beth and Model-Theoretic Arguments
5.1.1 Non-Standard Interpretations
There are a number of influential arguments based on model theory in phi-
losophy, and it is therefore natural to wonder whether Beth’s argument is in
effect a version of a more established one. The two most salient candidates for
comparison are Putnam’s argument against metaphysical realism, and Skolem’s
paradox about the relativity of set-theoretic notions. In this and the next few
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sections I will argue that Beth’s argument should not be identified with either
of these, which also makes some defences of Carnap in the secondary literature
ineffective. It will be convenient to start the discussion by introducing some
terminology to distinguish between different kinds of non-standard models.
Using PA as an illustration, the first kind of non-standard interpretation of
PA is one where the domain is isomorphic to the standard model N but contains
different elements. Since there is a one-one mapping between the natural num-
bers and the even numbers, for instance, a model in which the domain contains
only even numbers can make the same sentences true as the standard model.
Non-standard models of this kind are called isomorphic:
Isomorphic
A model which is isomorphic but not identical to the standard model.
Example: Interpreting PA in the sets of even numbers by mapping
each number n to 2n.
The second kind of non-standard interpretation involves models which are not
isomorphic to the standard model. By the upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,
for instance, we know that PA has some uncountable models. Since the natural
numbers are countable, such an uncountable model cannot be isomorphic to the
standard model. In contrast to the third kind of non-standard model I will de-
scribe later, however, interpreting PA in such a model does not show up in the
object-language, since every sentence of PA that is true in the standard model is
also true in the non-standard model. This property is called elementary equiva-
lence, and the second kind of non-standard model can thus be characterised as
follows:
Non-Isomorphic but Elementarily Equivalent
A model which is not isomorphic to the standard model but makes
the same sentences true as the standard model.
Example: Interpreting PA in an uncountable model via the upward
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
The third and last kind of non-standard model is the most interesting, since it
involves changes of the truth values of certain object-language sentences. We
have already seen that PA has non-standard models of this kind by considering
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Since the sentence ConPA is independent of
the axioms of PA, both PA+ConPA and PA+¬ConPA have models. In the standard
model ConPA is true, however, and there is thus a non-standard model which
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gives a sentence in the language of PA a different truth value compared to the
standard model of arithmetic. I call these kinds of non-isomorphic non-standard
models truth-switching:
Truth-Switching
A model which is not isomorphic to the standard model and changes
the truth value of some sentences from those of the standard model.
Example: Interpreting PA in a model where ¬ConPA holds.
My interpretation of Beth’s argument in the previous chapter crucially relies on
the possibility of truth-switching non-standard models – for otherwise Carnap
and Carnap* could not disagree on the facts of syntax. Not all philosophical
uses of non-standard models are like this, however, and it has for instance been
argued that the availability of isomorphic non-standard models suffices to put
some conceptions of the relationship between language and the world under
pressure.
This is best illustrated by considering Putnam’s model-theoretic argument
against metaphysical realism. A lot could be said about what exactly is charac-
teristic of the flavour of realism Putnam intends to attack, but for our purposes
the following characterisation is a good starting point:
Metaphysical realism, on the other hand, is less an empirical theory
than a model – in the ”colliding billiard balls” sense of ’model’. It is,
or purports to be, a model of the relation of any correct theory to all
or part of THE WORLD. [...] In its primitive form, there is a relation
between language and a piece of THE WORLD (or a kind of term).
(Putnam 1977: 483f)
Talking about ’THE WORLD’ in capital letters here is supposed to convey the
idea that reality is in itself divided into objects, wholly independently of our
ways of conceptualising it. The relationship between the world and our best
theory can then be thought of as follows: the objects making up reality are the
intended interpretation of the theory, and, ’there are cats’ is a true sentence of our
theory if and only if some of the objects reality consists of are indeed cats.
The underlying idea that there is some kind of correspondence between real-
ity and our theories is a natural one, but Putnam thinks that it faces some deep
problems. One of his objections – the argument from completeness – begins as
follows:
102
Alternative Interpretations of Beth Beth and Model-Theoretic Arguments
Since the ideal theory T1 must, whatever other properties it may or
may not have, have the property of being consistent, it follows from
the Gödel Completeness Theorem [...] that T1 has models. (Putnam
1980: 473)
More specifically, one can show that every consistent first-order theory has a
model in the natural numbers. And this seems to be an uncomfortable result for
the metaphysical realist. For whatever we may think the intended interpretation
of our best theory – which is just THE WORLD itself – looks like exactly, it seems
unlikely that it is purely mathematical. If this is so, however, the metaphysical
realist needs to answer the following question: why exactly should we suppose
that the model of our best theory is the intended interpretation rather than some
purely mathematical model, given that both make the very same sentences of
the theory itself true?
I will not go further into Putnam’s reasons for thinking that the metaphysical
realist has no good answer here. For whether successful or not, it should hope-
fully be uncontroversial that Carnap is not a metaphysical realist, and is hence
not a target of Putnam’s attack. In the earlier discussion of Carnap’s treatment
of the reference-relation (section 1.1.3) it already emerged that he has in effect
a disquotational conception of reference: if within a framework we can express
that ’cat’ refers to cats then, for Carnap, there is no further question of whether
’cat’ might really refer to numbers after all. In in a later section we will also see
that, unlike a metaphysical realist, Carnap at times actually endorsed the idea
that all our quantifiers range over sets and numbers (section 9.1).
I think that, for this reason, there is no way to argue against Carnap’s position
based purely on the existence of isomorphic non-standard models. Putnam’s ar-
gument attacks a way of thinking about the relationship between theories and
reality that Carnap would reject anyway. This result will probably not come as
a huge surprise, as it is not very tempting to read Carnap as a metaphysical
realist in the first place. We can therefore move on to an interpretation of Beth’s
argument that is much more plausible but still distinct from mine: namely read-
ing Beth as putting forward a version of Skolem’s paradox, which relies on the
possibility of non-isomorphic but elementarily equivalent non-standard models.
5.1.2 Ricketts on Beth and Skolem
Right after describing Carnap*, Beth writes that ”the above considerations [...]
are only variants of the Löwenheim-Skolem paradox” (Beth 1963: 478), an in-
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fluential argument first presented by Skolem in 1922 that is nowadays usually
just called Skolem’s paradox (Skolem 1967) . Ricketts has taken this reference
very seriously, and interprets Beth’s whole argument as a version of this (al-
leged) paradox. From this he then concludes that Beth poses no serious threat
to Carnap’s position, which is not surprising, since Skolem’s paradox is also not
usually regarded as a genuine paradox.1 I will first introduce Skolem’s paradox,
describe Ricketts’ reconstruction of Beth, and then show that it fails to capture
the actual argument.
One consequence of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is the following:
If a first-order theory has an infinite model, it has both countable and
uncountable models.
As yet there is nothing paradoxical about this, but things get interesting if we
apply this result to a first-order axiomatisation of set theory, such as ZFC. For
in ZFC we can express the distinction between countable and uncountable sets,
and, furthermore, can prove the following:
There exists an uncountable set, i.e. a set which is not isomorphic to
the countable natural numbers.
By the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem ZFC has a countable model – i.e. it can be
interpreted in a domain that is isomorphic to the natural numbers. And one
might think that this result is contradictory. For how could ZFC be true in a
countable model even though it proves the existence of uncountable sets?
This tension is merely apparent though. For the provability of the existence of
an uncountable set within ZFC amounts to the following: in every interpretation
of ZFC there are two infinite sets such that there is no one-one mapping between
them. Looked at from the outside, in a countable model both such sets will be
countable as well, provided that the model is transitive.2 One of them will
nevertheless seem uncountable from within the theory ZFC, and this is because
the interpretation must be such that it fails to contain the function that would
map the objects from both sets to each other. To put this differently: when we
say that there is no one-one function between sets, we usually mean to quantify
over all functions whatsoever. But if ZFC is interpreted with respect to a specific
1 See Bays 2014 for an overview of the most common philosophical responses.
2 A transitive model is such that if its domain contains a set, then all members of this set are
also members of the domain. A non-transitive model, on the other hand, can have countably
many objects in its domain, while one of these objects is an uncountable set such as the set
of real numbers.
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model, the quantifiers in ZFC merely range over the functions contained in that
model. And so although two sets will be countable for someone who quantifies
over all functions, one of them can appear to be uncountable to someone who
quantifies over fewer functions.
In a nutshell, the apparent paradox is resolved as follows: if interpreted in a
countable model, the sentence of ZFC that apparently asserts the existence of an
uncountable set doesn’t really express this claim after all. This is because, from
our perspective, we can see that the quantifiers of this interpretation leave out
some functions that are relevant to the question of countability. There is hence
no genuine paradox, for there is no one claim – such as there are uncountable sets
– for which we have reasons for and against accepting it. Instead we can always
use Cantor’s theorem to show that there are uncountable sets, and while it might
be that sets that seem uncountable from one perspective appear countable from
another standpoint, this is no genuine contradiction because ”uncountable” has
different meanings in the two perspectives, thanks to the difference in what
functions are being quantified over.
One might nevertheless be tempted to think that, even though the original
paradox has been defused, some reason to be concerned remains. Thomas Ty-
moczko gives voice to the nagging doubts someone might have as follows:
Maybe the reals are really countable and we simply lack the 1-1 func-
tion that shows this. Maybe we are living in someone else’s countable
model! (Tymoczko 1989: 289)
He immediately points out, however, that on reflection this worry is just con-
fused:
There is something crazy about this suggestion. After all, we can
prove that the reals are uncountable. If Cantor’s mathematical proof
is not good enough to settle the matter, what would settle it? Surely it
doesn’t make sense to wonder whether the reals are ’really countable’
according to some hypothetical alien concept of countablity to which
we, by hypothesis, have no access. [...] We construct the alternative
[countable model] by leaving certain things out of the model (e.g., al-
most all the real numbers). It is totally incoherent to turn around and
wonder whether that world might not be ours after all. (Tymoczko
1989: 289f)
And for Carnap this is clearly the right thing to say, given that he is strictly
opposed to any completely language- and theory-independent external perspec-
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tive. Suppose we adopt a framework in which we can prove that there are
uncountable sets, and meet someone with a different framework from whose
perspective our sets will seem countable. We can then discuss whether it might
be convenient to adopt this other, apparently more powerful, framework. But for
Carnap there can be no sense in which we would be making a factual mistake if
we just stick with the framework we have.
I therefore think that one cannot generate trouble for Carnap’s position by
purely relying on Skolem’s paradox, which is why I stressed the importance of
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in Beth’s argument. Let us now look at how
Ricketts reads Beth:
In his reply to Beth, Carnap observes that Beth’s point really turns
on the possibility of a tacit divergence between two logicians in their
understanding of the informal syntax language they use to state the
transformation rules for Language II. One logician might understand
the arithmetic in the informal syntax language standardly; the other
might understand it non-standardly. This divergence need not be mani-
fest in their use of the sentences of the informal syntax language. [...] Hav-
ing read our Skolem, we observe that we can state transformation
rules in two different ways, one corresponding to the standard model
of arithmetic, another corresponding to a non-standard model. We
may suppose that each group of transformation rules demarcates the same
formulas of the object calculus as true. (Ricketts 2004: 194, my emphasis)
As I understand this, the scenario Ricketts describes here is not like the case of
Carnap*. For Carnap and Carnap* do manifest divergent usage in the informal
syntax language, and do not agree on the truth values of all object language
sentences: they have incompatible views about the consistency of PA, for in-
stance. What Ricketts has in mind is rather a character we may call Carnap**,
who like Carnap* reads Logical Syntax and interprets in a non-standard way, but
generates his non-standard interpretation by applying the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem rather than Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Carnap** then uses a
metalanguage with a non-standard interpretation, but one that is elementarily
equivalent to the standard interpretation. He and Carnap thus agree on the truth
values of all sentences, and so for this scenario Ricketts’ description fits.
Ricketts concludes that the possibility of Carnap** is no problem for Carnap,
and with this I agree. For Carnap** would only be troublesome if it would make
sense to worry about the possibility of ’inhabiting’ some non-standard model
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without this showing up in the truth values of any sentences, just like we saw
with respect to ZFC and uncountable sets. And this is clearly not an issue that
Carnap should take seriously.
Supposing that I am right, my reconstruction of Beth’s argument from the
previous chapter is therefore damaging to Carnap’s position in a way that the
one discussed here is not. One may nevertheless worry that in several ways
the actual text of Beth’s paper fits Ricketts’ version much better than mine. For
one thing, I quoted Beth’s reference to Skolem’s paradox at the beginning of
the section. For another, in my reconstruction linguistic dispositions play a major
role, which are not something Beth explicitly writes about at all. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether what I have defended is my own argument from
non-standard models rather than Beth’s. This exegetical question is maybe less
important than the systematic question of whether the argument succeeds, but
in the following I nevertheless want to defend my ascription of the argument to
Beth.
5.1.3 Exegetical Traps and Pitfalls
It is not easy to interpret Beth’s paper in a way that perfectly fits all of the
claims he makes. Some initially confusing remarks become intelligible once one
appreciates that the scenario Beth describes is easily misinterpreted. It is for
instance very tempting to describe Carnap and Carnap* as disagreeing about a
common subject matter, namely the object language of Peano arithmetic, but this
is not really appropriate since they do not actually share a metalanguage. This
is a point Carnap stresses as well:
Therefore it seems to me misleading to say that Carnap* has views
about the languages II and II* which diverge from our views about
these languages. It seems to me more correct to describe the situation
as follows: (a) Carnap* does not use the metalanguage ML, but a
language ML* which, although it uses the same words and sentences,
differs from ML, since some of the words and sentences have different
meanings; and (b) since the labels "II" and "II*" have in ML* meanings
different from those in ML, Carnap* is not talking about the same
languages as Carnap. (Carnap 1963b: 928f)
For expository purposes it is nevertheless helpful to conceive of Carnap and
Carnap* as looking at one and the same object language, since otherwise it is
hard to understand what Carnap*’s non-standard interpretation is like in the
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first place. But this description only makes sense from our perspective, assuming
that we are like Carnap and unlike Carnap*. Someone who was actually like
Carnap*, on the other hand, would not have been able to follow the construction
of a non-standard interpretation by adding ¬ConPA at all, since for them neither
PA nor any extension of it would have any model due to their inconsistency.
Some of Beth’s remarks remain elusive, however, even if one keeps the dis-
tinction between Carnap and Carnap*’s perspectives firmly in mind. In a foot-
note he for instance suggests that for Carnap* languages II and II* have no finite
axiomatisation (Beth 1963: 478n27). But on my reading this is clearly false, since
for Carnap* both of these theories are inconsistent, and finitely axiomatising the
inconsistent theory is easy. I can therefore not completely rule out the possibil-
ity that Beth had a slightly different scenario in mind after all, and that another
interpretation could be given. I think that there are good reasons to just dismiss
the remark from the footnote as a simple mistake on Beth’s part, however. For
as we will see now, Beth makes at least one other claim which is clearly a factual
mistake.
As it happens, the relevant mistake is precisely the claim which made Rick-
etts’s interpretation compelling: namely that ”the above considerations [...] are
only variants of the Löwenheim-Skolem paradox” (Beth 1963: 478). As I already
mentioned this comes right after the introduction of Carnap*, and hence Beth
seems to say that the possibility of Carnap* follows from the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem. But that is clearly not true. Based on Löwenheim-Skolem, we can in-
deed show that theories such as PA or Carnap’s language II have non-standard
models, and even that they have what I called non-isomorphic but elementar-
ily equivalent interpretation – so the possibility of Carnap** from the previous
section does follow. But the essential feature of Carnap* was that he and Car-
nap come to different verdicts concerning the consistency sentence ConPA – so
the interpretations they use are not elementarily equivalent, but assign different
truth values to some sentences. And in order to show that such truth-switching
non-standard interpretations are possible, we actually need to rely on Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems, and not merely on the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
The point I just made would be moot if all theories that have non-isomorphic
but elementarily equivalent non-standard models also have truth-switching non-
standard models. But this is not so. Earlier I briefly mentioned the non-recursive
theory True Arithmetic. By construction this theory is complete, since each arith-
metical sentence is such that either it or its negation is an axiom, and so there
can be no truth-switching interpretation. Nevertheless True Arithmetic has un-
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countable non-standard models that are not isomorphic to the standard model
N, and hence True Arithmetic is an example of a theory which has the one kind
of non-standard models but not the other.
This observation hopefully undermines the suggestion that a reconstruction
of Beth along Ricketts’s lines is preferable as a matter of exegesis. But it doesn’t
really address the second worry I alluded to, namely that the argument I pre-
sented makes heavy use of considerations about language use and dispositions,
which are themes that do not appear explicitly in Beth’s paper at all. To put this
in a slogan, one might object that my interpretation of Beth makes his argument
insufficiently model-theoretic, and too much like a specific version of the rule-
following problem. In the following I will respond to these concerns, although
the discussion is much more speculative than the previous point.
The crucial idea of Beth’s argument seems to be that formal languages do
not uniquely determine an intended interpretation, which is demonstrated by
the case of Carnap*, who learns the letter of Logical Syntax but misses its spirit
by interpreting the book in an unintended way. If this is the core of Beth’s point,
however, then this problem should affect all theories that can be interpreted in
more than one way – i.e. any consistent first-order theory. But it turns out that
Beth’s paper contains some remarks that are directly in conflict with this con-
clusion. They come towards the end of the paper where, after discussing other
aspects of Carnap’s position, Beth comes back to the case of Carnap*. Other
commentators have not paid much attention to these passages so far, presum-
ably because they have the appearance of afterthoughts that do not substantially
affect Beth’s main point. But as will show now, a close reading of them actually
reveals some important clues about how Beth intended his argument to work.
Beth begins by clarifying the nature of his opposition to Carnap. He stresses
that he is sympathetic towards the principle of tolerance, but sees the need to
restrict its scope when a particular language is supposed to be used as a met-
alanguage. He then distinguishes between metalanguages of varying strength,
and discusses the problems that arise:
In the first place, such a language, which may be called M, should
enable us, as pointed out by Church, to state the necessary directives
for the concrete manipulation of certain physical objects, namely, the
signs of the object language. This implies that M must contain the
means of expression for a certain version of elementary arithmetic
or of a suitable general arithmetic. Moreover, this part of M, which
will be called M1, must be understood in accordance with strict usage.
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This demand, however, strongly restricts the development of M1, the
language of elementary syntax, into a means of expression, called M2,
for theoretical syntax; this follows from our discussion in Section 6.
(Beth 1963: 499f)
M1 must be some elementary form of arithmetic, since it needs to be used to
describe the manipulation of syntactical objects. I therefore assume that we can
regard M1 to be weak theory such as Robinson arithmetic. Furthermore I assume
that by the language of theoretical syntax M2, Beth has in mind something like
Carnap’s metalanguage of Logical Syntax ML. This is a much stronger language
than M1 partly because it includes the infinitary inference rules we have seen in
action. It is striking, however, that in the quote Beth seems to say that there is no
problem about using M1 in accordance with strict usage. And this is confirmed
by the following remark:
If we do not wish to be caught in the same trap as Carnap*, and,
for instance, to be compelled to conclude that certain consistent the-
ories are inconsistent, then we ought to be cautious in carrying out
the passage from M1 to M2. Hence the question arises as to which
precautions we could take in this connection. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to point out precautions which are fully adequate. (Beth
1963: 499f)
This is remarkable since it strongly suggests that the issue of strict usage does
not reduce to whether a theory has non-standard models. For the second in-
completeness theorem also holds for very weak theories of arithmetic, including
Robinson arithmetic, which has a finite number of axioms.
One might suspect that Beth was simply unaware of these results, and mis-
takenly thought that incompleteness doesn’t arise for elementary arithmetic. But
that is not plausible, since this result was proved in the influential Undecidable
Theories by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson, and Beth was actually one of the
proof readers of the book (Tarski et al. 1953: ix). Of course Beth might still have
been confused in his argumentation here, but charity demands that we at least
try to read him in a way that makes sense of these remarks. I therefore think that
the right conclusion to draw is that Beth’s initial description of what it means
to understand a language in accordance with strict usage was misleading, or at
least incomplete.
On my own interpretation of Beth’s argument, these last passages are much
less mysterious. For there is a clear sense in which, say, Robinson arithmetic is
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less problematic than Carnap’s ML. Since Robinson arithmetic has finitely many
axioms and recursive inference rules, there is no deep puzzle about how we
could have dispositions corresponding to this theory. As I have argued at length
already, this is not so for ML. I think that this fact provides indirect evidence for
my hypothesis that considerations about linguistic dispositions are relevant to
Beth’s notion of ’strict usage’ after all, even though some creative exegesis was
required to tease this out.
In the end the systematic question of whether there is a successful argument
against Carnap is more important though, and I will now leave guesses about
what Beth’s true intentions were behind. In the next section I will discuss and
reject some more attempts to defend Carnap’s position.
5.2 Other Approaches
5.2.1 Friedman for and against Beth
Since the late 1980s Michael Friedman has discussed Beth’s argument in a num-
ber of papers. His opinions have changed considerably over the years, however.
In ”Logical Truth and Analyticity in Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language”3 from
1988, he thinks that the considerations of Beth (and Gödel) show that Carnap’s
treatment of analyticity is flawed. In response to Goldfarb and Ricketts he modi-
fied his arguments, but in his ”Tolerance and Analyticity in Carnap’s Philosophy
of Mathematics” from 1999 he still holds that Carnap’s account faces a deep ten-
sion (Friedman 1999b). But by 2009 Friedman has renounced his earlier criticism,
and now in effect argues that Carnap’s response to Beth is all that needs to be
said (Friedman 2009: 241).
The basic idea behind the earlier Friedman’s arguments was that Carnap’s
employment of strong metalanguages – i.e. metalanguages that contain non-
recursive rules – is philosophically dubious. This is of course a hunch many
people shared, but we already saw that it is not so easy to actually turn it into a
non-question begging argument against Carnap’s view. I think that Friedman’s
two attempts are ultimately not successful as they stand. It is instructive to
understand why this is so, however, as I think that the earlier Friedman’s skep-
ticism towards strong metalanguages is closer to the truth than his later move
towards agreement with defenders of Carnap like Goldfarb and Ricketts.
3 I am citing the reprint of this paper from Friedman’s collection Reconsidering Logical Positivism
as Friedman 1999a.
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In the first version of his argument, Friedman directly attacks Carnap’s use
of non-recursive resources in his definition of analyticity, on the grounds that
this move is incompatible with the proclaimed aim of using purely syntactic
methods to account for mathematics:
Here is where Gödel’s Theorem strikes a fatal blow. For, as we have
seen, Carnap’s general notion of analytic-in-L is simply not defin-
able in logical syntax so conceived, that is, conceived in the above
”Wittgensteinian” fashion as concerned with the general combinato-
rial properties of any language whatsoever. Analytic-in-L fails to be
captured in what Carnap calls the ”combinatorial analysis ... of finite,
discrete serial structures” (§2): that is, primitive recursive arithmetic.
(Friedman 1999a: 176)
But this objection is too quick. It is certainly true that in §2 of Logical Syntax there
are passages which sound as if Carnap conceives of syntax in the way Friedman
describes. If we take these remarks seriously then Carnap’s program would in
effect be a version of Hilbertian finitism: some weak theory such as primitive re-
cursive arithmetic is regarded as understood and philosophically unproblematic,
and the task is to justify the use of the more powerful remainder of mathematics
on this slender basis. In light of Gödelian incompleteness, Hilbert’s program is
nowadays widely regarded as a non-starter (Smith 2013: section 37.5).4 Regard-
less of what we think about this, however, it is obvious that Carnap’s way of
defining analyticity, with its reliance on infinitary rules, does not fit the model
of the Hilbertian finitist at all.
It therefore seems best to conclude that Carnap’s project is different from
Hilbert’s, and that his identification of syntax with the ”combinatorial analy-
sis [...] of finite, discrete serial structures” (Carnap 1937a: 7) should be taken
with a grain of salt. For later in the book Carnap is perfectly open and up-
front about his use of non-recursive methods, and since he repeatedly discussed
Hilbert’s program with Gödel he can hardly have been unaware of these differ-
ences. Goldfarb and Ricketts have therefore criticised Friedman’s first argument
as attacking a straw man, and not the actual Carnap of Logical Syntax (Goldfarb
and Ricketts 1992: 65f).
Friedman accepted that his initial objection construed Carnap in a too Hilber-
tian fashion, but he maintained that one can still show that the use of strong
metalanguages is problematic. The second version of his argument is not as
4 See Detlefsen 1986 for a more optimistic perspective.
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straightforward, but the problem Friedman sees arises in situations where some-
one who uses a strong metalanguage encounters someone who only accepts a
weaker language. Since Carnap at one point considers such an example him-
self, let us start by introducing a concrete scenario: logician More accepts lan-
guage LMore in which one can quantify over individuals, sets of individuals, and
sets of sets of indidivuals, whereas logician Less accepts language LLess whose
quantifiers range over fewer entities, namely only individuals and sets of those
individuals.5 Carnap comments on this situation as follows:
Both logicians understand the syntactical rules for both languages.
Both are in agreement with respect to many results concerning the
two languages, in particular, with respect to syntactical results. Al-
though [Less] understands neither language [LMore] nor its semantical
rules, he can nevertheless learn to manipulate the sentences of this
language according to the syntactical rules, and even to manipulate
the semantical rules and semantical statements about [LMore], if they
are stated in the form of a semantical axiom system whose syntactical
metalanguage he understands. (Carnap 1963b: 873)
Less and More can discuss the merely syntactic properties of their languages
without any problems. But there is an important asymmetry between them.
More interprets Less’s claims by disquotationally translating them into his own
language, whereas Less is not in a position to proceed in the same way, because
in his language ”there is the set of sets of apples” is either meaningless or al-
ways false, regardless of the truth value it has for More. It is in this sense that
Less cannot understand More’s language in the same way More can understand
Less’s.
As I understand Friedman’s argument, he thinks that this scenario is incom-
patible with the principle of tolerance. He considers the analogous case of the
encounter of an intuitionist and a classical mathematician, and writes that the
”Carnapian proponent of classical mathematics [...] can show that the mere idea
that classical mathematics is analytic itself rules the intuitionist out of court”
(Friedman 1999b: 230) – which in turn is supposed to be in tension with the prin-
ciple of tolerance.6 In light of this Friedman recommends that Carnap should
restrict himself to weak metalanguages that are acceptable to all participants in
the debate over mathematics:
5 I have changed the names, Carnap uses the less memorable ’X1’ and ’X2’.
6 It is actually not so clear whether this example is really analogous to the case of Less and
More: since classical logic can be interpreted in intuitionistic logic, it is doubtful whether
classical logic is really unambiguously stronger than intuitionistic logic (Gödel 1986).
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By contrast, the choice of a restricted meta-language equally accept-
able to all parties to the dispute is much better suited to Carnap’s
profession of tolerance. [...] We thus can see, even in this restricted
metaframework, that the classical rules are much more expedient
for physical applications, whereas the intuitionistic rules provide far
more safety against contradiction. Hence, in accordance with the
spirit of the principle of tolerance, we then can view the choice be-
tween the two frameworks as a fundamentally pragmatic one. (Fried-
man 1999b: 230)
Friedman adds that this conception undermines Carnap’s way of drawing the
analytic/synthetic distinction, but seems to think that preserving the spirit of
tolerance is more important. But why does Friedman think that accepting a
metalanguage in which classical mathematics can shown to be analytic rules out
intuitionism in the first place? The only reason I can think of is an argument
along the following lines: in such a metalanguage we can show that bivalence
holds for mathematical discourse, and therefore intuitionism is immediately re-
futed. I think that this is much too quick, however, since there is a Carnapian
response to the alleged incompatibility of strong metalanguages and the princi-
ple of tolerance.
Concerning the case of Less and More from above, Carnap comments as
follows:
I would object only if [Less] were to say to [More]: “In contrast to you,
there is no possibility for me to choose between the two languages.
On the basis of careful considerations, I have arrived at the following
two ontological results:
(6) There are classes of objects.
(7) There are no classes of classes of objects.
What you regard as semantical rules for L1 contains the phrase ’classes
of classes of objects’, which does not refer to anything. Therefore, no
semantical rules for L1 have actually been stated; thus L1 is not an
interpreted language but merely a calculus”. (Carnap 1963b: 873)
Note that the issue here is not that (6) and (7) are false – Less’s language is in
fact designed in such a way that they come out true. The problem rather arises
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if one wants to use (6) and (7) to argue against the language More uses. This
attempt clashes with the distinction between external and internal questions, for
while (6) and (7) are true in Less’s framework, it cannot be a general requirement
on accepting any framework that (6) and (7) come out true. If Less felt like it,
they could adopt More’s framework without making any factual mistake, which
is just a consequence of Carnap’s assumption that all external questions are
pragmatic.
How is this relevant to the case of classical mathematics versus intuitionism?
It seems to me that Carnap would reject Friedman’s claim that the fact that in
a classical metalanguage bivalence can be established is a refutation of intution-
ism. For it is perfectly possible to adopt an intuitionistic metalanguage as well,
in which bivalence doesn’t hold. And a classical mathematician who accepts
the principle of tolerance and the internal/external distinction would not be in
a position to call the adoption of an intuitionist metalanguage incorrect in any
objective sense – once again, choosing between the two options is just a matter
of pragmatic decision.
I therefore think that the second version of Friedman’s argument fails as
well, since the conflict he diagnoses is merely apparent. On the other hand,
the thought that the ”spirit of the principle of tolerance” is better served by the
adoption of weak metalanguages is certainly not completely misguided. For as
Carnap understands it, the principle of tolerance does seem biased in favour of
strong frameworks, unless we have positive reason to suspect that the strong
frameworks are inconsistent. This is because anyone who sticks with a weak
linguistic framework, while not making a factual mistake, will quickly appear
stubborn and irrational, given that Carnap does not believe in any metaphysical
reasons for rejecting the conveniences of strong metalanguages. Goldfarb and
Ricketts also flag this bias towards classical mathematics in Carnap’s thinking:
It should be noted, moreover, that from Carnap’s vantage point only
obscurantism prevents any logician from embracing the Principle of
Tolerance. A proponent of intuitionistic mathematics who acquires
an attitude of tolerance will not scruple at using classical syntax lan-
guages for matters that cannot be treated in weaker syntax languages.
(Of course, the Principle of Tolerance does show Carnap’s antipathy
towards intuitionist criticisms of classical mathematics.) (Goldfarb
and Ricketts 1992: 69)
It is therefore not unreasonable to wonder whether one can understand the prin-
ciple of tolerance in a more neutral way, and anyone interested in this idea will
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find Friedman’s appeal for weak metalanguages attractive. But as an objection
to Carnap’s actual position it has little force.
More recently Friedman has accepted that the second argument ”misses the
essence of Carnap’s conception” (Friedman 2009: 241). Not only that, but he
now also holds that Beth’s own argument, which motivated Friedman’s initial
skepticism about the use of strong metalanguages, is misguided. His response
to Beth is now similar to that of Carnap, namely to point out that there is noth-
ing mysterious or philosophically problematic about the need for a standard
interpretation:
[...] Carnap is completely untroubled by [... Beth’s argument] be-
cause he is assuming, entirely reasonably, that an unproblematic un-
derstanding of the standard model of arithmetic is encapsulated in
ordinary mathematical usage. There is no deep mystery here – there
is no need to puzzle ourselves over the question how we somehow
force an uninterpreted formal calculus to designate or refer to an in-
tended model. (Friedman 2009: 240)
I think that Friedman has moved into the wrong direction here, however. As I
have argued in the previous chapter, it only seems possible to claim that such an
understanding of the standard model is part of our ordinary use of mathemat-
ical language if we use a language with non-recursive and infinitary rules, and
hence Carnap runs into the problem of insufficient dispositions. This leads us to
another defence of Carnap, which I will discuss in the next section: according to
Gary Ebbs, there is a sense in which claims about metalanguages are independent
of claims about dispositions, contrary to what I have been supposing.
5.2.2 Who Is Speaking?
My reconstruction of Beth’s argument from non-standard models relies on the
assumption that Carnap thinks that there is a fact of the matter concerning which
metalanguage we actually speak, namely that it is like ML and unlike ML*. This
leads to the problem that while there is a sense in which recursive rules can
correspond to linguistic dispositions, this kind of correspondence does not easily
transfer to infinitary rules. I will now consider a response to this argument based
on work by Gary Ebbs, who suggests that Carnap can say that we actually speak
ML without needing to back up this claim by relying on the presence of particular
linguistic dispositions.
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This proposal is an interesting one, in particular since among all commen-
tators Ebbs’s interpretation of Beth’s argument comes closest to the one I have
presented – the main difference being that the distinction between recursive and
non-recursive rules plays no role. Like me Ebbs notes that the undetermination
of frameworks by linguistic disposition seems to lead to the potentially disas-
trous result that it is indeterminate whether speakers ever share a particular
metalanguage or not:
The trouble is that, by Carnap’s own standards, a speaker’s linguis-
tic behavior does not uniquely determine what semantical rules she is
following: there is more than one coherent set of coordinative defi-
nitions, hence more than one coherent semantical description of her
linguistic behavior. This apparently undermines Carnap’s starting as-
sumption that investigators can share a metalanguage within which
to codify semantical rules. (Ebbs 1997: 124f)
Unlike me, however, Ebbs thinks that this problem is merely apparent, since it
is based on the failure to appreciate a crucial distinction Carnap makes: namely
the distinction between pure and descriptive semantics. It is introduced as follows:
By descriptive semantics we mean the description and analysis of
the semantical features either of some particular historically given
language, e. g. French, or all historically given languages in gen-
eral. [...] On the other hand, we may set up a system of semantical
rules, whether in close connection with a historically given language
or freely invented; we call this a semantical system. The construction
and analysis of semantical systems is called pure semantics. (Carnap
1942: 11f)
Given this terminology, the task of coordinating a particular linguistic frame-
work with an actually spoken language is obviously part of descriptive seman-
tics. The construction of some arbitrary linguistic framework without any regard
for whether it corresponds to some language already in use, on the other hand,
would presumably be an example of pure semantics. In order to flesh out the
distinction some more, Carnap draws an analogy to geometry:
Both in semantics and in syntax the relation between the descrip-
tive and the pure field is perfectly analogous to the relation between
pure and mathematical geometry, which is a part of mathematics and
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hence analytic, and physical geometry, which is a part of physics and
hence empirical (Carnap 1942: 12)
I take the analogy Carnap has in mind here to be as follows: we can construct
various kinds of geometrical calculi without having to care about the geometry
of physical space. If we do so we either treat the geometrical systems as com-
pletely uninterpreted, or as having a purely mathematical interpretation. That’s
pure geometry, and it would be inappropriate to object to or argue in favour
of any system of geometry understood in this sense. Similarly in pure seman-
tics: maybe we have constructed a linguistic framework that doesn’t correspond
to any actually used language, but if that was never the aim there is nothing
wrong with it. The descriptive case is different: if we are interested in captur-
ing the structure of physical space, then obviously not all systems of geometry
are equally suited to this purpose. Empirical facts will rule out many geome-
tries, and equally so in the case of descriptive semantics: not just any arbitrary
linguistic framework can be coordinated with a natural language like English.
Using this new terminology, we can observe that I have construed Carnap’s
we in fact speak ML response as a thesis of descriptive semantics, and hence em-
pirical facts about what kinds of dispositions we do and can have were relevant.
According to Ebbs, however, this is actually a mistake:
This ”problem” stems from a subtle but serious misunderstanding
of both pure and descriptive semantics. For Carnap an empirical de-
scription of the semantical properties of a speaker’s utterances is not a
description of how the speaker implicitly ”interprets” her words. Em-
pirical discoveries about the semantical properties of a speaker’s ut-
terances can neither undermine nor justify agreements reached within
pure semantics, since such agreements set the ultimate parameters for
our inquiries. In this sense there is no legitimate perspective higher
or firmer than pure semantics from which to question our use of the
shared metalanguages to codify rules for inquiry. (Ebbs 1997: 125)
Unpacking Ebbs’s understanding of Carnap’s position here is not easy. One
might think that he wants to argue as follows: the claim that we use and share
metalanguage ML is not a claim of descriptive semantics, but rather of pure se-
mantics. For this reason empirical facts about actual human beings are irrelevant
and can neither justify nor undermine it. And thus the considerations about dis-
positions I presented earlier are unsuited to put pressure on Carnap’s claim that
we actually speak ML. Hence Carnap’s reply to Beth remains unscathed after all.
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The problem with this response, however, is that it is hard to understand
how the claim that we speak metalanguage ML could possibly be a claim of
pure semantics. For it seems to essentially involve reference to a community of
speakers (the we), and, so I assume, these speakers are human beings, and hence
part of the empirical world. Pure semantics was supposed to be independent
of facts about the empirical world, however, and therefore cannot really involve
reference to speakers at all, just as pure geometry is not a theory about physical
space. If this is correct, it would therefore not even be possible to express the
claim that we speak a particular metalanguage within pure semantics.
In personal communication Ebbs has clarified that he actually had a different
kind of reply in mind. The thought is not that claims about metalanguages
are part of pure semantic, but rather that we need to presuppose that we speak
and share a certain metalanguage before we can even begin to do any semantic
investigations, whether pure or descriptive. There is thus a sense in which the
actual use of a metalanguage can neither be justified nor undermined, since
we can only reason about our metalanguage from the perspective of this very
metalanguage. Ebbs therefore describes our actual use of a metalanguage as
a pragmatic presupposition, and draws a parallel to Quine’s acquiescence in our
home language.
To a point I agree with Ebbs, for it would surely be unreasonable to question
our sharing of a metalanguage on the basis that there is no conclusive proof
establishing this fact. As long as communication proceeds smoothly it is indeed
sensible to assume that we speak the same language. But this kind of consider-
ation only establishes that we are entitled to the pragmatic presupposition that
we speak and share some metalanguage or other. As I stressed in section 4.2.1,
however, enabling communication is not the only role Carnap has for a meta-
language: it is also supposed to resolve Gödelian incompleteness, and it is this
latter feature that Beth attacks. As far as I can see, there is no way to run Ebbs’
argument in such a way that it entitles us to assume that our metalanguage is as
strong as ML or ML*. For it is arguably not the case that we can only commu-
nicate if we use a metalanguage with non-recursive inference rules, rather than
one with only recursive rules that would not allow us to overcome incomplete-
ness. I therefore think that the claim that we speak ML goes beyond what can
reasonably be taken for granted without further argument, and hence questions
about linguistic dispositions remain salient.7
7 Comparing Carnap to Quine is illuminating in this context, since I think that the latter can
indeed rebut any Beth-style worries in the way Ebbs suggests. This is possible precisely
because Quine does not want the metalanguage to settle the truth values of mathematical
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For this reason I think that Ebbs’ defence of Carnap does not suffice to under-
mine Beth’s argument. I will conclude this section by briefly considering another
way of cashing out the idea that facts about metalanguages are independent of
facts about linguistic dispositions, namely by construing the claim that we speak
metalanguage ML in such a way that it does not refer to empirical human beings
at all. This may seem outlandish at first, but there is a long philosophical tradi-
tion of distinguishing between an empirical and some kind of non-empirical self
– Kant’s distinction between the empirical and the transcendental self is proba-
bly the best-known example. And this idea can also be found among Carnap’s
contemporaries, for instance in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the
self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ’the world is my
world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body,
or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the meta-
physical subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it. (Wittgenstein
1961: 5.641)
One could therefore interpret Ebbs as follows: when Carnap says that we speak
metalanguage ML, the ’we’ in this claim doesn’t refer to empirical human beings
at all, but to speakers of a language in a non-empirical sense. And for this reason
concerns about dispositions are misplaced.
A lot could be said about this suggestion, but I think it is pretty clear that
Carnap would not have openly endorsed anything like non-empirical selves.
For while he was strongly influenced by the Tractatus, he quickly came to reject
the more esoteric and metaphysical aspects of the book. As Carnap describes
in his Intellectual Autobiography, this difference in view especially applies to
Wittgenstein’s conception of language:
We read in Wittgenstein’s book that certain things show themselves
but cannot be said; for example the logical structure of sentences and
the relation between the language and the world. In opposition to
this view, first tentatively, then more and more clearly, our conception
developed that it is possible to talk meaningfully about language and
statements, and so for him enabling communication is the only relevant task. I will come
back to the relationship between Beth and Quine in chapter 8.
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about the relation between a sentence and the fact described. Neurath
emphasized from the beginning that language phenomena are events
within the world, not something that refers to the world from outside.
(Carnap 1963a: 29)
I think that this attitude is incompatible with a notion of language that is inde-
pendent of what happens in the empirical world, and hence incompatible with
non-empirical selves.
In the end I therefore see no way to use the distinction between descriptive
and pure semantics in such a way that Carnap can maintain his reply to Beth
without facing the problems caused by the lack of dispositions for non-recursive
rules. One could of course conclude that Carnap was mistaken to reject non-
empirical selves à la Wittgenstein, and should have endorsed the view I just
considered. This may well be right, but then this proposal would not be so
much a defence of Carnap’s actual position, but rather a rejection of a central
tenet of his philosophy: namely his strictly anti-metaphysical stance. For now I
therefore conclude that Beth’s challenge works as it stands.
5.2.3 Explication
The argument I presented by drawing on Beth is basically an underdetermina-
tion argument: different definitions of analyticity for mathematics which are not
extensionally equivalent are all equally compatible with our linguistic dispo-
sitions, and hence no one definition of analytic is pinned down by the latter.
André Carus has recently argued that focusing on the underdetermination of
formal languages by linguistic dispositions is misguided, however, since it pre-
vents us from appreciating that Carnap’s real aim is to reform language rather
than just to describe it. This is supposed to be a consequence of Carnap’s idea
of explication, and applied to the case at hand the thought is that Carnap’s ac-
count of analyticity is not a descriptive claim about actual language use at all,
but rather as a proposal about how we should speak:
Proposed Analyticity
For all mathematical sentences S: we should talk in such a way that S is
either analytic or contradictory.
In the end I will argue that this defence is unsuccessful, since the lack of dispo-
sitions for non-recursive rules also undermines Proposed Analyticity. But since
the notion of an explication plays a major role in Carnap’s later philosophy it
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will be worth going through the proposal in some detail, as it will further clarify
the theoretical role linguistic frameworks are supposed to play.
Let us us begin by looking at Carnap’s own explanation of what it means to
explicate a concept:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less in-
exact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the
second. We call the given concept (or the term used for it) the expli-
candum, and the exact concept proposed to take the place of the first
(or the term proposed for it) the explicatum. The explicandum may
belong to everyday language or to a previous stage in the develop-
ment of scientific language. The explicatum must be given by explicit
rules for its use, for example, by a definition which incorporates it
into a well-constructed system of scientific either logicomathematical
or empirical concepts. (Carnap 1950: 3)
He then stresses that since the target concept of natural language, i.e. the ex-
plicandum, will be inexact, it does not make sense to ask whether a proposed
explicatum is correct or not. Carnap does give some criteria for what a good
explication should strive for though:
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way
that, in most cases in which the explicandum has been so far
used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is
not required and considerable differences are permitted.
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its
use (for instance, in the form of a definition), is to be given in
an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-
connected system of scientific concepts.
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the
formulation of many universal statements (empirical laws in the
case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a
logical concept).
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as
simple as the more important requirements (1), (2), and (3) per-
mit. (Carnap 1950: 7, §3)
(1) is of particular interest to us, since Carnap allows deviations from ordinary
usage. The following reply to Beth’s argument suggests itself: Carnap’s formal
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definition of analytic for mathematics is clearly intended to be an explication of
the vague natural language concept. The problem is that our actual usage of
the word does not pin down the definition Carnap suggests over extensionally
deviant explications. But it is clear that Carnap did not regard this as a require-
ment for good explications anyway, and so the disposition argument is irrelevant
given Carnap’s own conception.
Carus’ discussion supports the kind of reply I just summarised. He argues
that one could of course construct formal systems of syntax and semantics, in-
cluding a definition of analyticity, with the aim of capturing and predicting
existing ordinary usage. But, so he stresses, this project is quite different from
giving explications, and hence objections to the one kind of project do necessar-
ily transfer to the other:
Quite separately from (and irrelevantly to) this, however, pure se-
mantic or syntactic theories (with or without empirical models) may
be put forward as explications of vague concepts in ordinary lan-
guage, such as the logical words that indicate connections among
segments of everyday speech that could by some behavioural stan-
dard be classed as ‘deductive’. An empirically interpreted semantic
theory may succeed or fail as an empirical hypothesis, but this has no
bearing on its corresponding purely logical theory as a candidate for
explicating such vague concepts of ordinary language. (Carus 2007:
248)
In order to assess whether this is a successful rebuttal of Beth, we need to have
a better understanding of what the point of explications is. Suppose we have
given an explication of some informal everyday concept by describing explicit
rules of use for the replacement concept in a formal system. What happens
next? Presumably the idea is that we can use the explicated concept, either
by changing the way we talk in everyday life, or at least by using it in scientific
contexts where more precision than in ordinary language is desirable. According
to Carus, explications give rise to an interplay between natural language and
formal systems that represents a major paradigm change in Carnap’s overall
thinking. The project of rational reconstruction Carnap pursues in the Aufbau,
for instance, is more unidirectional in that it always privileges scientific notions
over those of ordinary language:
Unlike rational reconstruction, explication no longer envisaged one-
way replacement of the ordinary, intuitive world view by a scientific
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one, but a dialectical interchange between the two kinds of system.
Our practices and our values reside within an intuitive Lebenswelt that
can be progressively improved, whose quality can be raised piece-
meal through explicative replacement of its concepts by constructed
ones, but we decide what replacements to undertake from the overall
standpoint of the Lebenswelt, our practical concerns and our values.
(Carus 2007: xi)
While the overall picture of Carnap’s project of explication presented here sounds
straightforward and compelling, the idea that we can use and adopt certain ex-
plications and thereby modify natural language needs further attention. One of
the examples of explications Carnap himself gives concerns the concept temper-
ature: he describes the development of quantitative temperature concepts from
the more basic concepts found in ordinary language, such as ’hot’ or ’warmer
than’ (Carnap 1950: 9f). This is helpful, for it is not hard to see what it would
mean for a population of speakers who do not already have quantitative tem-
perature concepts to adopt them into their everyday life. We thus have a case in
which something that begins as a purely formal description of a certain concepts
eventually influences the way people talk.
How about Carnap’s explication of analyticity, however? We already saw
that his preferred explication determines each mathematical sentence to be ei-
ther analytic or contradictory, which means that it settles the status of all the
infinitely many sentences not decided by the Peano axioms. We also saw that
it is implausible to maintain that we actually have dispositions to use ’analytic’
in this way. This didn’t seem so bad in light of the fact that explications don’t
need to conform to prior usage. Suppose now, however, that we like Carnap’s
explication and want to adopt it. This requires that we change our dispositions
in such a way as to conform to the explication. But this is arguably impossible,
for the same reason that claiming that we already have these dispositions is not
credible: namely that it in general seems impossible for finite human beings to
have dispositions which are non-recursive.
It is very unfortunate that, despite Carnap’s heavy reliance on non-recursive
rules in his philosophy of mathematics, he rarely problematises their philosoph-
ical implications. There are reports that he did so when teaching, but little is
known about the content of these discussions:
In classroom discussion, when pursued by questions as to how the
’ultimate’ metalanguage came to be understood, Carnap would ex-
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pand at length on how languages carne to be learned by children
– first by pointings, then by context, correctings, and by increasing
use of informal metalinguistic talk (in a manner not unlike Quinean
regimentation). On a few occasions, this was extended into a reveal-
ing discussion of how Language II, with its apparently non-intuitive
number-based syntax, would be learned by a child in a society which
spoke such a language. (Bohnert 1975: 196)
It might well be that Carnap had some account of how to use infinitary rules
that he never discussed in his writings. But to me it seems more likely that he
just did not think that much about what he calls pragmatics, i.e. the study of
spoken languages and their relation to formal systems, since he preferred the
construction of formal systems. There is at least one other case where a critic
of Carnap – in this instance Otto Neurath – was dissatisfied with a language
Carnap proposed on account of it being unusable in practice. As is well-known,
in the Aufbau Carnap tries to construct the physical world in an auto-psychological
language, i.e. one in which I ultimately only talk about my own experiences
(Carnap 1967). In the 1930s Carnap then moved towards preferring a physical
language as the base language, and even gave something like a private language
argument (Carnap 1934). Neurath was a driving force in this development, for
he had advocated using a physical language early on (Neurath 1931).
For Neurath, however, Carnap’s rejection of auto-psychological languages
did not go far enough. Carnap’s private language argument is only meant
to establish that each sentence of a phenomenal language has the same truth-
conditions as a statement in a physical language. And while Carnap now ex-
presses a preference for physical languages, he still considers the choice to be a
pragmatic matter. Neurath, on the other hand, wants to say something stronger:
for him it is misleading to call the phenomenal language of the Aufbau a genuine
language at all, since it is not something we could actually speak. Thomas Uebel
sums this up concisely:
Neurath did not argue that phenomenal languages were logically im-
possible: Carnap had apparently shown how to construct one in the
Aufbau (the technicalities of which Neurath did not fault). [...] Any
protocol languages whose sentences needed no justification were to
be rejected as ”non-realizable.” This formulation clearly takes account
of, and rejects as irrelevant, Carnap’s proof of the logical possibility
of an auto-psychological language, namely its construction in the ab-
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stract. A private language was – in a sense to be made precise – a
human impossibility. (Uebel 1992: 453)
We do not need to go into how Neurath spells out the relevant possibility here
any further, but I think that the general lesson Uebel draws from this disagree-
ment is correct: unlike Neurath, Carnap is happy to describe systems of rules
as languages even though it is not humanly possible to follow their rules. And
while this may be fine in some contexts, it becomes a problem when we want to
adopt such a system of rules as an explication. If explications are not just given
for the sake of doing so, but need to be usable by us, then Carnap’s explication
of analytic for mathematics fails this crucial test.
My conclusion is therefore that, even if Carus is right that using a formal
system as an explication is very different from using it as a description of actual
behaviour, the problem of insufficient dispositions nevertheless remains. Read-
ing Carnap’s definition as a proposal rather than a descriptive claim may help
against some objections that have been raised, but not against the version of




In this chapter I will discuss a more radical attempt to defend Carnap’s position
against Beth’s argument: namely rejecting the fundamental assumption that, as
a matter of fact, we actually use metalanguage ML. This kind of response is
inspired by the deflationary readings of Carnap we already encountered in sec-
tion 1.2.3. I will argue, however, that such an interpretation of Carnap is not
only exegetically implausible, but also results in a much more extreme posi-
tion than deflationary commentators such as Goldfarb and Ricketts recommend.
This will be illustrated by comparing the resulting philosophy of mathematics
to Wittgenstein’s controversial radical conventionalism.
6.1 Carnap and Semantic Facts
My reconstruction of Beth’s argument can be summed up as follows: for Carnap
to maintain that we in fact speak metalanguage ML, which is committed to the
standard model of arithmetic, he needs to hold that our linguistic dispositions
encode a commitment to the standard model. But, given plausible assumptions,
our linguistic dispositions must be describable using a recursive theory, and since
by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems all such theories have non-standard mod-
els, the task cannot be achieved.
This reading presupposes that Carnap himself actually accepts the existence
of certain semantic facts, namely those of the form
A population of speakers (such as ourselves) speaks one particular
metalanguage ML rather than another.
This assumption needs to be scrutinised more carefully, however. For in effect
the crucial question is whether our speech behaviour pins down a particular
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linguistic framework, and in section 4.1.3 I already flagged that Carnap’s own
remarks on this issue are not clear-cut.
Moreover, a version of the question whether Carnap is committed to semantic
facts has already been controversially discussed in the secondary literature. In
his influential book on The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap (Coffa 1991), J.
Albert Coffa asks whether, for Carnap, it is a fact that mathematics is merely a
matter of conventions. Coffa argues for an affirmative answer, and ascribes to
Carnap a factualism at the second level, according to which there are semantic facts
about what is conventional or not:
The multiplicative axiom is not a factual claim but a convention. But
this statement is not a proposal for a convention. It is a factual state-
ment about the nature of mathematical axioms. (Coffa 1991: 322)
Goldfarb has convincingly argued, however, that it is implausible to interpret
Carnap in this way. For Coffa’s reasoning seems to be as follows: if there were
no semantic facts of the relevant kind, there would be no sense in which Carnap’s
preferred account of mathematics is more correct than that of a mathematical re-
alist, such as the external Platonist we have frequently considered. Against this,
Goldfarb stresses the deflationary nature of Carnap’s approach to philosophical
questions, on which factual questions about which view is objectively correct
are replaced with comparisons based on pragmatic considerations:
I am suggesting that Carnap’s position in [... Logical Syntax] is defla-
tionary. [...] Its stance toward alternative philosophical positions is
not of opposition to their doctrines with its doctrines, but of invita-
tion to clarification. The result of those clarifications, the frameworks
of the alternative positions, can then be compared with Carnap’s fa-
vored frameworks, and the greater desirability of Carnap’s, presum-
ably, will be evident. It is important to realize that those comparisons
can be made only on a case-by-case basis: there is no general the-
ory invoked against the alternatives. All of Carnap’s considerations
against other philosophical positions must be ad hoc. Indeed, no
other method would be compatible with thoroughgoing application
of the Principle of Tolerance. (Goldfarb 1997: 61)
As I understand this, Goldfarb’s deflationary reading amounts to the follow-
ing: when Carnap claims that mathematical axioms are conventional, this is
not supposed to entail that anyone who adopts a linguistic framework in which
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mathematics is not analytic is making some kind of factual mistake. Carnap
rather recommends that we adopt linguistic frameworks in which mathematics is
analytic, in the hope that we come to appreciate the convenience of this move.
Contra Coffa, there is thus no exception to the claim that choosing frameworks
is a matter of pragmatic decision.
This strikes me as a compelling reply to Coffa. The question that arises, how-
ever, is whether a similar response could be given to Beth. In the following I will
argue for a negative answer: to avoid the problem of non-recursive dispositions,
a much more radical form of deflationism would be required. In the following
I will explain why this is the case, and then argue that radical deflationism is
exegetically implausible, before considering the view on its own merits in the
next section.
In the quote above, Goldfarb describes Carnap’s strategy as a comparison be-
tween different frameworks, with Carnap hoping that his own preferred frame-
work for mathematics will prove to be most attractive. For this description to
make sense, however, it seems that one needs to be in a position to adopt and
use Carnap’s preferred framework. For if not, it is unclear what the point of
constructing the framework was in the first place. And this observation brings
us right back to Beth’s objection. For the problem with Carnap’s employment of
non-recursive inference rules in his framework for mathematics is precisely that
it is unclear how human beings can actually use such a framework. Goldfarb’s
response to Coffa thus presupposes that there can be semantic facts such as ”we
speak metalanguage ML rather than another”, and therefore cannot answer any
worries about the possibility of such facts.1
This is not to say that there is no way to give a deflationary response to
Beth’s argument. There is indeed an obvious candidate: one could deny that
Carnap really wants to claim that we determinately speak metalanguage ML
rather than ML*. In other words, we could read Carnap as agreeing that our
recursive dispositions don’t uniquely pin down a certain framework with non-
recursive rules, and that hence which framework we speak is to a certain extent
indeterminate.
On an exegetical level this proposal might seem to be a non-starter, for when
discussing Carnap’s reply to Beth from the Schilpp-volume, I emphasised that
1 One might worry that my reliance on semantic facts is in tension with Goldfarb’s rejection of
a language-transcendent notion of fact, which we encountered in his (and Ricketts’) response
to Gödel (section 2.2.2). I think that this is not the case, however. The relevant semantic
facts are rather internal to the framework of descriptive semantics, in which we can discuss the
coordination of dispositions with linguistic rules.
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his main point is that we in fact speak one particular metalanguage, namely
ML, rather than ML*. It must be admitted, however, that the reply also contains
passages which point in a different direction. Carnap there explicitly addresses
Beth’s contention that phrases such as ”for all syntactical properties of accented
expressions” and ”and so on”, which occur at crucial junctures in Logical Syntax,
can be interpreted in different ways:
It is of course not quite possible to use ordinary language with a per-
fectly fixed interpretation, because of the inevitable vagueness and
ambiguity of ordinary words. Nevertheless it is at least possible to
approximate a fixed interpretation to a certain extent, e.g., by a suit-
able choice of less vague words and by suitable paraphrases. [...] With
regard to this difficulty Beth gives two good examples. First he refers
to a passage in [Syntax] (p. 13) which contains in an informal expla-
nation the phrase ”and so on” [...], and secondly he refers to a place
(p. 113) where I myself point out that phrases like ”for all syntactical
properties of accented expressions”, which occur in syntactical rules,
are ambiguous. (Carnap 1963b: 930)
This case is crucial to the issue of non-standard interpretations, since the rele-
vant occurrence of ”and so on” appears in a passage where Carnap enumerates
the numerals 0, 0′, 0′′, ..., (Carnap 1937a: 13). It is thus ambiguous insofar as one
could continue this enumeration in standard or non-standard ways. One might
now think that, if Carnap actually endorsed the claim that our metalanguage ML
encodes a commitment to the standard numbers, he should deny that the rele-
vant ambiguity exists. In fact, however, he appears to be in complete agreement
with Beth:
I would certainly agree if Beth had said about these examples some-
thing like this: “At these two places the requirement of strict usage
of natural language, i.e., of a usage of words with fixed meanings, is
not fulfilled”. Amazingly, he says just the opposite; [...] Later he says:
“The term ‘and so on’ which appears in Carnap’s text, is supposed to
be univocal”. Presumably he means hereby to imply: “but, in fact, it
is not univocal”; and with this I would agree. (Carnap 1963b: 930f)
It is certainly possible to interpret this passage as saying that our ordinary use
of mathematical language does not pin down the standard numerals to the ex-
clusion of non-standard numerals. And if this is the correct reading, then the
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conclusion that, according to Carnap, there is no fact of the matter whether we
speak metalanguage ML or a non-standard version such as ML* is indeed very
natural. Overall I think that the reasons against such an interpretation outweigh
the reasons in favour, however. Note that holding that, in the relevant context,
”and so on” is ambiguous between standard and non-standard readings is com-
patible with believing that we manage to resolve this ambiguity in a particular
way. I therefore think that what Carnap agrees to here is that it is possible to
interpret the statements found in Logical Syntax in a non-standard way, but not
the stronger claim that it is impossible to determinately pin down the standard
conception. This would speak against reading Carnap as a radical deflation-
ist, and I will support my interpretation by drawing on an as yet unpublished
letter from Carnap to Irving Copi on the philosophical implication of Gödel’s
incompleteness results.
In 1950, Copi published an article called ”Modern Logic and the Synthetic
A Priori” (Copi 1949). Copi there argues that, in light of Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorems, the popular view that all mathematical truths are analytic must
be given up, at least if analyticity is identified with truth in virtue of linguis-
tic rules. He then suggests that undecidable sentences should be considered
synthetic a priori truths. This paper spawned a short debate in the Journal of Phi-
losophy where Copi’s article appeared. In a response, Atwelle Turquette made
the alternative suggestion that we should not regard undecidable mathematical
sentences as determinately true or false at all, but that calling them indetermi-
nate is more appropriate – a contention Turquette supports by considering the
possibility of non-standard models, referring to Henkin’s dissertation (Turquette
1950). In fact Turquette goes even further and suggests that sentences such as
ConPA are meaningless and nonsensical, a proposal Copi rejects as implausible in
a further reply (Copi 1950).
Carnap did not publicly intervene in this debate, but he apparently regarded
it as sufficiently important to write Copi a letter in which he defends his own
view that all mathematical truths are analytic. (Unfortunately for our purposes,
Carnap doesn’t directly comment on Turquette’s paper). In a move that will not
surprise us, the gist of Carnap’s letter is that Copi’s conclusion that undecidable
sentences do not follow from linguistic rules relies on a too narrow construal of
what kind of rules are relevant. The following is a central passage:
[The concept ”analytic”] is by no means identical with ”provable”,
because it is based on transfinite syntactical rules. [...] The decisive
point which you seem to overlook is this: it follows from Gödel’s
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consideration that his undecidable sentence is true and, moreover,
L-true. In other words, Gödel has actually shown, on the basis of
linguistic rules, (though not on the basis of the syntactical rules of
the given calculus), that the sentence is true. Thus the sentence is
known to be analytic. (Carnap, Letter to Copi from August 23 1949,
RCP 088-18-08)2
I think that this remark strongly supports a reading of Carnap on which he does
think that we in fact speak metalanguage ML, for a number of reasons. First,
the linguistic rules he is alluding to here are clearly those of a metalanguage. It
is therefore certain that he holds that we speak a metalanguage that settles the
truth values of some undecidable sentences. Secondly, I think it is reasonable to
assume that the particular Gödel sentence Carnap is talking about here is just
a convenient example, for nowhere in his work does he draw a theoretically
important distinction between different kinds of undecidable sentences. If this
is so, then the point he makes generalises: the linguistic rules of our metalan-
guage do not only settle the truth value of one, but of all undecidable sentences.
Thirdly, it is striking that the letter is formulated in a way that suggests Copi
has made a factual mistake: Carnap does not merely say that we could accept
linguistic rules that make the Gödel sentence come out as analytic, but he rather
implies that we already are committed to such rules anyway.3
The reading of Carnap’s position on the analyticity of mathematics that
emerges from the letter to Copi, and also large parts of his reply to Beth, can
thus be captured as follows:
Absolute Analyticity
Given the linguistic framework we actually accept, the following holds:
for all mathematical sentences S, it is determinate that S is either an-
alytic or contradictory.
This position requires that it is determinate which framework we accept, which
in turn relies on facts about what metalanguage we speak.
2 The Rudolf Carnap Papers are based at the Archives of Scientific Philosophy of the University
of Pittsburgh.
3 This is worth stressing since in many instances Carnap is keen to reinterpret apparent factual
disputes about philosophical matters as different proposals for how to speak. He does so
explicitly even for issues like monism versus dualism in the philosophy of mind (Carnap
1963b: 884f).
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6.2 Wittgenstein’s Radical Conventionalism
Earlier I described a deflationary response that denies facts about what metalan-
guage we use as radical, and we are now in a better position to appreciate why.
Without the relevant facts, Carnap’s position on the analyticity of mathematics
amounts to the following:
Relative Analyticity
For some mathematical sentence S, the linguistic framework we ac-
tually accept does not determinately settle whether S is analytic or
contradictory. Moreover, S is analytic relative to some way of extend-
ing our linguistic framework, and contradictory relative to another.
And this seems to be quite a major departure from Carnap’s official position. For
there will now be purely mathematical sentences that are indeterminate given
the framework we actually accept, a status that Carnap had originally reserved
for synthetic sentences about the empirical world (Carnap 1937a: 28). It might
of course be that this revision of Carnap’s view is nevertheless the best way of
defending him against Beth, and in this section I will therefore discuss what
further costs this move has.
I characterised radical deflationism as the view that which linguistic frame-
work for mathematics we accept is to a certain extent indeterminate. In order to
assess how viable this position is, we need to consider the question of how far
this indeterminacy reaches. Given the argument from dispositions of the previ-
ous chapter, the only defensible option seems to be the following: the recursive
rules of the framework of mathematics are settled by our usage of mathematical
language, but the non-recursive rules are left indeterminate.
In their article on Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, Goldfarb and Rick-
etts discuss what would happen to Carnap’s position if he could only use weak
metalanguages, i.e. ones with recursive rules. This is obviously a version of the
view that only the recursive rules of a framework are determinate, and so the
conclusion they draw is immediately relevant for the proposal at hand:
This way of characterizing how little is left of the notion of mathemat-
ical truth shows how far from Carnap’s stated views the restriction to
weak metalanguages winds up being. It summons a rather different
philosopher to mind. (Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992: 77)
The philosopher they allude to is Wittgenstein during his so-called middle pe-
riod, and the views he explores in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
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and lectures at Cambridge. They quote the following striking passage, in which
Wittgenstein sums up his interpretation of the philosophical upshot of the in-
completeness theorems:
”But may there not be true propositions which are written in this
symbolism, but are not provable in Russell’s system” – ’True propo-
sitions,’ hence propositions which are true in another system, i.e., can
rightly be asserted in another game. Certainly; why should there not
be such propositions [...] [... A] proposition which cannot be proved
in Russell’s system is ”true” or ”false” in a different sense from a
proposition of Principia Mathematica. (Wittgenstein 1956: 50e)
The natural interpretation of these remarks is as follows: Wittgenstein denies
that there is a unified notion of mathematical truth, if this is understood to go
beyond what is derivable in some specific calculus. Instead, all he accepts is
truth-according-to Russell’s system, truth-according-to-another-system, etc.
I think that, when read as a radical deflationist, Carnap would have to say
something very similar. If our dispositions don’t pin down one particular frame-
work for doing mathematics, but are rather compatible with a number of them,
then it becomes hard to see how he can speak about the framework of mathe-
matics at all. And while this result might be fine for some areas of mathematics,
the consequences when applied to arithmetic are quite severe. For as we saw in
section 4.2.3, without determinate truth values in arithmetic we do not get de-
terminate facts about syntax, including facts concerning what is derivable from
what.
Wittgenstein himself was aware of this peculiar consequence of his view, but
he openly embraced it, and for this reason has been described as a radical conven-
tionalist. The standard view among conventionalists about logic and mathemat-
ics is that once we have accepted certain conventions, it is thereby determined
what does and doesn’t follow from them. As Dummett points out, however,
one might be unsatisfied with such accounts if the nature of this determination
remains unexplained:
This account is entirely superficial and throws away all the advan-
tages of conventionalism, since it leaves unexplained the status of
the assertion that certain conventions have certain consequences. [...]
Wittgenstein goes in for a full-blooded conventionalism; for him the log-
ical necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of a
linguistic convention. (Dummett 1959: 328f)
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As Dummett reads him, Wittgenstein holds the surprising view that the accep-
tance of certain axioms and inference rules do not compel us to accept statements
which are derivable from them:
[...] at each step we are free to choose to accept or reject the proof;
there is nothing in our formulation of the axioms and of the rules of
inference, and nothing in our minds when we accepted these before
the proof was given, which of itself shows whether we shall accept
the proof or not; and hence there is nothing which forces us to accept
the proof. (Dummett 1959: 330)
Whether this is correct as an exegesis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathe-
matics is controversial, and alternative interpretations have been offered.4 There
is no denying, however, that (at least in this period) Wittgenstein’s views about
the nature of syntax appear to be unlike those of pretty much any other logi-
cian and mathematician. It was and is widely accepted that for any system of
axioms and inference rules, there is a fact of the matter whether they are consis-
tent, i.e. whether a contradiction is derivable from them, regardless of whether
anyone has ever actually derived a contradiction or not. This broad consensus
is repeatedly challenged by Wittgenstein, however, for instance in conversation
with Schlick and Waismann:
One imagines that there could be a contradiction that no one has ever
seen hidden in the axioms from the beginning, like tuberculosis. Sus-
pecting nothing, one suddenly drops dead. And so it is thought, by
analogy, that a hidden contradiction could erupt and bring catastro-
phe. (Waismann 1979: 120)
Wittgenstein takes up this health-based metaphor again in his lectures on the
foundations of mathematics at Cambridge, where he rejects the view that find-
ing a contradiction, ”like finding a germ in an otherwise healthy body, shows
that the whole system or body is diseased” (Wittgenstein 1989: 138). And his re-
jection of consistency facts that are independent of actual proofs is most explicit
in the following passage:
If you say, "The mere fact that a proof could be found is a fact about the
mathematical world", you’re comparing the mathematician to a man
who has found out something about a realm of entities, the physics of
4 For discussion see Stroud 1965 and Putnam 1979.
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mathematical entities. If you say, "You can go this way or that way",
you say there is no physics about mathematics. (Wittgenstein 1989:
138)
As ever when interpreting Wittgenstein one needs to be careful, for some of the
radical-sounding claims found in his writing may not express his own position
at all, but are rather vivid expressions of views Wittgenstein ultimately wants to
reject.5 Dummett was not the only one who took Wittgenstein to put forward
strikingly unorthodox theses on the nature of mathematics, however. Gödel,
for instance, is reported to have reacted to the publication of Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics by asking whether Wittgenstein had lost his mind
(Wang 1996: 179).6 For our purposes I will put such exegetical questions aside,
since it is instructive to consider radical conventionalism whether or not it was
Wittgenstein’s own view.
It should be uncontroversial that Carnap’s position is not actually a form if
radical conventionalism: in section 1.2.3 I already presented a quote in which
Carnap characterises the truth of certain sentences as being ”determined by
the logical relations holding between the given meanings” (Carnap 1963b: 916),
which seems to be just the kind of determination Wittgenstein rejects. And I
think it is also clear that Carnap should not embrace radical conventionalism ei-
ther, since it seems to undermine one of the most fundamental ideas behind
the notion of a linguistic framework: namely that we can set up a framework
by formulating explicit rules which then determine further sentences to be an-
alytic, contradictory, or synthetic – hardly an incidental component of Carnap’s
position.
That Carnap needs there to be determinate facts about consistency can be
demonstrated by looking back at Carnap’s account of empirical content from
section 2.2.2. We there encountered the following definition:
5 Cora Diamond has for instance proposed a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathe-
matics on which his position does not seem particularly revisionary (Diamond 1991).
6 I am not sure whether Carnap was aware of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of
mathematics in the middle period. There is reason to doubt it, however, as the following
anecdote illustrates:
Years later some of Wittgenstein’s students at Cambridge requested his permission
to send transcripts of his lectures to friends and interested philosophers. He
asked for the list of names, and then approved all of them but mine. In my life I
have never experienced anything even similar to this hate against me. (Carnap,
note dated 16.11.1956 entitled ”This is not in the Autobiography!”, RC 102-78-08)
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The content of a sentence S is the set of non-valid sentences which
follows from S. (adapted from Carnap 1937a: 175 (§49)).
Whether there are any non-valid sentences or not, however, depends on whether
the relevant linguistic framework is consistent. And without facts about consis-
tency the whole approach would therefore be undermined, for it seems incoher-
ent to assume that whether a framework has any empirical content at all could
be either indeterminate or a matter of choice. For Carnap’s position to be a
stable one, the collapse into radical conventionalism thus needs to be resisted.
6.3 Is there a Middle Way?
I have so far suggested that the choice between Relative and Absolute Analytic-
ity is exclusive. In this section I will consider a middle way between these two
extremes, which has has recently been defended in a number of papers by Gre-
gory Lavers. The general idea is that while for some areas of mathematics, such
as set theory, it is very plausible that our linguistic dispositions do not commit
us to one particular framework, an absolute conception might still be viable for
arithmetic. Along the way I will also address Lavers’ claim that Carnap’s phi-
losophy of mathematics underwent a major change between Logical Syntax and
the 1950s.
Lavers is very clear that, when read unrestrictedly as applying to all of math-
ematics, he rejects what I have called the absolute conception of analyticity, ac-
cording to which our linguistic practices commit us to a determinate way of
dividing sentences into analytic and contradictory:
We are able to show that for any mathematical sentence S, either S
is analytic or S is contradictory. But this does not imply that our
conventions assign a truth value to every sentence in some abso-
lute sense: the admission that the English expressions in the meta-
language are vague rules out this possibility. (Lavers 2008: 22)
At times it sounds as if Lavers’ reaction to this is simply to endorse the relative
conception of analyticity, by maintaining that undecidable mathematical sen-
tences have no determinate truth value. Commenting on Carnap’s reply to Beth,
Lavers suggests that Carnap does not actually want to use infinitary methods to
secure determinate truth values for all of mathematics, but is rather content to
live with a certain amount of indeterminacy:
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So long as the meaning of the English expression ‘natural number’ is
determined by a finite set of rules, [...] our ability to use Language
II is also, at bottom, explained by the grasp of a finite set of rules.
Carnap’s conventionalism can be saved by conceding that our math-
ematical notions are somewhat vague. (Lavers 2004: 313)
This initial impression is misleading, however, as Lavers’ considered position is
more sophisticated. An important notion in his overall interpretation of Car-
naps’ mature – i.e. 1950s – philosophy of mathematics is that of an intuitive
conception of mathematical truth. In a discussion of Gödel’s argument from ”Is
Mathematics Syntax of Language?”, Lavers maintains that while in Logical Syn-
tax Carnap wanted to use purely syntactic methods and abandon all use of math-
ematical intuition, his attitude towards the latter notion changed. According to
Lavers, in the 1950s Carnap is happy to rely on an intuitive understanding of
mathematics:
[...] our intuitive understanding of the domains of number theory,
or set theory, now plays the role of the explicandum in giving a sys-
tematic account of number or set. This last point is important since
Gödel’s arguments in these drafts presuppose that our intuitive un-
derstanding of the domain of numbers should play no role in a syn-
tactic philosophy of mathematics. (Lavers 2019: 240)
According to Lavers, this change in position has important consequences for the
matter under discussion. While he agrees that neither our intuitive conception
nor formal definitions can deliver determinate truth values for all mathematical
sentences, he thinks that in some cases the intuitive meaning of natural language
expressions can settle their truth value in a way a formalised system cannot:
What is defined in natural language is vague. However, this vague-
ness is not so pervasive that any interpretation of the vocabulary is
equally acceptable. If some structure is clearly a non-standard inter-
pretation of arithmetic, then it is clearly not this structure that we
intend when we speak of the natural numbers in English. [...] If the
English-language expressions concerning the natural numbers or the
power-set operation are vague, then there must be some set of sen-
tences whose truth conditions are left undetermined by the meanings
of these concepts. This class will be narrower than the class of sentences
left undetermined by some formal definition of these concepts (e.g., their im-
plicit definition by first-order axioms). (Lavers 2008: 21f, my emphasis)
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As I understand it, the view Lavers recommends is as follows: for some highly
abstract claims – he mentions the continuum hypothesis – Carnap’s approach
indeed leads to mathematical indeterminacy, since neither the formal theory
ZFC nor our intuitive conception of sets commits us either way. But this inde-
terminacy is not so widespread as to apply to every undecidable sentence. For
arithmetic, for instance, there is a well-entrenched intuitive conception of the
natural number sequence present in our practice of mathematics. In virtue of
this, sentences like ConPA can therefore have determinate truth values despite
being undecidable.
Lavers refers to models that are clearly non-standard, and it is not so obvious
what this amounts to. A model which only contains even numbers, for instance,
is surely non-standard in some sense, but may not be clearly non-standard if it
makes all the same sentences true as the standard model. I will here make the
assumption that a model is clearly non-standard if it is not Π1-sound, i.e. if it as-
signs a different truth value to some Π1-sentence than the standard model.7 This
can be motivated in the following way: consistency sentences such as ConPA are
Π1-sentences. If we want to avoid radical conventionalism and get determinate
facts about syntax, we should at least exclude all models that get the facts of syn-
tax wrong. Hence Lavers’ middle way is only effective if the models excluded by
our intuitive conception of numbers include the ones which are not Π1-sound.
I think this position would be an attractive one. It is maybe not quite as am-
bitious as Carnap’s own, since one still cannot get absolute analyticity for strong
mathematical systems such as set theory. But accounting for the analyticity of
arithmetic would be a major success nevertheless, given that we need determi-
nate truth in arithmetic in order to have determinate facts about syntax. The
problem with this proposal, however, is that it is unclear how exactly our intu-
itive conception mathematics could manage to be more powerful than a formal
theory in the way Lavers describes, for reasons I will explain now.
To begin with, one might worry that it is implausible to read Carnap as
relying on any kind of intuition at all. For if one interprets intution as some
mysterious faculty by means of which we can acquire insights into a realm of
abstract objects, then it is clear that, even in the 1950s, Carnap would not coun-
tenance anything of this kind. This is not what Lavers has in mind though. He
calls our intuitive understanding of the natural number series a ’psychological
fact’ (Lavers 2019: 239), and there is indeed textual evidence that Carnap accepts
7 Π1-sentences have the form ∀x1∀x2...φ, i.e. an arbitrary number of universal quantifiers fol-
lowed by a quantifier-free formula.
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intuition understood as an ability to make certain distinctions. In 1965 he gave a
talk called ”Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition” at a conference in London,
which was later published together with the ensuing discussion:
In order to learn inductive reasoning, we must have what I call the
ability of inductive intuition. [...] Maybe you have the feeling that
this mysterious inductive intuition is a rather dubious basis for such
a serious enterprise as the construction of a system of inductive logic.
If so, I would like to call your attention to the fact that the situation
in deductive logic is exactly the same. If you had before you a per-
son who were deductively blind, that is to say, unable to distinguish
between valid and invalid deductive inferences, or between deduc-
tively valid and invalid statements, even in the simplest cases, then
you could not do anything with him. (Carnap 1968: 265)
Carnap illustrates the idea of deductive blindness by considering a person who
is unwilling to reason in accordance with modus ponens, and can also not be
persuaded to do so. Understood in this way the notion of intuition is surely a
sensible one, but the use of the term ’intuition’ nevertheless irritated and con-
fused some of the philosophers in the audience, presumably since they associ-
ated this notion with the kinds of speculative philosophy Carnap rejected. Karl
Popper complained about Carnap’s reliance on intuition in his response to the
talk, which prompted Carnap to clarify once more that there is nothing spooky
going on:
Since Popper seems allergic to the terms ‘inductive’ and ‘intuition’,
let us for the moment use neutral terms. Instead of ‘inductive’ we
shall say ‘probabilistic’ [...]; and instead of ‘intuition’: ‘the ability
to discriminate (at least in simple cases) between valid and invalid
reasoning’, or briefly ‘discriminative ability’. I can hardly see reasons
for serious doubt when I make the following assertion which indeed
seems to me rather trivial: we cannot hope to teach someone to use a
language and, furthermore, to speak and think in a logically correct
way unless he has from the beginning certain basic discriminative
abilities; and this holds for the whole field of reasoning, including
deductive and probabilistic reasoning. (Carnap 1968: 310)
The question thus becomes whether Carnapian intuition, understood as a dis-
criminative ability, can achieve what Lavers thinks it can: namely to pin down
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a conception of the natural numbers in a way that goes beyond what a formal
theory such as first-order Peano arithmetic can do. As far as I can see the answer
is no, provided that we accept the earlier assumption that human abilities need
to be describable by means of a recursive theory. For since there is no way to
recursively enumerate all Π1-sentences that are true in the standard model, it
cannot be that our recursively describable dispositions exclude all non-standard
models which get the facts of syntax wrong. And given that the example Carnap
uses to motivate his acceptance of intuition involves recursive inference rules –
namely modus ponens – it is very doubtful whether he would have made room
for the possibility of discriminatory capacities so powerful that they outstrip a
recursive formalisation.8
In the end I therefore think that the cognitive constraint on human capacities
– i.e. that they cannot outrun a Turing-machine – stands in the way of making
Lavers’ middle way a viable option. His claim that Carnap’s approach to math-
ematics underwent a major change from the 1930s to the 1950s strikes me as in-
sufficiently motivated as well, for while Carnap’s terminology certainly changed,
it is hard to believe that in the 1930s he would have been opposed to the idea of
basic discriminative abilities to use logical inferences. But even if there was this
alleged change in view, Beth’s argument from non-standard models remains a
stumbling block.
8 Another way to put my criticism would be as follows: without more information on the na-
ture of Carnapian intuition, there is good reason to be skeptical whether it can really solve the
problem. The same also applies to a somewhat related proposal in the literature suggested
by Sahotra Sarkar. His defence against Beth is that for Carnap, ”not all models had the same
epistemological status: the model with the intended interpretation was epistemologically
privileged. This was the model obtained by an abstraction1 from the given (typically em-
pirical) context” (Sarkar 2013: 367). While Sarkar talks about various kinds of abstraction in
some detail, it remains unclear in what sense exactly we are inhabiting an empirical context






In this chapter I compare Carnap’s position to some contemporary and histori-
cally influential views in the philosophy of mathematics, with a view to the ques-
tion whether a response to Beth can be given by drawing on the ideas of other
philosophers. We will first consider positions that, like Carnap’s own, try to
avoid a commitment to robust forms of Platonism, such as mathematical fiction-
alism. I will argue, however, that the relevant authors only avoid Beth’s problem
by being less ambitious than Carnap in their avoidance of external mathematical
facts. Secondly, I will consider whether using logical resources that go beyond
first-order logic might be of help to Carnap. The results will be negative as well,
as the problem of non-recursive dispositions undermines the two most salient
proposals. I then discuss a recent defence of infinitary reasoning, which if suc-
cessful would indeed help Carnap against Beth. As I argue, however, Carnap’s
theory of dispositions prevents him from accounting for the abilities this kind of
infinitary reasoning relies on. The chapters concludes with a brief look at Frege’s
logicism, which can be read in a way that neutralises Beth-style arguments. The
costs of this seem too high for Carnap, however: the principle of tolerance needs
to be given up completely, and the empiricist credentials of the Fregean position
are doubtful as well.
7.1 Internalism and Pluralism
Let us begin by considering a contemporary position that can justly be described
as neo-Carnapian: Thomas Hofweber’s internalism about arithmetic (Hofweber
2016). Hofweber introduces a general distinction between external and internal
quantification. External quantification is in effect ordinary objectual quantifi-
cation, where the truth of the quantified statement ’∃xFx’ requires that there
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is some object in the domain of quantification which satisifies the predicate F.
Hofweber calls the view that the quantifiers are read externally in some area
of discourse externalism about this domain, and one area where externalism is
plausible is talk about spatiotemporal objects.
Internal quantifiers, on the other hand, function broadly substitutionally. On
the internal reading, ’∃xFx’ is true if and only if there is a true substitution
instance ’Fa’. For this to be interestingly different from external quantification it
of course needs to be possible for sentences such as ’Fa’ to be true even though
there is no domain of quantification which contains an object that the constant ’a’
refers to. And Hofweber thinks that this is indeed so: He for instance assumes
that ’Paul is looking for the largest prime number’ can be true, and also its
existential generalisation ’There is something Paul is looking for’, even though
the expression ’the largest prime number’ doesn’t denote any object (Hofweber
2016: 150). The quantified claim thus couldn’t be true on an external reading,
but can be on the internal reading as no condition is put on the domain by it.
Hofweber argues in detail that internalism is true for arithmetic discourse
(Hofweber 2016: chapters 5-6). And this results in a position that is recognisably
Carnapian, for according to internalism the truth of arithmetic does not come
with a commitment to an external domain of mathematical objects, and – so the
hope – this will avoid the tricky metaphysical and epistemological questions that
plague Platonists. As I will explain now, however, the problem Beth raised for
Carnap will reappear as well.
We just saw that Hofweber is happy to say that using internalist quantifica-
tion we can truly state that there is such a thing as the largest prime number.
On the face of it this looks like a big problem. For if internalism about quantifi-
cation is supposed to apply to arithmetic as well, and it is a truth of arithmetic
that there isn’t such a prime number, then we face the threat of inconsistency.
Hofweber’s response is an appeal to an internalist form of quantifier domain re-
striction:
What this shows is that quantification in arithmetic can’t just be un-
restricted internal quantification. [...] [In] arithmetic we, in general,
generalize over the instances that are formed with the natural num-
ber terms: 1,2,3, and so on. That the largest prime is the largest prime
might be trivial, on an innocent reading of it, and thus that there is
something which is the largest prime (namely the largest prime). But
whether or not one of the numbers is the largest prime is so far left
open. And that is the question of whether or not 1 is the largest
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prime, or 2 is the largest prime, and so on. And here the answer is
no. So, on this, restricted, but internal, reading of the quantifier we
get that there is no largest prime. (Hofweber 2016: 151)
That arithmetical quantification is restricted in this way is of course also crucial
for the truth of claims about syntax, such as ConPA. For there are non-standard
numbers which can make ¬ConPA true, and they consequently need to be ex-
cluded from consideration as well if we want determinate truth values for unde-
cidable statements. So we have returned to the same problem Beth put forward:
how do we manage to specify the restriction we want – i.e. how do we manage
to pin down the natural numbers that are the intended range of substitution
instances? And this does not seem any easier to solve for Hofweber than it was
for Carnap.
As it happens Hofweber does have a proposal for how to account for facts
about syntax, especially consistency. He considers the view that axioms are
constitutive of mathematical truth, i.e. to be true is to follow from some axioms.
He points out that applying this model to arithmetic poses problems due to the
possibility of expressing syntax within arithmetic:
Constitutive axioms are supposed to determine all truth in their do-
main, but what if these axioms are inconsistent? Then no coherent
domain has been established at all. That the axioms are consistent
is essential for any domain with constitutive axioms. But whether
the axioms are consistent is itself a mathematical question. It is, in
effect, a question in arithmetic. If arithmetic, too, had constitutive
axioms, then there being a well-established domain of arithmetical
facts would itself depend on an arithmetical fact, leaving the domain
in limbo. The fact of consistency would only obtain if it is part of
the range of facts established by the axioms. But if the axioms are
not consistent then no domain is established. Thus if arithmetic had
constitutive axioms then none of this could get off the ground: there
being a domain of arithmetical facts at all would depend on one of
the arithmetical facts obtaining. (Hofweber 2016: 181)
Hofweber’s response to this challenge is, in effect, to maintain that arithmetic
is special. Whereas for other areas of mathematics it might well be that axioms
are constitutive, Hofweber adopts a logicist account of arithmetic, according to
which the Peano axioms merely partially describe a domain of mathematical facts
that goes beyond what is settled by them:
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On the logicist picture of arithmetic defended here, axiomatizations
of arithmetic, like Peano’s axioms, are descriptive axioms. The ax-
ioms of arithmetic play no role in determining what is true, and they
are secondary to the facts in all relevant ways. [...] The axioms don’t
exhaust what is true. Peano’s Axioms are incomplete, like many other
axiom systems, but some of the cases that are not settled by the ax-
ioms are clearly true, and not in some way indeterminate. (Hofweber
2016: 180)
One of the mathematical sentences that are clearly true despite being indepen-
dent of the axioms is presumably ConPA, and so the problem of accounting for
consistency has solved.
This exceptionalism about arithmetic come with a major cost, however. For
although Hofweber still rejects the externalist view that there is a domain of
numbers that determines mathematical truth, he is now committed to objective
mathematical facts that go beyond what can be accounted for by formal rules.
And as far as I can see this move is just a rejection of internalism about arithmetic
understood in Carnap’s sense, i.e. as the claim that all truths about arithmetic fol-
low from the rules of some linguistic framework. I will not discuss the question
of why Hofweber thinks that his form of logicism is preferable to straight-out
Platonism any further here. It is safe to conclude that Hofweber’s aims are dis-
tinct from Carnap’s though, who nowhere suggests that he wants to adopt a
different treatment for arithmetic than for any other area of mathematics.
A similar lesson can be drawn from a position called mathematical plural-
ism that Justin Clarke-Doane explores in a recent book (Clarke-Doane 2020).
Construed in the most radical way, mathematical pluralism is indeed similar
to Carnap’s internalism: it is the view that ”any (first-order) consistent math-
ematical theory is true of its intended subject, independent of human minds
and languages” (Clarke-Doane 2020: 160). One might think that this is just a
consequence of the completeness theorem, according to which every consistent
first-order theory has a model. But as Clarke-Doane clarifies, mathematical re-
alists typically make a distinction between models, regarding some – such as
the standard model of arithmetic – as intended interpretations, whereas others
are unintended. Furthermore, it is commonly held that some consistent theories
only have unintended models. We have already encountered an example of such
a theory, namely PA+¬ConPA, which, from the perspective of a mathematical
realist at least, only has non-standard interpretations.
The claim that every consistent theory has an intended interpretation in
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which it is true is thus analogous to Carnap’s rejection of external question that
are not pragmatic. Clarke-Doane quickly notes, however, that this radical form
of mathematical pluralism leads to unwelcome results when it comes to matters
of syntax:
A model of PA + ~Con(PA) is a model in which there is an infinitely
long ”proof” of a contradiction from PA. I put ”proof” in quotes,
because a proof must be finite. The model is wrong about finiteness.
Or that is that we would like to say. But if we hold that PA + Con(PA)
and PA + ~Con(PA) are equally true of their intended subjects, like,
say, (pure) geometry with the Parallel Postulate and geometry with
its negation, then there will be no objective fact as to what counts as
finite and, hence, no objective fact as to what counts as a proof in PA.
Consequently, there will be no objective fact as to whether PA, or any
theory which interprets it, including a regimented physical theory, is
consistent! (Clarke-Doane 2020: 82f)
Clarke-Doane thinks that this kind of pluralism is too extreme, since if embraced
it would, for instance, become a non-objective matter what formal theories such
as PA even are. This is because theories are individuated by syntactic criteria, and
if there is more than one correct theory of syntax there will be multiple equally
correct characterisations of PA. His suggestion is therefore to moderate math-
ematical pluralism somewhat, such that theories which get the facts of syntax
wrong do not have an intended interpretation. This is implemented by assum-
ing that Π1 sentences express objective mathematical facts, and then expressing
moderate mathematical pluralism as the view that every Π1-sound theory has
an intended interpretation. Since consistency sentences such as ConPA are Π1
sentences, this strategy successfully excludes the unwanted deviant theories of
syntax.
Clarke-Doane’s treatment thus mirrors Beth’s criticism of Carnap as I have
interpreted it in chapter 4. The pluralism enshrined in the principle of tolerance
and the rejection of factual external questions is an attractive position, but needs
to be restricted when it comes to syntax. While Beth put this in terms of ontology,
Clarke-Doane – similar to Hofweber – speaks of a set of objective mathematical
truths (Clarke-Doane 2020: 161). But the upshot is the same. If we don’t want
the unattractive conclusion that there are no determinate facts about syntax, we
need some resources that are theory-external:
[...] only theories that are right about finiteness and consistency will
147
Lines of Defence Fictionalism and Modality
count as true of their intended subjects. (Note that Con(PA), Con(ZF),
and so forth are all Π1 sentences.) This implies that the set of ”objec-
tive” mathematical truths is no longer recursively enumerable, as it
would be if the ”pluriverse” witnessed every (first-order) consistent
mathematical theory whatever. (Clarke-Doane 2020: 161)
Clarke-Doane is thus forced to postulate the existence of a non-recursively enu-
merable realm of mathematical truths, where these truths must be taken as basic.
And in an important way this approach is not too different from the route Beth
himself recommends, namely that in order to get a plausible conception of syn-
tax we need some language-external resources of the kind Carnap wants to reject
across the board. Beth put this requirement in ontological terms, but postu-
lating facts or primitive truths does an equally good job. Just like Hofweber,
Clarke-Doane’s moderate form of pluralism thus avoids Beth’s problem by re-
stricting the internalist approach to parts of mathematics that are not arithmetic,
and hence it does not constitute a defence of full-blown internalism as Carnap
understood it.1
7.2 Fictionalism and Modality
One theme of the previous section was that while Hofweber and Clarke-Doane
try to make do without a mathematical ontology, they cannot abstain from postu-
lating objective mathematical facts, which from Carnap’s perspective will seem
equally problematic.2 It is worth to dwell on the idea of replacing ontology with
ideology some more, however, in order to evaluate a popular strategy in post-
Carnapian philosophy of mathematics that relies on modality. Since Carnap,
unlike Quine, was not opposed to using modal notions such as necessity and
possibility, it makes sense to consider whether modal resources might be able to
save his internalism after all.
1 Another contemporary position that is worth mentioning here is Agustín Rayo’s trivialism
about mathematics (Rayo 2013), since Rayo himself is happy to label his view as Carnapian
(Rayo 2014: 533, in response to Hofweber 2014: 443). While there has been some discussion
of whether Rayo can account for the determinacy of set-theoretic claims such as the contin-
uum hypothesis (Sider 2014, Rayo 2014: 504), in his published work Rayo does not explicitly
address the determinacy of arithmetic in any detail. At this point I will therefore not investi-
gate whether Beth’s objection applies to trivialism as well, since this would involve too much
guesswork.
2 The general question of how crucial a role objects play in Platonistic accounts of mathematics
has received some discussion (Linnebo 2018: section 1.4), see for instance Kreisel’s dictum:
”the problem is not the existence of mathematical objects but the objectivity of mathematical
statements” (Dummett 1978: xxxviii).
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This question is best investigated by comparing Carnap’s position to a con-
temporary anti-Platonist position: mathematical fictionalism, as can be found in
the works of Hartry Field and Mary Leng (Field 1980, Field 1988, Leng 2007).
While there are various differences between their views, Field and Leng both
want to account for the usefulness of mathematical discourse without invoking
the existence of mathematical objects. And they also both face a particularly
pressing problem: namely that in their attempts to make sense of mathematical
discourse, they need to talk about formal theories and their properties. Field, for
instance, thinks that although mathematical theories are strictly speaking false,
they are nevertheless useful, and their falsity doesn’t cause any damage since
mathematics conservatively extends empirical theories. But, so an obvious objec-
tion goes, metalogical claims like ”theory T′ is a conservative extension of T” are
claims about abstract objects. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the math-
ematical fictionalist cannot dispense with all mathematical entities after all, but
at least needs to be a realist about syntax (Leng 2007: 90).
Once again, this line of thought is very similar to my reading of Beth’s claims
about the need for ontology. Field and Leng respond to it in a way we haven’t
examined yet, however. For while they agree that we need some additional re-
sources to account for metalogical claims, they do not reach for ontology. In-
stead they rely on a primitive notion of logical possibility and necessity to explain
the truth-conditions of metalogical claims. Consistency, for instance, is spelled
out as follows:
A theory T is consistent iff it is logically possible that the axioms of
T are all true.
The consistency of PA is then identified with the possible truth of the axioms
of PA (♦AxPA). Note that because of the induction schema first-order PA has
infinitely many axions, so in addition to the possibility operator the fictionalist
will have to allow for infinite conjunctions as well (Leng 2007: 91).
Much of the discussion concerning this strategy has revolved around the
question whether the move from ontology to ideology has any epistemological
advantages, but this is not an issue I want to look into here. In our context the
interesting question is whether Carnap could use the modal strategy to ensure
the determinacy of syntax in a way that is consistent with his internalism.
To cut the suspense, I think the answer is ’no’. For while it is of course true
that Carnap was very interested in modal logic, and even developed a sophisti-
cated semantics for quantified model logic in his Meaning and Necessity (Carnap
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1956b), he is not in a position to use these modal resources in the same way as
Field and Leng. In a nutshell, the problem is that Carnap essentially has a reduc-
tive conception of modality, where the reduction base are once again linguistic
rules, and therefore has no room for a primitive notion of logical possibility and
necessity. In the following I will spell this out further.
In many ways Carnap’s modal semantics is quite similar to the contemporary
Kripkean possible worlds semantics. There is one crucial difference though. In
a Kripke-semantics every frame comes with a set of worlds and an accessibility
relation on the worlds, and – importantly – what this set and this relation are
like is not determined by the non-modal part of the logic. This is very different
for Carnap: in his system the role of worlds is played by state-descriptions,
which are maximal-consistent sets of sentences, and any non-modal language
automatically determines a set of state-descriptions. Williamson sums up this
difference as follows:
The semantics of the non-modal language determines a unique set
of state-descriptions. [...] In this respect, his account is much more
informative than contemporary possible worlds model theories. [...]
Given the semantics of the non-modal language, Carnap defines what
it is for a sentence of the form ♦A or A to be true simpliciter, not
merely true in a given model. (Williamson 2013: 48f)
For this reason one can think of Carnap’s modal semantics as a reductive theory
of modality. The aim is to let the semantics not merely determine the truth-
conditions of modal statements, which is what a Kripke-semantics does. Rather
the truth values of modal statements are provided by the semantics as well, since
the non-modal part of the language fixes what the state-descriptions are.
Why does this conception of modality preclude Carnap from adopting the
modal approach to metalogic? The problem is not that he cannot construct a
linguistic framework with modal rules in which AxPA, i.e. the (infinite) conjunc-
tion of the axioms of PA, comes out as true. The issue is rather that one can also
construct a framework in which the negation of AxPA holds. If we don’t want to
conclude that PA is both consistent and inconsistent, we need a way to discount
one of these frameworks as irrelevant. But in order to do that we need to bring
in some framework-external factor, and we are therefore back to the problem
we started with. Beth’s conclusion that determinate facts of syntax require some
external facts is thus substantiated rather than avoided.
This is not to say that Carnap could not in principle broaden his conception
of modality, and hence accept the primitive logical modality Field and Leng
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rely on. But this move would be a rejection of full-blown internalism analogous
to the acceptance of ontology suggested by Beth. For if there are objective facts
about what is logically possible or not, it will be possible to judge some linguistic
frameworks by an external standard, similarly to how an external Platonist can
evaluate them relative to a Model-in-the-Sky. Contrary to the initial hope, relying
on modal notions thus does not give Carnap a way to save the determinacy of
syntax without weakening his internalism.
7.3 Second-Order Logic and Categoricity
In this section I consider a response to Beth that relies on stronger logical re-
sources than we have used so far, namely second-order logic. Unfortunately for
Carnap, we will see that this approach also faces the problem of non-recursive
dispositions. I will briefly sketch that this result generalises to other attempts of
overcoming incompleteness.
In presenting the argument I so far assumed that the theories we are con-
sidering are first-order. About this assumption one might now complain as fol-
lows: first, in section 2.1.3 we have already seen that Carnap is happy to employ
higher-order quantifiers, so the framing in terms of first-order theories is exeget-
ically misleading. And, secondly, this assumption is of systematic importance
as well. While all recursive first-order theories of arithmetic have non-standard
models, full second-order arithmetic is categorical, i.e. all of its models are isomor-
phic to each other, and hence this second-order theory manages to pin down the
standard model. In the current context second-order theories can thus no longer
be ignored.
I think these points are well-taken. On one occasion Carnap in fact discusses
the need to give the Peano axioms a particular interpretation:
Peano’s axiom system, by furnishing the customary formulas of arith-
metic, achieves in this field all that is to be required from the point
of view of formal mathematics. However, it does not yet achieve an
explication of the arithmetical terms ’one’, ’two’, ’plus’, etc. In order
to do this, an interpretation must be given for the semiformal axiom
system. (Carnap 1950: 17f)
In explaining how to achieve this, Carnap then refers to Frege and Russell’s
logicism, i.e. the program of reducing mathematics to logic – second-order logic,
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that is.3 The suggestion that for Carnap second-order resources play an essential
role in securing our understanding of the standard model is thus substantiated,
and so let us consider whether this move in fact avoids the problem posed by
Beth.
In second-orders Peano arithmetic (which I will call PA2 from now on), the
first-order induction schema is replaced by a single second-order induction axiom:
∀F[[F(0) ∧ ∀x(F(x)→ F(Sx))]→ ∀xF(x)]
By Dedekind’s categoricity theorem, all full models of PA2 are isomorphic to each
other.4 Since the standard model N is one of these models, there is thus no
sentence of PA2 that is true in one model but false in another, and hence a case
like that of Carnap and Carnap* cannot be constructed. In light of this there
seems to be an obvious route for Carnap to take: if he can convincingly argue
that our linguistic dispositions correspond to PA2, he seems to have established
that these dispositions manage to pin down the standard model of arithmetic up
to isomorphism. And since it is plausible that we use second-order quantifiers
in natural language anyway, this line of argument looks promising and well-
motivated.5
Unfortunately the situation is more complicated, as we can see by unpack-
ing the notion of a full model. Second-order Peano arithmetic only excludes
non-isomorphic non-standard models if we evaluate the second-order quanti-
fiers with what is called a full semantics. Second-order quantifiers range over
sets of objects, but which sets exactly? On a full semantics, the answer is that
the range of the second-order quantifiers is the power set of the domain of quan-
tification – and so, in other words, we can quantify over arbitrary collections of
objects.
On a full semantics, the domain of objects for the first-order quantifiers thus
determines the range of the second-order quantifiers. This is different on a
so-called Henkin semantics. Here one needs to specify a second-order domain
explicitly, and while this might be the full power set of the first-order domain,
it can also be a proper subset of the power set. And when the second-order
quantifiers of PA2 are interpreted according to a Henkin-semantics, PA2 can be
interpreted in non-standard ways – just as first-order PA.
3 Already in Carnap 1939: §14, Carnap uses Frege and Russell’s method to give a ’normal
interpretation’ to a mathematical calculus.
4 See Shapiro 1991 and Button and Walsh 2018: chapter 7 for more background on the technical
details and philosophical considerations of this section.
5 See for instance Boolos 1984 for reasons to think that not all quantification in natural language
is first-order, and Oliver and Smiley 2016 for much more on this topic.
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This observation changes the nature of the task Carnap faces. In order to
argue that our linguistic dispositions pin down the standard model of arithmetic,
he would have to show that we are committed to second-order logic with a
full rather than a Henkin-style semantics. And it seems that this cannot be
done. For it needs to be argued our dispositions commit us to interpreting
the second-order quantifiers as ranging over the full power set of the natural
numbers, and this task is at least as hard as the problem we are trying to solve
– namely explaining our commitment to the standard numbers. This can be
seen as follows: as a consequence of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem, every
purely arithmetical sentence is either true or false in PA2 given the full semantics.
But on the assumption that our linguistic dispositions correspond to a recursive
theory, it follows from the incompleteness theorems that for some arithmetical
sentence we are neither committed to it or its negation. There must therefore
be a gap between our recursive dispositions and what full PA2 commits one to,
and hence it is implausible to maintain that we actually work within the full
semantics.
For this reason it is widely held that Dedekind’s categoricity theorem is not
as useful for philosophical purposes as it might seem at first (Button and Walsh
2018: section 7.7). Here is a clear statement of this point by Hilary Putnam:
Some have proposed that second-order formalizations are the solu-
tion, at least for mathematics; but the ”intended” interpretation of the
second-order formalism is not fixed by the use of the formalism (the
formalism itself admits so-called ”Henkin models”, i.e., models in
which the second-order variables fail to range over the full power set
of the universe of individuals), and it becomes necessary to attribute
to the mind special powers of ”grasping second-order notions”. (Put-
nam 1980: 481)
One might think that one can get around this problem by using Dedekind’s
categoricity theorem in a more indirect way. It has been established that the
theorem can be proved in (even quite weak versions of) first-order set theory
(Simpson and Yokoyama 2013). Since such theories are recursively axomatizable
there is no deep problem about what it could mean to adopt them in practice.
Would this then not enable us to pin down the standard model of arithmetic
after all, by relying on Dedekind’s theorem from within set theory theory?
This approach will not work either. For the advantage of relying on a weak
theory – namely that it is easy to argue that we can actually use it – is at the
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same time a disadvantage – the theory will also have non-standard models. For
this reason Charles Parsons concludes that, even when used in this indirect way,
Dedekind’s theorem fails to deliver the philosophical cash-value we were hoping
for:
Thus, of whatever set theory in which we have proved Dedekind’s
theorem, there will also be nonisomorphic models. And nonisomor-
phic models of set theory can give rise to nonisomorphic models of
arithmetic. Consider now two models M1 and M2 of set theory, and
let ω1 and ω2 be their sets of natural numbers. [...] [Dedekind’s
theorem] does not tell us that ω1 is isomorphic to ω2; indeed, as
non–well-founded models of set theory can be constructed [...] they
need not be isomorphic. (Parsons 2007: 274)
Moving from first- to second-order arithmetic therefore does not provide an easy
way out for Carnap. And the problem generalises to other technical means that
have been studied in relation to incompleteness. Bernd Buldt’s off-puttingly
named paper ”On RC 102-43-14” (Buldt 2004), for instance, is a very illumi-
nating study of Carnap’s attitude towards the ω-rule. Based on unpublished
notes Buldt shows that Carnap was initially skeptical about Hilbert’s attempt to
overcome incompleteness by using the ω-rule:
Concerning Hilbert’s new rule of inference.
Me: It seems to me that it does not yield more or less than the rule of
complete induction; therefore, merely a question of expediency.
Gödel: But Hilbert conceives of it differently, more broadly; the con-
dition is meant to be the following: ”If ... is provable with any
metamathematical means whatsoever,” and not ”If ... is provable
with such and such means of a formalized metamathematics.”
(Carnap, note from 12 July 1931, see Buldt 2004: 235)
It is not obvious why Carnap at first thought that the ω-rule is merely a different
way of stating the induction schema, but Buldt conjectures that he assumed it
to be a version of what is now called the recursive ω-rule, which instead of
infinitely many premises just requires the arithmetised version of the claim that
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And one might think that this proposal is interesting for more than historical
reasons. The effects of iterated additions of the recursive ω-rule were further
studied in the 1930s by Rosser (Rosser 1937), a paper which Carnap reviewed
(Carnap 1938). And the idea of minimising incompleteness in this way has gen-
erated much more interest since the early 1960s, thanks to Feferman’s work on
reflection principles (Feferman 1991).6 It is therefore temping to wonder whether,
by using the recursive ω-rule, Carnap could dodge my objection from section
4.2.1: namely that it is impossible for human beings to follow the version of the
ω-rule under discussion there, which was infinitary and non-recursive.
Unfortunately for Carnap this question has to be answered in the negative.
For applying the recursive ω-rule finitely many times does not lead very far,
since only a transfinite number of applications of it leads to a ”considerable gain
in completeness” (Buldt 2004: 241fn20).7 The problem of how we finite human
beings could actually employ the rule in an interesting way thus reappears in
a different guise, and is possibly even more severe, as Carnap himself seems to
assume that applying rules must be a finite procedure:
A rule of transformation is called transfinite if it refers to an infinite
number of premisses. (Carnap 1939: 23)
We must [lay down rules] in such a way that this process of successive
reference comes to an end in a finite number of steps. (Carnap 1937a:
106)
Whether allowing infinitely many premises but prohibiting infinitely many ap-
plications is a well-motivated stance can be questioned, but I will not go further
into this here. For our purposes it suffices to note that there is no way around
incompleteness without relying on non-recursive means, and as it stands there
is no reason to think that the options considered in this section are any less
problematic than the ones I already criticised.
7.4 Infinite Reasoning Regained?
Since section 4.2.1 the argument against Carnap’s reliance on infinitary infer-
ence rules has been based on the assumption that using such rules in practice is
6 See Buldt 2004: 241fn20 for the equivalence between adding the recursive ω-rule and a much-
used reflection principle.
7 Spelling this out more precisely would require the introduction of various technical notions,
and I will refrain from doing so here so as not to loose track of the main argument. For more
details on the relevant technical results and their philosophical implications see Franzén 2004,
Buldt 2014, Shapiro 2019, and Wrigley 2019.
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impossible. This was motivated by the naturalistic assumption that human be-
haviour needs to be simulable by a Turing-machine, which is taken to entail that
human beings cannot follow non-recursive rules like the ω-rule. As I said there
this assumption is widespread in the relevant literature, but it has recently been
challenged by Jared Warren (Warren 2020b, Warren forthcoming). Against the
orthodoxy he argues that human beings are able to follow at least some infini-
tary rules without postulating mysterious non-recursive abilities, which makes
the prospects for certain forms of mathematical conventionalism much more
rosy. Let us therefore consider whether Warren’s account can be used to defend
Carnap against Beth.
Warren’s defence of infinitary reasoning has a negative and a positive part.
To begin with, he challenges the effectiveness of two arguments that seem to
underly the widespread rejection of infinitary rules. The first of these is the
argument from infinitely long proofs: if reasoning in accord with an infinitary
rule would necessarily require the construction of a formal proof, then infinitary
rules can plausible be rejected, since as finite beings in a finite world we are not
able to complete such a construction. But Warren argues that this requirement is
too demanding, since it is not in general the case that reasoning always proceeds
by way of constructing proofs (Warren forthcoming: 8). Secondly, there is the
argument from computation: since, for instance, PA + ω-rule is an arithmetically
complete theory, it may seem that if we could follow the ω-rule, we would
then be able to enumerate all the truths of arithmetic. And since the latter is
impossible, it must also be impossible to follow the ω-rule. Warren draws a
different conclusion, however. He sees no reason to think that being able to
follow the ω-rule in itself entails that we can enumerate the truths of arithmetic,
since even for finite inference rules it is not the case that we can enumerate all
the consequences that follow from the rules we accept (Warren forthcoming: 9).
So far infinitary reasoning thus remains unscathed.
Even if it is true that extant arguments against infinitary reasoning miss their
mark, however, it cannot be denied that there remains a very important differ-
ence between finitary and infinitary inference rules. While there are uncontro-
versial cases in which a person actually uses a rule like modus ponens in order
to reach a conclusion – maybe by constructing a formal proof – clear-cut exam-
ples of this kind are hard to come by for infinitary rules. Since this difference
in itself casts doubt on the notion of following infinitary rules, Warren gives a
positive proposal of what infinitary reasoning amounts to, which we will turn
to now. The guiding idea is that reasoning should be understood as a transi-
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tion between mental states, which are called premise and conclusion attitudes,
that fulfils certain conditions. Warren identifies three such conditions, but for
our purposes it suffices to just look at the first, which involves the obtaining of
certain counterfactuals:
If Sally were asked for her reasons for her conclusion attitude, she
would cite the content of her premise attitudes (Warren forthcoming:
11)
Furthermore, Warren claims that this counterfactual condition can in fact be
fulfilled for inferences that involve infinitely many premises. At first sight this
seems implausible, since presumably citing the content of an infinitary premise
attitude is an impossible task. Warren therefore clarifies in what precise sense
he thinks this to be possible:
[...] Sally can have the disposition to cite as many premises as might
be required. For no finite k does Sally have only the dispositions
to cite the first k premises and then stop. Her dispositions always
determine the next premise to be cited, after she has cited k, and this
is enough. (Warren forthcoming: 14)
The following picture thus emerges: Sally can accept a statement of the form
∀xφ(x) on the basis of infinitely many premises φ(0), φ(1), ... if she has what
may be described as an opened-ended disposition to cite more and more premises
of the form φ(n) when asked to give reasons for accepting the universal gener-
alisation.8
Warren’s proposal is certainly an intriguing one, and very exciting if success-
ful. I will not be able to further discuss and assess his defence of mathematical
conventionalism, however, and instead focus on a narrower question pertinent
to the aims of this thesis, namely whether Carnap could easily follow Warren’s
lead in order to deal with Beth’s problem. I think that he cannot, for as I will
explain now Carnap’s account of dispositions seems unable to accommodate the
kind of dispositions Warren’s strategy requires.
8 One might think that the problem of non-standard models reappears at this point, since
describing the infinitely many premises φ(0), φ(1), ... presupposes a conception of what the
standard numerals are. But Warren has a response to this worry: what is explanatory for
him is the (alleged) fact that Sally actually follows the ω-rule, not the claim that she accepts
some theory which includes a statement of the ω-rule (Warren 2020b: 12.III). There is thus
no point at which Sally would first have to pin down the standard conception of numerals
before she begins to follow the ω-rule.
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In section 4.1.3 we already saw that Carnap wants to make sense of disposi-
tions within his empiricist framework by means of so-called reduction sentences.
For fragility, for instance, the following is one of the most salient reduction sen-
tences:
(R) ∀x∀t(x is dropped at t → (x is fragile↔ x breaks at t))
Earlier I already alluded to a problem this kind of view faces, namely the status
of objects that are never in fact dropped. In itself (R) leaves open whether they
are fragile or not, but presumably we nevertheless want to say that some of the
undropped things are fragile whereas others are not. The most promising way to
achieve this goes as follows: a glass that is never dropped nevertheless counts as
fragile if it is similar in relevant ways to other things that are dropped and break
(Quine 1969a). Spelling out the notion of similarity at play here is of course no
easy task, but it does seem plausible that the extension of ’is fragile’ can be made
to approximate our intuitive conception in this way.
Not all problems for Carnap’s account are overcome by this strategy, however,
as Hugh Mellor points out:
[N]o sense is given to fragility unless something breaks at some time.
Unless some glasses are dropped and some (but not all) break, there
is nothing for others to be relevantly similar to. No doubt the condi-
tion is satisfied in fact, but it is surely not necessary to a glass’s being
fragile. (Mellor 1974: 166)
To illustrate the importance of this point, Mellor introduces the example of an
explosive fuel used in nuclear power stations. If the safety measures in such an
environment are effective, the fuel will never in fact explode, and ideally this
will be the case in all other power plants as well. It would be bizarre to conclude
from this, however, that the fuel is not in fact explosive after all, which is what
Carnap’s account suggests.
This shortcoming, so I think, also makes Warren’s strategy unavailable to
Carnap. For as we saw above Warren needs there to be certain dispositions for
which it is extremely unlikely that they will ever be manifested. Take again
Sally’s inference from φ(0), φ(1), ... to ∀xφ(x), and consider some arbitrarily
large number a. According to Warren Sally has the disposition to justify the
conclusion ∀xφ(x) by citing φ(a) if all the previous a− 1 premises have already
been given. If a is large enough, however, citing all a − 1 premises may take
longer than a human lifespan, and so one can be sure that the scenario never
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actually occurs. But if no human being ever actually cites premise φ(a) in sup-
port of the conclusion ∀xφ(x), then – just as in the case of the explosive liquid –
Carnap does not appear to be in a position to claim that anyone is disposed to do
so either.9
Warren himself has a response to this kind of worry. Broadly speaking his
solution is to hold that the infinitely many dispositions to accept φ(0), φ(1),
φ(2), ... are not independent of each other, but that there is a sense in which the
disposition to accept φ(n) for arbitrary n is the result of simpler dispositions.
According to him some dispositions can thus be composed of others:
S has a composite disposition to φ in situation C iff φing is (or would
be) the output of the iterated application of S’s linked simple (or
complex) dispositions, in C (Warren 2020a: 264)
And while this move may very well result in a plausible picture of the nature
of linguistic dispositions, I think that Carnap is barred from adopting the idea
that dispositions can be linked in order to generate composite dispositions. For
while Warren tries to remain as uncommitted on the metaphysical status of dis-
positions as possible, and wants his account to be neutral with regard to various
competing reductionist theses (Warren 2020a: 283fn6, Warren 2020b: 34), I think
that his conception of dispositions is nevertheless more robustly realist than that
of Carnap. For on Carnap’s approach dispositions are not a kind of entity at
all, and so it is impossible to make any substantive claims about their internal
structure unless these can somehow be translated back into reduction sentences.
Whether this can be done for claims about linking and complex dispositions is,
however, very doubtful.
Warren’s account is promising for friends of conventionalist approaches to
mathematics. My suspicion is that, for the reasons just described, it will have to
involve at least some divergences from Carnap’s original position when it comes
to dispositions and the role of modality. Ultimately this may well be a price
worth paying, but for now I will assume that the problem of infinitary rules
persists.
9 The problem would not arise in this form if Carnap had a more robust understanding of
modality, on which certain counterfactuals about what human beings would do can be re-
garded as primitive. But as I described in section 7.2 he essentially endorses a linguistic
conception of modality on which modal claims need to flow from certain rules.
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7.5 Frege and Logicism
The results of this chapter suggest the following master argument against the
very idea of thinking that mathematics is analytic:
(1) Only non-recursive rules are powerful enough to generate all the
true mathematical sentences.
(2) It is only legitimate to rely on non-recursive rules if one provides
an explanation of how we finite human beings are able to use
them.
(3) There is no plausible explanation of the kind (2) requires.
(C) We should therefore not identify mathematical truth with what
follows from certain rules.
Is there any way to save the analyticity of mathematics in light of this? In the
following I will show that it is possible to read Frege’s logicism in a way that,
somewhat surprisingly, rejects premise (2) of the master argument. Comparing
Frege and Carnap in this way is illuminating since it highlights some of the
deep differences in their thinking about the nature of logic, and also illustrates
the costs of holding on to the analyticity of mathematics.
I have already argued that Carnap is not in a position to deny (2), as on
his account the question of what logical system – in the form of a linguistic
framework – fits our actual usage of natural language is clearly a meaningful
one. For Carnap there is a sense in which natural language is ’logically amor-
phous’ (Ricketts 2003), and so questions concerning inference rules always apply
to linguistic frameworks which are coordinated with natural language, and not
immediately to natural language itself. Consequently Carnap has to face the
awkward question which dispositions correspond to non-recursive rules.
Being able to talk about the coordination of natural language with different
logical systems is also not an incidental component of Carnap’s position, for it
is necessary in order to make sense of the principle of tolerance. This point is
stressed by Ricketts, who draws the important comparison to Frege:
Frege calls the laws of logic the laws of truth (Wahrsein), and says
that these laws ”. . . are boundary stones fixed in an eternal foun-
dation that our thinking can overflow but never displace.” Behind
this vivid language lies a conception of the regulative role of logic in
thinking. The principles of logic are to articulate the most fundamen-
tal standards for validity and consistency in thinking. Any grasp we
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have of an array of options that we can freely choose among must
draw on some perhaps tacit grasp of these principles. From the per-
spective of this understanding of logic’s regulative role, it makes no
sense to represent the adoption of a logic, as Carnap does, as a choice
from ”an open ocean of free possibilities.” (Ricketts 2004: 190f)
I think that this difference in outlook enables Frege to give a kind of response
to Beth-style considerations that is not available to Carnap. To see how this is
supposed to work, consider what the aims of Fregean logicism are. Broadly
speaking, the idea is to show that all truths of arithmetics are really truths of
logic, and hence analytic. This immediately raises the question of what can be
counted as logic in the first place. In the Grundgesetze Frege uses what we would
now describe as second-order logic with the infamous Basic Law V, which he
regarded as a logical axiom (Frege 1884, Frege 1893):
Basic Law V
The extension of F = the extension of G iff ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx)
In this form logicism is not viable since the resulting system is inconsistent.
Contemporary neo-logicists therefore usually work with second-order logic plus
Hume’s Principle (Wright 1983, Hale and Wright 2003), which can already be
found in the Grundlagen:
Hume’s Principle
The number of Fs = the number of Gs iff the Fs and Gs are equinu-
merous.
A lot more could be said about the technical details here, but even based on
this rough sketch it would seem that the master argument against Carnap also
applies to Frege. For, given Gödel’s incompleteness results, the claim that mathe-
matics reduces to logic cannot mean that all truths of mathematics can be syntac-
tically derived using recursive inference rules. It therefore seems that the logicist
needs to rely on something like the consequence relation of the full semantics
for second-order logic (Rayo 2007). And since I argued in section 7.3 that Carnap
is unable to explain how we can be committed to the full semantics, why should
Frege be any better off?
To see why Frege might be in a stronger position after all, it will be help-
ful to introduce a distinction made by Jean von Heijenoort: that between logic
conceived as a calculus and logic conceived as a language (van Heijenoort 1967).
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Nowadays the former conception is probably more natural, since working on
logic usually involves dealing with metalogical results like the incompleteness
theorems. In such metalogical investigations the objects of study are certain
formal theories which, for the purpose of the investigation, are regarded as un-
interpreted systems of symbols. To think of logic as a language, on the other
hand, is to conceive of it not as an object of study, but rather as the medium in
which any kind of investigation takes place. And if, as Frege does, one accepts
the idea that logic in this sense captures the most basic laws of thinking, the lan-
guage of logic seems to differ from natural languages like English in at least one
essential way: while one could stop speaking English and start speaking Ger-
man, one cannot stop to use logic in the same way. For a non-logical language
would presumably not be able to express any meaningful thoughts at all, and
would hence be just gibberish rather than a genuine language. It is therefore
common to say that logic understood in this sense is universal.
One especially salient consideration is the extent to which discourse about
logic is possible for someone who accepts a universalist conception of logic. Van
Heijenoort describes Frege’s position on this question as follows:
Another important consequence of the universality of logic is that
nothing can be, or has to be, said outside of the system. [...] Frege
is indeed fully aware that any formal system requires rules that are
not expressed in the system; but these rules are void of any intuitive
logic; they are ’rules for the use of our signs’. In such a manipula-
tion of signs, from which any argumentative logic has been squeezed
out, Frege sees precisely the advantage of a formal system. (van Hei-
jenoort 1967: 326)
This specific formulation is slightly puzzling, since it seems that there cannot
even be rules for the manipulation of meaningless symbols without presuppos-
ing any kind of intuitive logic. But the general idea expressed, namely that Frege
has no place for metalogical enquiries, has been quite influential.
Probably the most well-known interpreter who reads Frege’s conception of
logic as being in tension with metalogic is Thomas Ricketts, who defended this
view in a number of articles beginning in the 1980s (Ricketts 1986a, Ricketts
1985, Ricketts 1986b, Ricketts 1997).10 According to Ricketts, Frege’s rejection of
a metaperspective is quite drastic, and for instance makes his position incompat-
ible with any kind of formal semantics. Various commentators have criticised
10 See also Goldfarb 1979 and Dreben and van Heijenoort 1986
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this reading as unmotivated and too extreme (Stanley 1996, Sullivan 2004, Sul-
livan 2005, Heck 2007), and I do not want to commit myself to any exegetical
claims here. Let us suppose, however, that Ricketts is right about one thing:
namely that Frege has no place for some foundational enquiries in the philos-
ophy of language, in particular those that concern the question how language
makes contact with the world. If this is correct, so I will argue now, then Frege
does have a way to avoid Beth-style worries.
Ricketts describes what he considers to be Frege’s view on the relationship
between language and reality as follows:
[... His] view of judgment commits Frege to taking the statements
of language more or less at face value. There is no standpoint from
which to ask whether the thoughts expressed by the statements of
language really represent reality, whether they are really true or false.
Similarly, there is no standpoint from which to ask whether the state-
ments of language really do express thoughts. (Ricketts 1985: 8, see
also Ricketts 1986a: 66)
As I understand this, Ricketts interprets Frege as rejecting what is often called
metasemantics: questions about why words have the meanings they do, names
refer to what they refer to, and the like. This is supposed to be the case because,
thanks to Frege’s universalism, there is no standpoint from which such questions
could be meaningfully raised.
I think that this idea can be generalised so as neutralise the master argument.
It previously seemed that it should pose a problem for Frege as well, as he
didn’t seem able to answer the pressing question about our commitment to a
full semantics for second-order logic either. But if Ricketts is right, then Frege
would actually be able to just reject the question itself, since it presupposes a
perspective from which our use of certain rules can be justified or questioned.
Indeed, the distinction between a full and a Henkin semantics for second-order
logic can only be drawn from a point of view outside of the logic we are actually
using. So instead of trying to answer questions about the status of second-order
logic, Ricketts’ Frege is in a position to say that the relevant concerns do not
even arise.
If this interpretation of Frege is coherent, there is at least some conceptual
space for a view according to which mathematics is analytic and to which the
objection from non-recursive dispositions does not apply. Is this good news
for Carnap’s project though? I think not. Setting aside the fact that Ricketts’
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interpretation is highly contested, Frege’s general outlook is in some respects
diametrically opposed to that of Carnap. Frege clearly believes that there is one
true logic, for he calls the laws of logic ”boundary stones which are anchored
in an eternal ground, which our thinking may wash over but yet cannot dis-
place” (Frege 2013: xvi). Furthermore, it is far from clear whether Frege’s anti-
psychologism about logic is even compatible with empiricism, and his notorious
remarks on the third realm of thoughts are not too reassuring (Frege 1918).11
The Fregean defence of the analyticity of mathematics I sketched thus seems
to abandon two of the most central tenets of Carnap’s philosophy, namely the
principle of tolerance and empiricism. Those who sympathise with Carnap are
therefore probably better served by looking forwards in time at the position of
Quine. While he famously gives up the analyticity of mathematics, Quine re-
mains a committed empiricist. And even though he doesn’t have anything as
strong as Carnap’s principle of tolerance, unlike Frege Quine at least makes
room for the revisability of logic.12 In the next chapter we will therefore investi-
gate whether Quine’s philosophy of mathematics can withstand Beth’s objection.
11 In an unpublished paper, Frege for instance describes grasping a though as a process in
which ”something comes into view whose nature is no longer mental in the proper sense [...]
and this process is perhaps the most mysterious of all” (Frege 1979: 145).
12 The coherency of which is contested, however, see for instance Arnold and Shapiro 2007.
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Chapter 8
Quine on Mathematical Truth
In this chapter I will outline what I take to be Quine’s position on the truth of un-
decidable mathematical sentences. This is not an easy task, as Quine’s attitude
towards mathematical truth is much more complicated and subtle than an initial
reading of his work may suggest. Nevertheless I will provide some reasons to
think that Beth’s argument does not have any force against Quine – despite the
many continuities of his position with Carnap’s. This is due to some funda-
mental differences in their respective conceptions of the nature of language and
logic, with Quine being more similar to Frege in that he rejects certain questions
Carnap needs to give answers to. My conclusions will be tentative, but will illu-
minate some of the deep differences between Carnap and Quine that are easily
missed.
8.1 Quine and Mathematical Platonism
In the short chapter 3 we already saw that Quine rejects the idea that mathemat-
ical statements are analytic, true in virtue of meaning or rules, or anything in
the vicinity. For him there is just truth simpliciter, and empirical and mathemati-
cal statements are true in the same (and only) way. But what is Quine’s positive
story about truth in mathematics, especially with respect to the undecidable sen-
tences that have occupied us so much? The usual textbook and encyclopaedia
story about Quine and the philosophy of mathematics goes as follows: Quine re-
jected Carnap’s linguistic doctrine of mathematical truth, and thereby Carnap’s
idea that using mathematics does not come with any ontological commitments.
The abstract objects mathematics would have to be about seemed mysterious,
however, and for this reason Quine sympathised with nominalism. This experi-
ment culminated in the joint paper with Nelson Goodman (Goodman and Quine
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1947), but afterwards Quine came to realise that abstract entities – in particular
sets – were indispensable for science, and hence – grudgingly – became a math-
ematical Platonist, although an unenthusiastic one who would have preferred to
do without abstract entities any day.1
While there is certainly something correct about this story, the sense in which
Quine’s mature position is a form of Platonism is not at all straightforward,
and can be easily misunderstood. It is tempting to think that Quine must have
embraced a kind of external Platonism according to which what Tait described as
a Model-in-the-Sky determines the truth values of mathematical sentences. For
unlike Carnap, Quine seems happy to regard ontological questions as factual
rather than pragmatic, as can be seen in a famous line from ”Two Dogmas of
Empiricism”:
Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions
of natural science. (Quine 1951: 43)
Since Quine definitely thinks that Carnap’s attempt to account for mathematical
truth in terms of linguistic rules has failed, it would thus only be natural to read
him as accepting an ontology of abstract entities in order to fill the explanatory
gap left by abandoning the analyticity of mathematics. On this view, undecid-
able mathematical sentences are true or false in virtue of there being a realm of
abstract objects.
If this is correct, then Quine’s attitude towards ontology would indeed be
radically different from Carnap’s: ontological investigations can be said to give
us insights into the structure of reality, showing in this case that there must be
abstract objects in addition to the concrete ones. The problem, however, is that
this picture does not fit how Quine describes his own conception of the role of
ontology at all:
The scientific system, ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of
our own making, linking sensory stimulation to sensory stimulation.
(Quine 1981a: 20, my emphasis)
1 Somewhat surprisingly there is not that much secondary literature specifically on Quine’s
philosophy of mathematics. Two salient older papers are Parsons 1986, to which Quine
responded (Quine 1986a), and the little-known Hart 1979. Isaacson 2004 contains an illumi-
nating discussion which flags various tensions in Quine’s position. Isaacson also mentions
that he plans to discuss Quine’s account of mathematics further in another paper (263fn25),
but unfortunately this was never realised (personal communication). Burt Dreben was com-
missioned to write a chapter on truth for the Cambridge Companion on Quine, which would
presumably have addressed the issue of truth in mathematics, but unluckily for us Dreben
died before writing it (Dreben 2006: 287).
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[...] our ontology, like grammar, is part of our own conceptual contribu-
tion to our theory of the world. (Quine 1990: 36, my emphasis)
Quine’s suggestion is that we are the ones who impose an ontology onto the
world. In order to better understand what he could mean by this, it is helpful to
consider his notorious doctrine of ontological relativity: the thesis that, roughly,
the ontology of any theory is relative to a background theory (Quine 1969b).
Suppose we accept a theory about the empirical world in which we have pred-
icates for animals such as cats and dogs. If we think about such a theory in a
model-theoretic way, there will be a domain of quantification the quantifiers of
our theory range over, and names and predicates apply to objects in this domain
as well. It is now natural to assume that the domain of an empirical theory actu-
ally contains empirical objects, such as cats and dogs. But, Quine observes, from
the perspective of the object language of the theory itself it does not really matter
which entities are in the domain at all. We can interpret the theory in a domain
consisting only of numbers as well, while preserving all the truth values of the
object language sentences. The sentence ”there are three dogs on the lawn” can
come out true, in other words, regardless of whether, from the perspective of a
metalanguage, ’dogs’ is interpreted as denoting dogs or numbers.
As a technical result this is almost trivial, but Quine takes it to have substan-
tive implications. According to him, the possibility of truth-preserving permuta-
tions of the domain shows that there is no fact of the matter as to what the correct
ontology of our best theory of the world is, since empirical evidence could nei-
ther favour or refute any claims about what the domain of quantification looks
like (Quine 1981a: 22).
This brings us to the important idea that, for Quine, sentences and their truth
are in a sense primary. Quine’s general conception of how language relates
to reality is as follows: language makes contact with the world at the level of
sentences (or even at the level of theories, which are sets of sentences). We are
interested in theories that are true, and for Quine truth, unlike ontology, is not
relative (setting aside the trivial relativity of truth to a language). And we are
interested in objects only to the extent that they are needed to account for the
transition between sentences:
It is occasion sentences that report the observations on which science
rests. The scientific output is likewise sentential: true sentences, we
hope, truths about nature. The objects, or values of variables, serve
merely as indices along the way, and we may permute or supplant
167
Quine on Mathematical Truth Quine and Mathematical Platonism
them as we please as long as the sentence-to-sentence structure is
preserved. (Quine 1981a: 20)
From Quine’s perspective it is therefore indeed conceivable, even though actu-
ally false, that we have a theory that tells us all there is to say about reality
without relying on the notion of an object at all. Suppose, for instance, that
our best overall theory of the world would not require quantifiers, but could be
expressed in propositional logic. In such a scenario all we are dealing with are
sentences and implication relations between them, and in this sense describing
the world does not require postulating objects. Quine repeatedly makes this
point with respect to other weak theories:
[... In the case of a finite universe of named objects] there is no occa-
sion for quantification, except as an inessential abbreviation; for we
can expand quantifications into finite conjunctions and alternations.
Variables thus disappear, and with them the question of a universe of
values of variables. (Quine 1969b: 62)
One can sum this up as follows: Quine is a realist about truth but an instrumen-
talist about ontology. Our best theories are such that they demand a universe of
objects to be true, but this only means that there need to be some objects or other.
Simple model-theoretic considerations show that if there is one set of objects that
makes a theory true, then there are many, and the upshot of ontological relativity
is that no one ontology is privileged over another as long as truth values are left
intact. Quine’s primacy of sentences and their truth is thus in stark contrast with
philosophers who want to explain the language-world connection by invoking
something like direct acquaintance with particular objects, like Russell in some
periods of his life.2
What are we to make of this? The literature on ontological relativity is im-
mense, and opinions differ widely on how exactly this doctrine should be under-
stood, what Quine’s arguments for the thesis are, whether those are any good –
and, indeed, whether the position is even coherent.3 We will not be able to go
2 Hylton helpfully contrasts Quine with Russell in Hylton 2006.
3 Eklund 2007 is a useful starting point, as it contains references to many of the most important
papers. Hilary Putnam, whose internal realism often looks quite similar to Quine’s position,
is actually one of the philosophers most strongly opposed to ontological relativity:
Doubtless Quine and Dreben will reply that one’s statements about objects can
be ’robustly’ true or false even if one’s reference to those objects ’float freely’. I
would discuss this claim if I could make sense of it; but, alas, I cannot. (Putnam
1992: 396)
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into more details here, but we have seen enough to come back to the question
from the beginning: namely whether Quine endorses a version of mathemati-
cal Platonism according to which mathematical truth is explained by relying on
mathematical ontology.
I think there is reason to be skeptical about giving ontology a serious explana-
tory role in Quine’s philosophy. For the primacy of sentences suggests that the
explanatory direction should go precisely the other way, such that the ontology
of mathematics would be determined by which mathematical sentences are true.
When motivating ontological relativity, Quine after all supposes that sentences
have fixed truth values irrespective of any particular interpretation, and so in
this sense the truth of sentences is what determines the admissible ontologies. I
would therefore hesitate to describe Quine as an external Platonist who assumes
the existence in a Model-in-the-Sky. The latter move seems dangerously close
to postulating a realm of Dinge an sich to account for empirical phenomena, and
clashes with Quine’s description of the way we interact with the world:
Man proposes; the world disposes, but only by holophrastic yes-or-no
verdicts on the observation sentences that embody man’s predictions.
(Quine 1990: 36)
Let us therefore consider whether taking the idea that truth determines ontology
seriously results in a more plausible reading of Quine.4
8.2 Beth’s Revenge?
Applied to mathematics, Quine’s stress on the primacy of sentences and their
truth suggests that our mathematical ontology is determined by which mathe-
matical sentences are true, rather than the other way round. In this section I
will show that this interpretation of Quine also has its problems, as it faces a
version of Beth’s objection. Furthermore there are passages in which Quine ex-
plicitly denies some core assumptions underlying this reading, which makes his
considered position all the harder to pin down.
4 As yet I am undecided whether there is merely a tension between external Platonism and
ontological relativity, or a genuine conflict. In order to assess this more fully one would have
to further investigate the relationship between Quine’s position and structuralism, for it seems
that even if a particular set of objects itself cannot play an interesting explanatory role, the
structure all admissible ontologies of a theory share might still be able to do so. In the late
paper ”Structure and Nature” Quine indeed expresses sympathies for structuralism, but also
adds that ”my global structuralism should not [...] be seen as a structuralist ontology” (Quine
1992: 9), which can be read as cautioning against the previous proposal.
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If the ontology of mathematics is determined by any theory, it will presum-
ably be determined by our best overall theory of the world. But what theory is
that exactly? This is a big question, but for our purposes it suffices to focus on
the idea that the theory is ours. For there must be a sense in which we actu-
ally accept or are committed to the theory that determines ontology, just as for
Carnap we could wonder about what using a framework actually means. Quine
helpfully describes what it is for a theory to be someone’s theory as follows:
In Word and Object and related writings my use of the term ’theory’ is
not technical. For these purposes a man’s theory on a given subject
may be conceived, nearly enough, as the class of all those sentences,
within some limited vocabulary appropriate to the desired subject
matter, that he believes to be true. Next we may picture a theory,
more generally, as an imaginary man’s theory, even if held by nobody.
(Quine 1969c: 309)
This should make some alarm bells ring, however. Quine enthusiastically shared
Carnap’s linguistic behaviourism, according to which believing a sentence to be
true needs to be spelled out in terms of dispositions to act in certain ways.
Therefore the argument from section 4.2.1 applies: our linguistic dispositions
need to correspond to some recursive theory, and hence the set of sentences we
hold to be true must be recursive as well. And this seems to give us an easy way
to turn Beth’s objection against Quine:
(1) Whatever our best theory of the world may look like, it must be
recursive.
(2) There will hence be mathematical sentences whose truth values
are not settled by the best theory.
(3) These undecidable mathematical sentences therefore have no de-
terminate truth value.
(4) Consequently our best theory cannot pin down the standard
model (or a model isomorphic to it) as its ontology.
(5) So our mathematical ontology is not isomorphic to the standard
model.
If this were right, Quine would therefore face the same issues as Carnap in
accounting for the truth of undecidable sentences.
As it stands, however, this argument is not successful. For the move from (2)
to (3) relies on the following assumption:
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(A1) For a sentence to be true is for it to follow from the best theory
of the world.
And the step from (4) to (5) relies on a second assumption:
(A2) What there is, i.e. our ontology, is determined by the ontological
commitments of the best theory of the world.
But Quine actually rejects both of these. In a paper called ”Quine’s Truth”
(Bergström 1994), Lars Bergström suggested that Quine might be committed
to a version of (A1). Quine’s response is an unambiguous denial:
He asks, rhetorically I suspect, whether I hold that ’a sentence is true
if and only if it follows logically from our theory or an idealized
version of it’. No. Such an ideal theory is impossible by Gödel’s
theorem. [...] Or do I hold that a sentence is true ’if and only if
implied by the best humanly devisable theory’. No; Gödel speaks
again. (Quine 1994: 496)
Quine thus clearly thinks that there are sentences which have determinate truth
values even though they are not entailed by any (recursive) theory.
As Quine’s tone suggests, (A1) presumably looked quite unappealing any-
way. (A2) may seem somewhat more plausible, as it is tempting to understand
Quine’s well-known notion of ontological commitment in a way that supports it.
Here is how Quine characterises this notion in ”On What There Is”:
[A] theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the
bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order
that the affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine 1953: 13f)
Given this it is very natural to think that what there is must somehow be de-
termined by the ontological commitments of some theory. But Quine explicitly
cautions against this only a few pages later:
We look to bound variables in connexion with ontology not in order
to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or
doctrine, ours or someone else’s, says there is; and this much is quite
properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another
question. (Quine 1953: 15f)
171
Quine on Mathematical Truth Beth’s Revenge?
The last sentence is not just a throwaway remark. In a paper in which Terence
Parsons distinguishes various non-equivalent ways of spelling out the notion
of ontological commitment, he stresses this point some more, obviously with
Quine’s approval:
This example further shows the distinctness of Quine’s notion of
”ontology” from any of his notions of ontological commitment. For
we have determined the ontological commitments of T1 in all three
senses without even knowing what its ontology is (without know-
ing the actual range of the variables). The ontological commitment
of a theory fixes neither the actual nor the possible ontologies of a
theory.) [Footnote: Quine has stressed the importance of this fact in
understanding ontological commitment.] (Parsons 1970: 68f, 73fn12)
So Quine would clearly not have accepted (A2) either.
As presented above, the Beth-style revenge argument therefore does not ap-
ply. But the discussion is bound to leave us in a puzzled state as to the nature
of Quine’s considered position on the relationship between mathematical truth
and mathematical ontology. The results of this section push us towards reading
Quine as accepting something like a Model-in-the-Sky after all, since he rejects
attempts to explain ontology in terms of truth. But it is still not easy to see how
this is compatible with the quotes we saw in the previous section, and the claim
that sentences and their truth are primary. One might thus wonder whether
Quine has a coherent position on the nature of mathematical truth at all.
In the next section I will try to make a positive proposal, by indicating a way
to read Quine as presenting a potentially attractive alternative to Carnap. In
order to do this I will set questions about ontology aside, and focus exclusively
on truth. After all, the crucial question – whether Quine is in a position to hold
that undecidable mathematical sentences have determinate truth values – can
be asked without any mention of ontology. I think that this will lead to more
illuminating results, as the confusion we encountered indicates that the whole
idea of an explanatory link between truth and ontology has no place in Quine’s
philosophy. If this is correct, then Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s conventionalism
can be described in the following way: it is not that we should explain math-
ematical truths in terms of ontology instead of linguistic rules, but one should
rather give up the fundamental assumption that mathematical truth requires a
special kind of explanation in the first place. Let us therefore explore whether
this idea gives Quine a way to deal with undecidable sentences.
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8.3 Quinean Internalism
It will be helpful to start with a big-picture question: why did Carnap want
mathematics to come out as analytic in the first place? The motivation he gave
in ”Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” was that in this way the apparent
tension between a commitment to empiricism and talking about abstract objects
is resolved. That there is such a prima facie conflict between empiricism and
the acceptance of abstract entities is an assumption Quine shares, and he like-
wise wants to hold on to empiricism. Instead of analyticity, however, Quine’s
favoured remedy is holism, and he helpfully describes this departure from Car-
nap as follows:
How, Carnap asked, can mathematics be meaningful despite lack-
ing empirical context? His answer was that mathematics is analytic.
Holism’s answer is that mathematics, insofar as applied in science,
imbibes the shared empirical content of the critical masses to which it
contributes. [...] Once we appreciate holism, even moderate holism,
the notion of analyticity ceases to be vital to epistemology. (Quine
2008: 26f)
While much could be said about the nature of Quine’s holism, it is at least rea-
sonably clear how it can account for the meaningfulness of some parts of math-
ematics. The thought is that our best physical theories cannot be formulated
without a good amount of mathematics, and so plausibly the best overall theory
of the empirical world will contain something like Peano arithmetic or a version
of set theory. Granting this, however, we get at most the result that mathemat-
ical sentences that follow from some recursive theory come out as meaningful.
What about undecidable sentences, which are formulated in the mathematical
language but independent of the relevant axioms?
In some cases it is possible to tell a story about how the truth of undecidable
sentences relates to observable facts, thus securing their empiricist credentials.
Take ConPA again: if it were false, we would expect that at some point some-
one would actually derive a contradiction from PA, and hence show it to be
inconsistent. Since PA is a theory that has been used and studied for decades
without any contradictions turning up, it is generally believed to be consistent,
and this plausibly provides some inductive evidence for ConPA.5 It must be said,
5 Exceptions prove the rule: in 2011 the mathematician Edward Nelson claimed to have a proof
of the inconsistency of PA, but this was later found to be flawed (https://golem.ph.utexas.
edu/category/2011/09/the_inconsistency_of_arithmeti.html).
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however, that ConPA is an unusual case. Most of the infinitely many undecid-
able sentences will never be of any practical use in physical theory, and it is
unclear whether we can even imagine them making any difference to the empir-
ical world. The crucial question thus becomes whether Quine is in a position to
maintain that all mathematical sentences are meaningful and have determinate
truth values, or just the subset of them that is actually needed to account for
empirical phenomena.6
It is not always obvious how much of mathematics Quine actually wants to
come our as meaningful. In his writings he usually focusses on set theory, and
describes his attitude as follows:
So much of mathematics as is wanted for use in empirical science is
for me on a par with the rest of science. Transfinite ramifications are
on the same footing insofar as they come of a simplificatory rounding
out, but anything further is on a par with uninterpreted systems.
(Quine 1984: 788)
The picture that emerges is one where mathematics can be divided into three
distinct regions. Some mathematical sentences will straightforwardly count as
meaningful in virtue of being needed to do empirical science. Other mathemati-
cal sentences are not strictly speaking necessary for science, but it is nevertheless
beneficial to treat them as meaningful since mathematical theories that include
both sentences of the first and second kind are simpler than ones which only
contain those of the first kind. And thirdly there are mathematical sentences
which do not even play an indirect role in any empirical context, and Quine
wants to treat them as uninterpreted symbols.
In which category do the undecidable sentences of arithmetic fall? I think
that Quine would regard them as meaningful even though most of them can
be expected to play no direct role in empirical science. This is because they
are formulated in the language of arithmetic, which Quine generally regards as
meaningful, and discounting them would therefore require giving up standard
principles of bivalence and compositionality. He admits that countenancing un-
decidable sentences is a theoretical cost, however:
We stalwarts of two-valued logic buy its sweet simplicity at no small
price in respect of the harboring of undecidables. [...] The matter is
undecidable, but we maintain that there is a fact of the matter. [...] on
6 For a more in-depth discussion of Quine’s naturalism about mathematics and the challenges
it faces see Maddy 1997.
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the mathematical side, for the continuum hypothesis or the question
of the existence of inaccessible cardinals. (Quine 1981b: 91)
Since Quine held onto classical logic until the end he clearly thought that, on
balance, this is a price worth paying. I therefore think that he would justify the
claim that undecidable sentences have determinate truth values in the following
way: first, we need some mathematical theory to do physics in any case, and
using its vocabulary we can formulate purely mathematical sentences which are
undecidable. Since we are also committed to classical logic we need to accept
that each of the undecidable sentences is either true or false. In many cases we
will have no idea which truth value it is, as there is no clear connection between
the mathematical sentences and empirical claims. While that is unfortunate the
resulting picture is nevertheless more simple and elegant than one where biva-
lence is given up, since accepting that undecidable sentences have determinate
truth values does no real harm either, and so reforms are not urgent.
This argument based on bivalence and simplicity will probably appear sus-
picious to many. It seems that Quine in effect commits himself to something like
brute facts about mathematical matters, similar to some of the contemporary po-
sitions surveyed in section 7.1. And one might therefore think that empiricism
has gone over board after all, for we end up with a realm of facts about abstract
objects that are in no clear way related to anything in experience.
This is indeed a pressing worry, and Quine himself seems to have felt some
uneasiness about the status of mathematical facts. He reports being pressed
about this issue by Burt Dreben, but the paper from which this passage is taken
contains no clear resolution on Quine’s part:
Dreben once put me a [...] challenging question: is there no fact
of mathematical matters? For me, unlike Carnap, mathematics is
integral to our system of the world. Its empirical support is real but
remote, mediated by the empirically supported natural sciences that
the mathematics serves to implement. On this score I ought to grant
mathematics a fact of the matter. But how, asks Dreben, does this
involve the distribution of microphysical states? What would there
being a largest prime number have to do with the distribution of
microphysical states? (Quine 1986b: 430)7
There might be a way out, however. In an interview from 1994, Martin Davies
explicitly asked Quine about the status of truths in higher set theory, where even
7 For a discussion of Quine’s notion of facts of the matter that also suggests an interesting
response to the current challenge see Ricketts 2011.
175
Quine on Mathematical Truth Quinean Internalism
indirect connections to experience are impossible to make out. The following is
an illuminating passage:
Davies: I wanted to ask whether in the outer reaches of set theory,
where you said along the way in your answer that you would advert
to considerations of simplicity for example, whether its best to think
of simplicity as a guide to the truth or as constituting the truth in
those cases.
Quine: Ah yes, I don’t think I can distinguish that once we get that
far out. Just as when we’re way in at the other extreme at the most
obvious, the truth functions and the like, I can’t distinguish between
what’s a change of logical theory and what’s a change of terminology
and semantic interpretation. (Fara 1994: ”The Dreben Panel”, my
transcription)
This suggests a response to the worry about Quine’s commitment to brute math-
ematical facts. The objection relies on the assumption that mathematical truth
necessarily needs to track some feature of the world – hence no truths without
the corresponding facts. But while this is a reasonable assumption for some ar-
eas of discourse, the tracking metaphor has no sensible application in the most
abstract parts of mathematics. Accepting that all mathematical sentences have
determinate truth values is therefore possible without the kind of metaphysical
baggage that would conflict with empiricism.
Whether this argument from bivalence and simplicity is ultimately successful
requires a more extensive study which I will not be able to pursue here. Much
remains unclear, for instance what it could mean to say that simplicity constitutes
truth in some cases. But I do think that Quine’s way presents a genuine alterna-
tive to Carnap’s approach, and should be explored further by those attracted to
an empiricist outlook.
Assuming that Quine’s account has a chance of success, one obvious question
is whether Carnap could not just replicate it, and hence avoid Beth’s objection
after all. I do not think that this can be done in a way that retains the core com-
mitments of Carnap’s position, however. For there is a sense in which Quine
can be regarded as a more thoroughgoing internalist than Carnap: Quine does
not draw a sharp distinction between natural languages and constructed frame-
works, and is therefore happy to accept the notion of truth simpliciter rather
than just truth in some framework. Hence Dreben’s enigmatic remark that the
”core of Quine’s difference with Carnap over the string ‘analytic”’ is ”Quine’s
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insistence to Carnap that truth is truth and existence is existence” (Dreben 1996:
57fn18).8
Quine’s considerations therefore do not really address the same question
that made trouble for Carnap: namely in virtue of what we speak a linguistic
framework with one definition of ’analytic’ for mathematics rather than another.
Indeed, for Quine this is a question that does not even arise, as for him we
always start theorising from the perspective of one language or other, and can
then wonder about truth and falsity within that language (Quine 1960b: 24).
Carnap, on the other hand, can only start to ask such questions once it is settled
what framework we are using (Carnap 1942: 14). He therefore faces a much
harder task: he does not only need to invoke considerations of simplicity in
order to motivate the acceptance of bivalence in general, but would have to argue
that there is one specific framework for mathematics that is simpler than any
other. And I do not see how this could be achieved. To be sure, Carnap might
be able to emulate Quine if he were ready to treat mathematics as synthetic, and
thus abandon the notion of analyticity altogether. But this would arguably be
more of a capitulation than a defence of Carnap.
8 We already encountered this very important point in section 3.1. Ricketts aptly describes Car-





In this last chapter I will venture beyond the philosophy of mathematics in order
to look at Carnap’s attitude towards the ontology of the empirical world: observ-
able objects like tigers and theoretical entities posited by the sciences, such as
electrons. My ambition is not to give a comprehensive account of Carnap’s treat-
ment of observation and empirical science. The main motivation for looking at
this area at all is that Carnap takes abstract mathematical objects to play an im-
portant role even in the empirical parts of language. Another reason for ending
the thesis on this note is that one general lesson that can be drawn from Beth’s
argument – namely that problems start to appear once one scrutinises the rela-
tionship between natural language and constructed frameworks – also applies
to the empirical case. As we will see in the last section, moreover, some difficult
questions Carnap faces also arise for a form of neo-Carnapianism, namely Amie
Thomasson’s easy ontology.
9.1 Hyper-Pythagoreanism
So far we have been concentrating almost exclusively on the ontology of mathe-
matics, and hence on abstract entities such as numbers or sets. I have described
Carnap’s position as an internalist version of Platonism, because he accepts that
we can truly say that there are such abstract entities, which goes beyond what a
nominalist is willing to admit. Since the truth of mathematical existence state-
ments is supposed to follow from the linguistic rules of a framework, however,
it does not commit Carnap to metaphysical posits such as the external Platon-
ist’s Model-in-the-Sky. The stability of this position has come under pressure by
Beth’s argument, but let us set this worry aside in order to ask a different ques-
tion: what, according to Carnap, is the status of the ontology of the empirical
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world, and existence statements about tigers and particles?
When I introduced Carnap’s notion of a linguistic framework in section 1.1.2,
we saw that the distinction between internal and external questions and state-
ments applies to all areas of discourse, both mathematical and empirical. This
means in particular that Carnap would also reject factual external questions about
empirical objects, such as whether there really are any tigers, independently of a
linguistic framework which provides rules that allow one to assess this question.
Consequently, just as Carnap denies that there is a Model-in-the-Sky understood
as a language-independent arbiter of mathematical truth, he would also reject
the view that the world in itself provides a privileged domain of empirical objects
to quantify over. Instead, each linguistic framework will have its own internal
domain of quantification.
One important difference between abstract and empirical objects, however,
is that in the empirical case the rules of the frameworks should not determine
which entities exactly the domain of quantification contains. For whether there
are any tigers at all, and if so then how many, is clearly not a matter of linguistic
conventions, but depends on the state of the world. So while for mathematical
discourse the framework rules in themselves determine what we quantify over,
in the empirical case it is framework rules plus the world which – in some as yet
unspecified way – settle the extent of the domain of quantification.
So far Carnap’s views on the ontology of the empirical world seem pretty
straightforward. But the situation is complicated by the fact that on a number of
occasions, the picture Carnap paints is actually quite different from what I have
described. In Logical Syntax he introduces the concept of a coordinate language,
which, as it is first presented, appears to be a language in which objects can be
referred to in an especially systematic way, for instance by means of space-time
coordinates:
A language which is concerned with the objects of any domain may
designate these objects either by proper names or by systematic po-
sitional co-ordinates, that is by symbols which show the place of the
objects in the system, and, thereby, their positions in relation to one
another. [...] We shall call a language (or sub-language) which de-
notes the objects belonging to the domain with which it is concerned
by positional designations, a co-ordinate language, in contradistinction
to the name-languages. (Carnap 1937a: 12)
But later in the book it becomes clear that for Carnap the distinction between
name and coordinate languages does not just concern how objects are designated,
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but also relates to what objects the quantifiers of the language range over in the
first place. For in a discussion of whether the axiom of infinity can be considered
a logical law despite its ontological commitments, Carnap has the following to
say:
In our object languages I and II, the matter is quite different owing
to the fact that they are not name-languages but coordinate-languages.
The expressions of type 0 designate not objects but positions. The
axiom of infinity (see §33, 5a) and sentences like ‘(∃x)(x = x)’ are
demonstrable in Language II, as are similar sentences in language
I. But the doubts previously mentioned are not relevant here. For
here, those sentences only mean, respectively, that for every position
there is an immediately succeeding one, and that at least one position
exists. But whether or not there are objects to be found at those
positions is not stated. (Carnap 1937a: 141)
Carnap seems to say here that in a coordinate language the sentence ‘(∃x)(x = x)’
does not express the claim that an object exists, which is a bit misleading. For on
Carnap’s considered view, the positions that are being quantified over are sets –
quadruples of numbers representing space-time coordinates, more specifically.
In the quote therefore Carnap doesn’t seem to count abstract entities as genuine
objects, and one should read ’object’ as shorthand for ’empirical object’ in this
context.1
Understood in this way, Carnap’s preference for coordinate languages leads
him to a purely mathematical ontology of sets and numbers, with no concrete
objects such as tables and tigers showing up in the domain of quantification
at all. This may seem bizarre at first, but a few decades later Quine also con-
sidered the advantages of such a position, for which he introduced the term
hyper-Pythagoreanism. In his ”Whither Physical Objects?”, he – rightly, I think –
traces it back the idea to Carnap’s coordinate languages:
Carnap was propounding such a Koordinatensprache already in 1934,
and not because of constraints on the notion of physical object from
the side of physics; for the scheme has also a certain intrinsic appeal.
Numbers and other mathematical objects are wanted in physics any-
way, so one may as well enjoy their convenience as coordinates for
physical objects; and then, having come thus far, one can economize
a little by dispensing with the physical objects. (Quine 1976: 502)
1 For more on Carnap’s views on the axiom of infinity see Lavers 2016b.
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The natural question to ask is how hyper-Pythagoreanism can be taken seriously
in light of the obvious fact that reality is not purely mathematical. I and the
computer I am typing on right now are clearly neither sets nor numbers, for
instance, so in what sense could it be that all objects are abstract? Quine explains
why hyper-Pythagoreanism is not a completely insane view as follows:
We must note further that this triumph of hyper-Pythagoreanism has
to do with the values of the variables of quantification, and not with
what we say about them. It has to do with ontology and not with
ideology. The things that a theory deems there to be are the values of
the theory’s variables, and it is these that have been resolving them-
selves into numbers and kindred objects – ultimately into pure sets.
The ontology of our system of the world reduces thus to the ontology
of set theory, but our system of the world does not reduce to set the-
ory; for our lexicon of predicates and functors still stands stubbornly
apart. (Quine 1976: 503)
The guiding idea is that while all objects are purely mathematical, some of the
predicates of our theory of the world are nevertheless empirical, which means
that whether or not they apply cannot be decided based on purely mathematical
considerations. And this approach can also be found in Carnap’s writings, who
explains how one can make empirical statements in a coordinate language as
follows:
[...] ‘Blue(0′′‘)‘ may be read: “The position with coordinate 2 is blue”.
Strictly, ‘0′′‘ designates only the pure number Two; reference to the
position does not belong to the significance of ‘0′′‘, but to that of
the predicate ‘Blue’, whose significance is “The position having ...
as coordinate is blue.” It is convenient, however, to speak as if the
individual expressions designate not only numbers, but coordinated
positions of the system as well. For this reason we often call such
positions (be they space points, time points, or space-time points) the
individuals of the coordinate language in question. (Carnap 1958:
162, §40)
Analogously, talking about tigers in a coordinate language would presumably
work as follows: the statement ’there is a tiger’ corresponds to the claim that
there is a collection of coordinates (which are abstract but represent space-time
points), such that an empirical predicate that corresponds to ’x is a tiger’ applies
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to this collection. In a loose sense even hyper-Pythagoreanists can thus admit
that there are empirical objects, they just need to interpret this claim in a way
that does not commit them to tigers being in the domain of quantification.
We have now seen two ways in which Carnap can account for talk about em-
pirical objects: what one may call the commonsense view on which frameworks
have both abstract and concrete objects in their domain of quantification, and the
hyper-Pythagorean position in which contact with the empirical world is made
purely though predicates. What is the relationship between these two different
options, however? Is only one objectively correct, and must we hence choose
sides? Knowing Carnap as we do, it seems pretty obvious that he would say
that the choice between these two ways of doing things is a pragmatic question
of convenience. There are some passages, however, that point in a different di-
rection, and suggest that it is philosophically important to think of the ontology
of observable entities in a particular way. We will turn to this issue in the next
section.
9.2 Observable and Theoretical Entities
The fact that Carnap at times proposes a hyper-Pythagorean position vividly
demonstrates something I already mentioned in section 1.1.3: namely that for
him, language doesn’t make contact with the world by an association of names
with objects. For both Carnap and Quine the distinction between objects and
properties emerges from the theory-internal distinction between names and pred-
icates, and so there is no place for a relation of direct acquaintance with entities.
This is at least what is suggested by the remarks we have discussed so far, and
I also think that it is ultimately the correct reading of Carnap. But there are
admittedly passages which suggest that there is a part of language that is spe-
cial, and obeys different rules: namely the observation language, in which we talk
about macroscopic everyday objects. Let us therefore consider whether Carnap’s
conception of empirical objects needs to be revised after all.
So far I have treated the empirical part of languages as an undivided unit,
but we need to draw some distinctions now. For while tigers and electrons both
differ from numbers and sets in not being abstract, and by playing a role in
the description of empirical facts, there is nevertheless an important difference:
while tigers can be observed with one’s eyes, electrons are unobservable entities
that are posited to explain observable phenomena. Carnap therefore calls them
theoretical entities, and accounting for their role in theories is one of his main areas
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of interest in the 1950s. In section 4.1.3 we already saw that Carnap liberalised
his strict verificationism in order to make room for disposition predicates through
reduction sentences in ”Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936, Carnap 1937b),
and this trend continued, culminating in the influential ”The Methodological
Character of Theoretical Concepts” from 1956 (Carnap 1956c).
The account of theoretical terms Carnap gives in this paper is complex, and
for our purposes it will not be necessary to explain and assess it in full detail.
What is important is that Carnap draws a distinction between the observation
language (called LO) and the theoretical language (LT). The latter contains both the
means to talk about abstract entities and theoretical entities, and the question
Carnap tries to answer is, roughly, how talk about theoretical entities can be
explained in terms of the observational vocabulary from LO. One thing that is
particularly striking is that Carnap begins by enumerating a number of require-
ments that, according to some philosophers, languages must fulfil. One of these
requirements is the following:
Requirement of nominalism: the values of the variables must be con-
crete, observable entities (e.g., observable events, things, or thing-
moments). (Carnap 1956c: 41)
And while, unsurprisingly, Carnap denies that such a requirement is justified
for languages in general, he does say that it makes sense to accept it for the
observation language in particular:
Since LO is intended for the description of observable events and
therefore is meant to be completely interpreted, the requirements, or
at least some of them, seem to have merit. [...] Any language ful-
filling these requirements is more directly and more completely un-
derstandable than languages transgressing these limitations. (Carnap
1956c: 41)
This is intriguing for two reasons. First, it seems that at this point Carnap has left
behind the hyper-Pythagorean conception of a coordinate language for the ob-
servation language. The second, and more important, potential upshot requires
some setting up.
In the passage I quoted Carnap calls the observation language ’completely
interpreted’, which distinguishes it from the theoretical language that, so Car-
nap frequently writes, only has a ’partial interpretation’. As Putnam has pointed
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out in a well-known paper, however, it is not particularly clear what Carnap re-
ally means by the distinction between complete and partial interpretation, since
he does not give explicit definitions of these notions anywhere (Putnam 1962).
The quote above, however, makes it very tempting to spell out this distinction in
ontological terms. For Carnap does seem to say that the fact that the observation
language has a complete interpretation is a consequence of the fact that the vari-
ables of the observation language refer to concrete entities. If this were correct,
then ontology would play an important explanatory role in Carnap’s account
after all.
Of course this kind of interpretation only makes sense if Carnap denied that
theoretical terms, which he regards as partially interpreted, refer to concrete
entities. And this is in fact what he does. The Ramsey-sentence method plays
a major role in Carnap’s 1950s theory of theoretical terms, through which sen-
tences with names for theoretical entities like electrons are replaced by existential
generalisations.2 Carl Gustav Hempel had assumed that Carnap’s goal was to
eliminate ontological commitments to theoretical entities in this way, and criti-
cised his approach by pointing out that, regardless of whether names or quan-
tifiers are used, the ontology remains unchanged. To this Carnap responded as
follows:
I agree with Hempel that the Ramsey-sentence does indeed refer to
theoretical entities by the use of abstract variables. However, it should
be noted that these entities are not unobservable physical objects like
atoms, electrons, etc., but rather [...] purely logico-mathematical en-
tities, e.g., natural numbers, classes of such, classes of classes, etc.
(Carnap 1963b: 963)
It is therefore not surprising that the distinction between the completely inter-
preted observation language and the partially interpreted theoretical language
has been interpreted in analogy with the distinction between realism and in-
strumentalism in the philosophy of science. Lavers is especially explicit on this:
he reads Carnap as shying away from realism about theoretical entities, which
would manifest itself in the claim that ’electron’ refers to electrons, and opting
for sets and numbers as ersatz referents instead. Lavers thinks that this approach
is philosophically unmotivated, however:
Carnap’s proposed semantic systems are quite strongly revisionist.
Instead of taking a term like ‘electron’ to stand for an unobservable
2 For more background see Psillos 2000a and Psillos 2000b.
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physical object, Carnap proposes to have it stand for a mathematical
entity of some sort. [...] It is not at all clear that having ‘electron’
refer to a class of natural numbers is more clear, fruitful, or simple
than having it stand for electrons, especially if at the level of the ob-
ject language the term electron is taken to be sufficiently clear. The
move made by Carnap in his response to Hempel lacks sufficient mo-
tivation. Just as Carnap sought to allow empiricists to overcome their
nominalistic scruples, he himself should have more fully overcome
his instrumentalist scruples. (Lavers 2016a: 217)
I think that one needs to be more careful here, however. Lavers may well be right
that, from a practical point of view, the ’realistic’ interpretation he favours is
equally good, or even superior, to the ’instrumentalist’ proposal Carnap prefers.
But the talk of ’overcoming instrumentalist scruples’ suggests that the decision
between these two options is of great philosophical importance, and might even
amount to a fundamental revision of Carnap’s position, which I think is mis-
taken. For in the ”Methodological Character” paper itself Carnap addresses the
question of what theoretical terms refer to, and warns his readers not to overin-
terpret some of his claims:
I said previously that the elements of the basic domain I may be
regarded as natural numbers. But I warned that this remark and
the others about real numbers, etc. should not be taken literally but
merely as a didactic help by attaching familiar labels to certain kinds
of entities or, to say it in a still more cautious way, to certain kinds of
expressions in LT. [...] Thus the structure can be uniquely specified
but the elements of the structure cannot. Not because we are ignorant
of their nature; rather, there is no question of their nature. (Carnap
1956c: 45f)
This warning should be taken very seriously. I think that, on closer inspection,
the initial impression that the distinction between the completely interpreted
observation language and the partially interpreted theoretical language has to
do with a difference in their respective ontologies is misguided after all. This
is clearer in some of Carnap’s earlier writings from the mid-1930s, for there
observation terms are not characterised with reference to ontology, but rather by
drawing on the ability to use them in a certain way:
A predicate ’P’ of a language L is called observable for an organism
(e.g. a person) N, if, for suitable arguments, e.g. ’b’, N is able under
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suitable circumstances to come to a decision with the help of few
observations about a full sentence, say ’P(b)’, i.e. to a confirmation of
either ’P(b)’ or ’∼P(b)’ of such a high degree that he will either accept
or reject ’P(b)’. (Carnap 1936: 454f)
That this is the distinguishing feature of observational terms over theoretical
terms becomes even more explicit in the following passage:
We can, of course, state a rule for any term, no matter what its de-
gree of abstractness, in a form like this: ’the term ’te’ designates tem-
perature’, provided the metalanguage used contains a corresponding
expression (here the word ’temperature’) to specify the designatum
of the term in question. But suppose we have in mind the following
purpose for our syntactical and semantical description of the system
of physics: the description of the system shall teach a layman to un-
derstand it, i.e., to enable him to apply it to his observations in order
to arrive at explanations and predictions. [...] A rule like ’the sign ’P’
designates the property of being blue’ will do for the purpose indi-
cated; but a rule like ’the sign ’Q’ designates the property of being
electrically charged’ will not do. (Carnap 1939: 62)
Here Carnap says that we could adopt the approach Lavers suggests, i.e. to give
a ’realistic’ interpretation of theoretical terms. But he stresses that while this is
possible it is not particularly useful, since the important question about theo-
retical terms is not what they refer to, but rather how they are to be used. For
observational terms like ’blue’, so Carnap supposes, how and when to apply
them is already understood, and so in those cases there is no need for anything
more informative than disquotational application conditions. Not so for theoret-
ical terms, however, especially if they are newly introduced. Bridge principle of
the following kind are therefore crucial:
If x is warmer than y, then the temperature of x is higher than the
temperature of y.
Such principles connect statements involving theoretical terms to already under-
stood statements involving observational vocabulary. Since few theoretical terms
can be explicitly defined in terms of observational terms, however, there will in all
likelihood be cases where the bridge rules do not specify whether a theoretical
term applies or not. And as I understand Carnap, this is precisely the sense in
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which the interpretation of theoretical terms is not complete but merely partial.
While he assumes that for observational terms we can always decide whether
they apply in a particular situation or not, in the case of theoretical terms it will
sometimes be left indeterminate whether they apply. In fact we already encoun-
tered this phenomenon for the special case of disposition predicates in sections
4.1.3 and 7.4.
Whether this is a plausible account of theoretical entities is not something I
want to decide here. But if my interpretation is on the right track, questions of
reference and ontology are actually quite unimportant in spelling out the nature
of the observation language – just as one would have expected, and in spite of
the potentially misleading passages I discussed.
9.3 Making Contact with Reality
The upshot of the previous two sections can be summarised as follows: although
at first sight abstract objects seem to play an important role in Carnap’s ac-
count of the empirical world, this initial impression must be severely qualified.
On closer inspection objects, whether concrete or abstract, do not really play
an explanatory role in how language makes contact with the world at all, and
hence the thesis of hyper-Pythagoreanism is much less strange and radical than
it sounds at first. This observation raises the question whether Beth’s argu-
ment from non-standard models has any relevance to the issues just discussed,
or whether our excursus into the empirical world was a mere digression. In
the following I will argue that there are some aspects of Beth’s criticism that
generalise beyond the philosophy of mathematics.
Considered at a high level of abstraction, one can draw the following lesson
from my interpretation of Beth’s argument. In his published works Carnap tends
to focus on the description and construction of formal linguistic frameworks,
and pays little explicit attention to how these relate to language as it is actually
used. This suggests that the latter question is not important for Carnap’s project,
but Beth’s argument has shown that this is mistaken. Some of the challenges
for Carnap’s position only begin to emerge when we consider the relationship
between formal and natural languages, so anyone interested in an assessment of
Carnap’s position is well-advised to pay special attention to it.
This is a lesson, so I think, that also applies to Carnap’s account of the empir-
ical world. I have repeatedly asserted that, for Carnap, language doesn’t make
contact with reality by an acquaintance relation that connects names with ob-
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jects. But how does hooking up language with reality work then? Suppose we
have constructed a formal calculus which is as yet completely uninterpreted.
Carnap thinks that, if we want to, we can give such a calculus an empirical in-
terpretation, which in turn enables us to use the formal system to talk about the
world. What we need to investigate in more detail, however, is what he means
by ’giving an empirical interpretation’.
Logical Syntax contains a section called ”The Interpretation of a Language”,
which addresses precisely this question. Here interpretation is equated with the
translation of the formal language into a natural language that is assumed to be
already understood:
’P1’ shall be equivalent in meaning to ’red’, ..., ’Pk’ to ’blue’ [...] (Car-
nap 1937a: 230)
One might suppose that the later acceptance of semantic notions, especially ref-
erence, changed Carnap’s conception of interpretation.3 But the differences be-
tween syntactic and semantic period are actually very minor, for while semantic
notions are now being used, the important theoretical work is still done by the
assumption that the background language in which the interpretation is stated
is already understood. Here are two representative examples from Carnap’s
semantic period:
The customary interpretation, i.e., that for whose sake the calculus is
constructed, is given by the following semantical rules. ’lg(x, t)’ des-
ignates the length in centimeters of the body x at the time t (defined
by the statement of a method of measurement) ; ’te(x, t)’ designates
the absolute temperature in centigrades of x at the time t (likewise
defined by a method of measurement); ’th(x)’ designates the coeffi-
cient of thermic expansion for the body x; ’Sol’ designates the class
of solid bodies; ’Fe’ the class of iron bodies. (Carnap 1939: 58)
For example, the rule
(2) "DDese (c1, Blue)"
says that the direct designatum of the constant c1 is the class Blue,
i.e., the class of those positions which are blue. (Carnap 1963b: 900)
3 Beth in fact suggests this to be so (Beth 1963: 484).
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As such there is of course nothing wrong with this approach. It makes perfect
sense to hook up an as-yet meaningless calculus with the real world by means
of another language which has already made contact with reality. But things be-
come more problematic once we begin to wonder how the background language
we use to achieve this task manages to describe an empirical reality in the first
place. It seems that at this point we have two options: either we countenance
a way of giving an interpretation that does not already rely on an interpreted
language, or we regard an interpreted background language as basic, and deny
that there are any useful questions to be asked about how this language relates
to the world.
The second option seems to be the view Wittgenstein endorses in the Tracta-
tus. It is plausible to interpret him as holding that certain fundamental questions
about language that appear sensible, including those about how words relate to
objects, are actually nonsense. For Wittgenstein there is a sense in which we
cannot talk about language at all, since its fundamental features cannot be de-
scribed but merely show themselves. How exactly to understand this doctrine is
very controversial, but it is reasonable to read it as denying the possibility of
investigations into how language makes contact with reality.
It is not likely that Carnap would have approved of this Wittgensteinian view,
however. In Logical Syntax, for instance, he explicitly rejects Wittgenstein’s idea
of unsayability:
According to another opinion (that of Wittgenstein), there exists only
one language, and what we call syntax cannot be expressed at all – it
can only ”be shown.” As opposed to these views, we intend to show
that, actually, it is possible to manage with one language only; not,
however, by renouncing syntax, but by demonstrating that without
the emergence of any contradictions the syntax of this language can
be formulated within this language itself. (Carnap 1937a: 53)
And the same sentiment is still present many years later in Carnap’s Intellectual
Autobiography, from which I already quoted the relevant passage in section
5.2.2. If he does not want to go down the Tractarian route, then, Carnap should
adopt the first option: give an account of how language relates to the world that
does not rely on the existence of an already understood language.
I am not sure whether such an account could be given, but it is clear that
Carnap did not in fact have much interest in pursuing a project of this kind.
The question of how language makes contact with the world was most salient
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during the protocol sentence debate of the early 1930s.4 The details are complex,
but in his interventions Carnap puts most emphasis on the claim that there is
no one true way of formulating protocol-sentences, and seems to regard most
other substantial questions as matters for biology and psychology to investigate,
not philosophers (Carnap 1932). This attitude already seemed unsatisfactory to
some of Carnap’s contemporaries, such as Ernest Nagel, who writes the follow-
ing in a report about the state of philosophy in Europe:
Since Carnap does not believe that science is simply human caprice,
and he does think there are better reasons for acting upon predictions
made on the basis of scientific method than by a clairvoyant, it is es-
sential that he specify more carefully than he has yet done the pro-
cedures involved in arriving at the protocols. Indeed, I think Carnap
has thrown out the baby with the bath in excluding from philosophy
the study of the process of observation through which protocols are
obtained. For while it is legitimate to departmentalize research and
to define logic as the study of syntax, a coherent account of meaning
and knowledge is sacrificed by not considering the more inclusive sit-
uation in which thinking has its origin, development, and terminus.
(Nagel 1936: 45f)
Despite such complaints Carnap did not consider the observational language to
be of great philosophical importance in his later work. In the writings on theo-
retical entities we briefly looked at, for instance, Carnap regards the observation
language as unproblematic and fully understood, and thus quickly proceeds
to talk about the issues he regards as less clear. One will therefore not find a
worked-out account of the language-world relation in Carnap’s writings.
I think that this is an important gap. Whether there is a problem cannot be
decided here, however. Some of Carnap’s contemporaries, in particular Neu-
rath and Quine, were much more interested in this particular issue after all, and
it might well be that their views are compatible with Carnap’s outlook. This
question goes beyond what I can investigate here. I hope to have established,
however, that investigating the relationship between formal frameworks and nat-
ural language is important not only for Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, but
also for his theory of the empirical world.
4 For all the twists and turns of this debate see Uebel 2007.
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9.4 Thomasson’s Easy Ontology
I will end this chapter by briefly considering a contemporary position that can
be described neo-Carnapian: Amie Thomasson’s easy ontology. As before, my
ambition is not to give a comprehensive summary and evaluation of this posi-
tion. I rather want to show that this modern view faces questions about how
contact with the world is made as well, and that Thomasson is not more explicit
about these issues than Carnap was.
Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology is opposed to what has become the
mainstream methodology for doing metaphysics, namely the neo-Quinean view
according to which we can find out what exists by looking at what the quantifiers
of the best overall theory of the world range over (Thomasson 2007, Thomasson
2009, Thomasson 2015). According to Thomasson, the construction and compar-
ison of sophisticated metaphysical theories that is characteristic of this method-
ology is not actually needed. Instead we can answer ontological questions easily
using simple empirical and conceptual means. Here the concept of an application
condition plays a major role: Thomasson thinks that sortal terms such as ’table’
and ’chair’ are associated with conditions of the following form:
(T) ‘Table’ refers iff there are particles arranged table-wise.
Furthermore, she endorses the following link between reference and existence:
(E) Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’
are fulfilled. (Thomasson 2015: 86)
And since Thomasson regards it as an obvious empirical truth that there are
particles arranged table-wise – one that is not even challenged by revisionary
metaphysicians who deny the existence of composite objects – one can establish
that ordinary objects such as tables exist without doing any deep metaphysics.
A lot more could be said about the account than I did in this very brief sketch.
Since this is principally a thesis about Carnap, I only want to comment on the
extent to which Thomasson’s position resembles that of Carnap. Thomasson is
keen to stress the Carnapian origins of her positions, and it is certainly true that
both of them share a deflationary attitude towards ontology and metaphysics. It
must be noted, however, that some aspects of Thomasson’s position are also very
un-Carnapian. As we have seen for Carnap the distinction between linguistic
frameworks with explicit rules, and the informal natural language which does
not uniquely pin down a particular set of rules, is crucial. This distinction makes
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the principle of tolerance possible and gives rise to the need for explications.
Thomasson, on the other hand, seems to think that the linguistic rules which she
calls application conditions can be immediately read off natural language, and
that hence our ordinary concepts commit us to a certain ontology. In response to
ontological questions such as whether there are ordinary objects, her answer is
therefore not ’it depends on what linguistic framework for talk about ordinary
objects we want to accept’, but rather the uncompromising ’yes’.
These un-Carnapian tendencies are especially apparent in her philosophy of
mathematics. Although she doesn’t discuss her account in that much detail, it
does not very much resemble Carnap’s Logical Syntax, but rather seems to be
a form of neo-Fregean logicism, with Thomasson responding to classic problems
such as the bad company objection (Thomasson 2015: chapter 8). Since introduc-
ing neo-Fregeanism would take us too far afield I will therefore set Thomasson’s
philosophy of mathematics aside. Instead I want to mention one aspect of her
view that immediately connects with the topic of the previous section: namely
the role of application conditions in an account of how language makes contact
with reality.
The relevant point is best introduced by considering an objection against easy
ontology recently posed by Andrew Brenner. One principle about application
condition Thomasson endorses is the following:
(¬C) Application conditions must not take the following form: ‘K’
applies iff Ks exist. (While this will always be true, it will not
count as an application condition, in our terms.) (Thomasson
2015: 96)
Based on this, Brenner notes that Thomasson’s view seems to face either an
infinite regress or a problematic kind of circularity. For suppose A is a sortal
with non-trivial application conditions, which means that whether ‘A’ refers or
not cannot be settled on the basis of conceptual truths alone, but requires some
worldly condition to be fulfilled. Due to (¬C), the application conditions for
A cannot be “A’ refers iff As exist’, but rather will have to be something like
“A’ refers iff Bs exist’, for some sortal B. However, whether Bs exist depends
on whether the application conditions associated with ‘B’ are fulfilled. Since
those cannot be “B’ refers iff Bs exist’, another sortal C is needed: “B’ refers iff
Cs exist’. It is easily seen that this reasoning can be repeated indefinitely, and
so there either is an infinite regress, or there must be exceptions to (¬C) after
all. And as Brenner points out, neither option seems acceptable for Thomasson
(Brenner 2018: 4f).
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This argument is watertight if we assume that, necessarily, on the right-hand
side of an application condition for a sortal a different sortal must be invoked.
Things are different, however, if there could be application conditions of the
form
’A’ refers iff Φ,
where Φ expresses a non-trivial condition but doesn’t do so by means of a sortal.
In that case the regress could terminate with application conditions that are
wordly – i.e. require that the world is a certain way rather than another to be
fulfilled – but do not themselves depend on yet further application conditions.
Whether this way out of the regress is an option for Thomasson depends
on what the precise role of sortals and application conditions is supposed to
be on her view. At times it is tempting to read her as saying that sortals with
application conditions are needed for language to make contact with the world at
all. If that is the right reading, then Brenner’s argument is certainly forceful. But
other passages suggest that her actual view is more subtle: while she certainly
thinks that sortals are required to represent the world in terms of persistent
objects with determinate identity-conditions across space and time, Thomasson
also sees room for pre-objectual ways to refer to reality (Thomasson 2015: section
2.3).
Brenner recognises that this is a possible way out:
Perhaps Thomasson can avoid the sort of regress or circularity I’m
pressing by maintaining that there can be sortal terms with non-
trivial application conditions which nevertheless are such that those
application conditions do not appeal to the existence of anything for
their satisfaction. Thomasson makes at least two suggestions that
might be amenable to a view of this sort. In both cases, Thomas-
son aims to specify sufficient application conditions for there being
objects which fall under some sortal K which are such that the suffi-
cient application conditions in question do not appeal to there being
objects of any sort [...] (Brenner 2018: 4)
The first of the two suggestions Brenner alludes to here is to give sortal-free
application conditions by relying on the idea that there is a basic concept of an
object that can be explained purely in terms of perceptual experience. Draw-
ing on research in contemporary psychology, Thomasson argues that there is a
notion of object of experience that even infants can use, and whose application
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conditions won’t involve any sortal. The second approach to give sortal-free
application conditions is to use a feature-placing language (O’Leary-Hawthorne
and Cortens 1995). Using this, we can for instance state the application condi-
tions for cup as follows:
(C) ’Cup’ refers iff it is cupping around here.
Thomasson’s discussions of these two options are quite brief however, and Bren-
ner puts forward objections to both approaches. I do not want to assess whether
these are successful here, however. Even if Thomasson can be defended, Bren-
ner has made an important point: namely that the question of how language
makes contact with reality in the first place is not something a defender of easy
ontology can just set aside, but is rather central to the stability of the position.
Unfortunately – just like Carnap – Thomasson spends comparatively little time
on this topic in her writings.
In fact, Thomasson is not the only neo-Carnapian who has been criticised for
being insufficiently clear about the fundamental question of the language-world
relation. Rayo’s position in The Construction of Logical Space, for instance, resem-
bles Thomasson’s position in that conditionals stating truth-conditions play a
major explanatory role (Rayo 2013). As Jason Turner points out, however, this
cannot be the whole story about how language makes contact with the world,
since the specifications Rayo (and also Thomasson) describe rely on other parts
of language:
Rayo talks quite a lot about ‘truth-conditions,’ and assigning truth-
conditions to sentences. But nowhere in the book do we get a meta-
physics of truth-conditions. We’re told how to ‘specify’ them, but the
specification is of course always simply in terms of other sentences,
which in turn need truth-conditions specified for them, and so on
down the line. There’s no story as to how the linguistic rubber meets
the extra-linguistic road, to get the whole enterprise running down
the track. (Turner 2015: 2614)
This is a slightly unfortunate way of putting the problem, since a metaphysics of
truth-conditions sounds like the kind of thing Carnap and the neo-Carnapians
would want to reject in any case. But, using another metaphor, the point can
be put in such a way that it cannot be ignored as easily: what seems needed is
some story about why our language (in the case of Thomasson) or a linguistic
framework (in the case of Carnap) is not just ”frictionless spinning in the void”
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(McDowell 1994: 11) – i.e. why it is that ”there’s a tiger in a room” is true in
some situations and not others, depending on factors external to language itself.
The gap in Carnap’s account of how language makes contact with the empir-
ical world thus reappears. It seems to me that neo-Carnapians like Thomasson
have two ways to respond: either they could supplement their account by a pos-
itive story, or they could try to dissolve the problem by denying the assumption
that such a story is needed in the first place. I suspect that Thomasson would
prefer the second route, but will not be able to go into this topic here. For now




In this thesis I have argued that Carnap’s anti-metaphysical philosophy of math-
ematics cannot be accepted as it stands. I will conclude by summarising the
possible reactions to this result, assuming that my argument is correct. Some
of these options have already been discussed earlier on, but a concise overview
should be useful for friends and enemies of Carnap’s position alike. During the
course of this thesis our attention has been focused on the problematic aspects
of Carnap’s position, but the range of available theoretical options hopefully
shows that such a critical engagement can give rise to positive impulses for the
philosophy of mathematics.
As I have emphasised several times, my interpretation Carnap’s philosophy
of mathematics is contentious. I think, however, that there are good exegetical
and systematic reasons to read him as accepting the following position: there
is a definition of ’analytic’ which is such that (1) every mathematical sentence,
including undecidable ones such as ConPA, is either determinately analytic or
contradictory, and (2) our linguistic behaviour commits us to the acceptance
of this definition. In section 6.2 I then argued that giving up (2) would turn
Carnap’s position into Wittgenstein’s radical conventionalism, a view that is
universally rejected.
It might of course be that the Wittgensteinian path is more defensible than
has been realised. I am not aware of any contemporary philosopher who ex-
plicitly endorses a version of radical conventionalism, but what comes closest
is probably the idea that mathematical indeterminacy is much more prevalent
than is commonly assumed. Joel Hamkins, for instance, has recently suggested
that the possibility of non-standard models should undermine our confidence in
the claim that there is such a thing as the standard model of arithmetic:
So why are mathematicians so confident that there is an absolute
concept of finite natural number, independent of any set-theoretic
concerns, when all of our categoricity arguments are explicitly set-
theoretic and require one to commit to a background concept of set?
Conclusion Conclusion
My long-term expectation is that technical developments will eventu-
ally arise that provide a forcing analogue for arithmetic, [...] and this
development will challenge our confidence in the uniqueness of the
natural number structure, just as set-theoretic forcing has challenged
our confidence in a unique absolute set-theoretic universe. (Hamkins
2012: 428)5
This would have wide-ranging consequences indeed, since without a fixed con-
ception of the natural numbers other syntactic notions, such as that of a finite
proof, become indeterminate as well. If Hamkin’s view is defensible, then the
arguments from syntax in the previous chapters would loose some of their bite.
I cannot go further into the viability of this option here, but it should be noted
that Hamkin’s account seems to be a revisionary one, and hence does not accord
with Carnap’s ambition to leave classical mathematics as it is.
Suppose we do not want to follow Wittgenstein and Hamkins, and stick to
the assumption that claims about syntax have determinate truth values. One
way to implement this strategy is exceptionalism about arithmetic: the idea being
that while the adoption of other mathematical theories is a matter of pragmatic
decision, arithmetic tracks some genuine features of reality. This is the option
Beth himself seems to have in mind, and, as we saw in section 7.1, can also be
found in the writings of Hofweber and Clarke-Doane. This represents a depar-
ture from Carnap’s global internalism, and so to a certain extent the position
of the external Platonist is vindicated. But, so the hope would be, internalism
about other areas can be saved, and the philosophical questions raised by an
ontology of natural numbers, or facts about them, might be more tractable than
they would be for other kinds of abstract objects.
Nevertheless, it would be much more exciting if Carnap’s own ambitious
form of internalism could be salvaged after all, and there is indeed a glimmer of
hope. As described in section 7.4, recent work by Warren suggests that there is
a way to conceive of infinitary rules on which following them does not require
mysterious non-recursive abilities. If this view is defensible, then using the
ω-rule might be a way to pin down the standard model without relying on
ontology after all. I argued that it is unlikely that this would enable one to retain
Carnap’s original position without any revisions, since Warren’s account seems
to require a more robustly realist account of dispositions than Carnap has to
offer. This kind of departure may be less problematic than other approaches,
5 See https://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-November/020689.html for a critical discus-
sion of this idea.
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however, since an ontology of dispositions seems more tractable by scientific
means than an ontology of abstract objects or mathematical facts.
Lastly, we could try to follow Quine and question Carnap’s basic assumption
that, in order to be compatible with empiricism, mathematics needs to be con-
strued as analytic. In chapter 8 I already flagged a number of potential problems
for Quine’s philosophy of mathematics, but I think that its viability should be
investigated further. Despite seeming quite different on the surface, Quine’s phi-
losophy actually preserves many of Carnap’s most central commitments, such
as his empiricism and the rejection of metaphysical speculation. In light of the
problem Beth poses for Carnap’s own internalism, those who still want to avoid
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